Cutting edge: the evolution of capability advantage in Australian strategic policy discourse 1968-2009 by Hardy, John
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
CUTTING EDGE 
THE EVOLUTION OF CAPABILITY ADVANTAGE IN 
AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POLICY DISCOURSE 
1968-2009 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
of the Australian National University 
94,553 words 
 
 
John Hardy 
October 2015 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Statement of Originality 
 
 
I confirm that the material contained in this thesis is my own original work, and that, to 
the best of my knowledge, it contains no material previously published or written by 
another person, except where due reference is made in the text. 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis was the second-most difficult thing I have ever written. It took the support and 
patience of many people, far more than I could possibly name here. 
I owe a special thanks to my son, Nate, who has suffered my doctoral candidacy for 
almost his entire childhood, and my daughter, Jill, who was born during my candidacy 
and has known no other life. That you were able to bring joy into a life besieged by 
research and writing is a testament to your amazing vitality and loving dispositions. 
To my wife, Brooke, I apologise profusely for inflicting this experience on you. I am 
pleasantly surprised that you still care for me and greatly appreciate your endless patience 
with my years of research-related preoccupation. 
To my father, whom I lost to illness along the way, I wish you were here to pretend to 
read this. I know that you would have tried valiantly, but given up eventually, and would 
have been proud anyway. Probably in that order. 
To my colleagues at the many universities which have so kindly employed me over the 
years, I offer my thanks and appreciation. 
  
 
 
 
 
6 
 
I owe particular thanks to my mentor Jason Flanagan, who supported me tirelessly 
through the four years of my candidacy and kept my children fed through the long 
Canberran winters. 
To my supervisor, Michael Wesley, I owe you my undying gratitude for getting me over 
the line and offering sage counsel at every step of the way. Thankfully, cooler heads 
prevailed at significant decision points along the journey. I attribute that largely to you. 
Your guidance and mentorship have been invaluable to both my candidature and personal 
development. 
And to everyone else, the unnamed heroes who suffered me throughout the years, I salute 
you. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Abstract 
Capability edge is one of the most expensive ideas that Australian politicians have ever 
had. The notion of using technology to offset demographic and economic limitations on 
Australia’s military emerged in the early 1970s alongside the concept of defence self-
reliance. It began as a means to bolster Australia’s credibility as a regional security 
partner as British security commitments to Southeast Asia waned. By the twenty-first 
century it became a recurring policy concept and featured in public statements and 
diplomatic signals at the highest levels of government. Although the need for an ‘edge’ in 
military capability was articulated consistently in policy and political statements, the 
meaning of the concept changed over time. This evolution provides insight into key 
strategic policy decisions and offer lessons for scholars, policymakers and analysts alike, 
but has not been directly examined. 
  
This thesis traces transformations of the concept of an edge from its emergence in the 
1970s through to the twenty-first century. It conducts a comparative analysis of publicly-
released policy documents and archival records of speeches made by Prime Ministers and 
Ministers for Defence in order to identify the ways in which the concept evolved and how 
transformations were represented in political statements. It finds that three conceptual 
links were crucial in the evolution of the edge. The first was the link between credibility 
and technological advantage which emerged in the early 1970s and cemented the notion 
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that technology mitigated Australia’s strategic deficiencies. The second was the gradual 
entrenchment of the principle that Australia required a degree of relative advantage, 
which created a narrative of confidence that was based on the condition of superiority. 
The third was the explicit link between technology and quality which occurred in the late 
1990s and conceptually mapped the concept of advantage, which had changed 
significantly from its origins, back to credibility. 
 
These processes have created a conceptual trap in which expectations of Australia’s 
defence policy risk becoming untenable but have been a fundamental tenet of the 
dominant defence narrative for so long that it will be a serious challenge to change the 
discourse to accommodate new realities. The evolution of the edge is a cautionary tale to 
the extent that there remains a significant risk of incurring enormous expenses in pursuit 
of an objective which gained prominence in a different policy context. As regional 
militaries modernise, they will in combination, if not individually in some cases, eclipse 
Australia’s capacity to retain an edge. This will challenge a political idea which has 
become a principal element of defence force structure planning, a core measure of the 
standard of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and a key expectation of the Australian 
public. Understanding the evolution of the edge from its inception to 2009 is crucial to 
making an informed decision about the next evolution of capability edge. 
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Introduction  
Pursuing a qualitative advantage in military technology is among the most expensive 
ideas that Australian politicians have ever had. The Commonwealth Government spends 
billions of dollars every year on acquiring and maintaining cutting edge defence 
technology. Currently planned major capital expenditure projects are by far the most 
expensive in Australia’s history. 1  Nonetheless, successive governments have upheld 
commitments to ensure that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is equipped with high 
technology weapons and communications systems. This practice began in the 1960s and 
has intensified significantly since. The rationale for maintaining a high-technology 
defence force emerged in Australian strategic policy during the late 1960s and early 
1970s, largely in response to significant changes in the strategic environment in Southeast 
Asia caused or exacerbated by the waning interest of the United States of America (US) 
and Great Britain. Emphasis on Australia’s advanced technological and industrial 
capacity paralleled the emergence of the concept of self-reliance in defence at first. 
                                                 
1 See Department of Defence, "Defence Capability Plan 2009: December 2010 Update," Public version 
(Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2010). 
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However, by the late 1970s technological advantage had become a discrete policy 
concept. 
 
Since its introduction in the Australia’s 1976 defence white paper2 the stated rationale for 
qualitative advantage has evolved, both in strategic policy and in policy guidance 
delivered publicly by senior politicians. The broad conceptual family of qualitative 
advantage in military capability stems from a general idea of an edge in military 
technology that emerged and evolved throughout the period 1968-2009. For the purposes 
of this study, this time frame will be broadly labelled the era of self-reliance, referring to 
the prominence of defence self-reliance in Australian strategic policy.3 Throughout the 
era of self-reliance a focus on high-technology military capability and relative advantage 
in qualitative terms has underpinned the evolving concept of an edge. An umbrella term 
for the concept under examination is relative qualitative advantage in military capability 
and systems. For the purpose of clarity this can be shortened to: relative advantage. The 
concept of relative advantage has featured prominently in discussions regarding 
Australia’s force structure and posture, major acquisitions and strategic policy. 4 It has 
been used as a rhetorical device to structure and frame policy debates and is now central 
in Australia’s defence lexicon. 
 
                                                 
2 Australian Defence, Defence White Paper (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976). 
3 See Hugh White, "Four Decades of the Defence of Australia: Reflections on Australian Defence Policy 
over the Past 40 Years,"  History as Policy, ed. Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher (Canberra: 
ANU ePress, 2007). 
4 For example, see Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia  (Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1987), para. 3.15. 
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The relationship between rhetoric and reality is a long-standing feature of strategy. 
Language shapes strategy because it can direct or misdirect military effort, it can isolate 
enemies and motivate allies, it can galvanise a society toward a common purpose and it 
can attract support from neutral parties. For this reason, Shy and Collier contend that ‘the 
rhetoric of political conflict becomes the reality of political theory.’5 Rhetoric is equally 
important in strategic policy as it is in strategy and theory. The concepts that are used in 
strategic policy discourse can shape and constrain the avenues of action available to 
political actors.6  But these concepts are not static. Once introduced into the strategic 
policy corpus, 7  concepts are influenced by the instruments, forces and people who 
implement policy programs.8 Concepts evolve over time, often through institutional and 
political discourse. The causes for conceptual evolution often reveal important contextual 
processes which can exert influence on the policy cycle and explain policy changes in 
greater detail than descriptive historical approaches. 
 
The purpose of this research is to examine the evolution of an idea employed in 
Australia’s strategic policy discourse in order to understand how it has been 
conceptualised since its inception and what factors may have influenced its 
transformation. The thesis investigates the evolution of a frequently deployed but hitherto 
under-examined political concept from two perspectives: as a rhetorical device employed 
                                                 
5 John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, "Revolutionary War,"  Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to 
the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986), 821. 
6 Jeffrey H. Michaels, The Discourse Trap and the Us Military: From the War on Terror to the Surge  (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).; Shy and Collier, "Revolutionary War," 821-22. 
7  Tony Bastow, "Defence Discourse II: A Corpus Perspective on Routine and Rhetoric in Defence 
Discourse,"  Language and Power: An Introduction to Institutional Discourse, ed. Andrea Mayr 
(London and New York: Continuum, 2008). 
8 Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "From Ideology to Program to Policy: Tracking the Carter Human Rights Policy," 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 2, no. 1 (1982): 2. 
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by political actors and as a concept used in policy documents. It articulates the concept of 
relative advantage used in policy documents and traces the coevolution of relative 
advantage in policy documents and policy statements throughout the period of defence 
self-reliance. It then identifies relationships between relative advantage and other 
concepts which have dominated strategic policy discourse during the period 1968-2009. 
Such examination of relative advantage contributes to existing debates by introducing 
unique data and a different perspective to inform policy formulation and analysis. This 
research does not intend to present a critique of relative advantage as a policy or to 
provide an historical narrative of the development of policy within the Department of 
Defence (Defence), bureaucracy. There are rich and complex stories of how specific 
technology and force structure policies were developed within Defence, but they fall 
outside the scope of this study.  
 
Research problem 
A technology-based edge in military capability is an idea that emerged in Australian 
defence policy in the late twentieth century. It has been employed in political rhetoric to 
justify billions of dollars in expenditure, to reinforce perceptions of Australia’s military 
professionalism to domestic and international audiences and to validate force structure 
planning and concepts of operations for the ADF. The fundamental principle of investing 
in high-technology or ‘cutting edge’9 military platforms and systems has become widely 
                                                 
9  Defence Material Organisation, "Priority Industry Capability Innovation Program,"  
http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/picip/.; "Building Defence Capability: A Policy for a Smarter 
and More Agile Defence Industry Base," (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2010), 85-91. 
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accepted by politicians, the bureaucracy and the Australian public.10 The 2009 defence 
white paper explicitly prioritised investment in the exploitation and application of ‘new 
advanced technologies’11 in order to offset some of Australia’s strategic constraints,12 
chief among them an exceptionally weak force-to-space ratio. 13  Although relative 
advantage is not the only solution presented, it is a significant conceptual approach to 
mitigating the disparity between Australia’s geographical responsibilities, delineated by a 
large continental landmass and extensive maritime patrol zones, and the size and capacity 
of the ADF. As a result, emphasis on the need for a ‘strategic edge’14 has become a 
largely unchallenged principle in policy and academic debates regarding Australian 
strategic policy. Given the gravity of some decisions founded on the policy principle that 
Australia needs to maintain a ‘strategic capability advantage,’15 deeper analysis of the 
idea of relative advantage is warranted. 
 
References to the need for an ‘edge’16 in defence policy debates and in recent defence 
policy documents17 often allude to the use of qualitative superiority to offset quantitative 
deficiencies or to mitigate limitations such as Australia’s small population and economy, 
                                                 
10 Department of Defence, "Looking over the Horizon: Australians Consider Defence," (Canberra: Defence 
Publishing Service, 2008), pp.13-17. 
11 "Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030," Defence white paper (Canberra: Defence 
Publishing Service, 2009), para 8.57. 
12 Ibid., para 8.54. 
13 Michael Evans, "Australia and the Quest for the Knowledge Edge," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 30 (2002): 
43. 
14  Desmond J. Ball, ed. Maintaining the Strategic Edge : The Defence of Australia in 2015, Canberra 
Papers on Strategy and Defence No 133 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1998). 
15 Department of Defence, "Force 2030," para 8.53. 
16 Ross Babbage, "Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030," Kokoda Paper No 15 (Canberra: Kokoda Foundation, 
2011).; Ball, Maintaining the Strategic Edge : The Defence of Australia in 2015. 
17 For example, the 2009 defence white paper has a section entitled ‘maintaining a strategic capability 
advantage’ Department of Defence, "Force 2030," 66. 
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demographic trends and low levels of public support for a significantly larger ADF.18 But 
the notions of capability and edge used are imprecise and inconsistent across policy 
documents and literature. The term is used in two distinct contexts which are often 
conflated in debate concerning relative advantage. In the first instance capability is a 
categorical term and refers to an individual piece of hardware. For example, a Main Battle 
Tank may be referred to as a capability. In the second instance, capability is used to infer 
the capacity to achieve a policy outcome.19 Precisely what kind of edge should be pursued 
is unclear and includes a diverse range of options: capability edge, technological edge, 
knowledge edge, information edge and decision edge.20 
 
A dominant technocratic rationale 21  has developed in Australia’s strategic policy 
discourse and has been used to justify large capital expenditure in capability debates, the 
acquisition of in-service military platforms and in current procurement policy.22 Yet, the 
validity of the strategic imperative to pursue relative advantage has not been substantiated 
or debated in policy, strategic guidance from political leaders or through policy analysis.23 
This suggests that the underlying principle of relative advantage, a perceived need for 
                                                 
18 Ibid., paras 8.53-8.55, 8.63. 
19 The Defence Organisation uses the term Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC) to explicitly outline the 
conception of capability used in official policy. For further explanation, see "The Strategy 
Framework," (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2010). 
20 Martin Burke, "Information Superiority, Network Centric Warfare and the Knowledge Edge," Technical 
Report (DSTO-TR-0997) (Canberra: Defence Science and Technology Organisation, 2000). 
21 Technocracy is not unique to matters of Defence and is prevalent in a wide variety of public policy 
debates. See Alan Fenna, Australian Public Policy  (Sydney: Pearson Longman, 2004), 11. 
22 Department of Defence, "Defence Capability Plan 2009: December 2010 Update."; Mark Thomson, "The 
Cost of Defence: Aspi Defence Budget Brief 2008-09," (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute, 2008).; Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, "Australian Defence 
Procurement," The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1979). 
23 According to Mark Thomson, ‘strategic guidance sets out the approach that Australia will employ to 
defend itself and protect its interests.’ Mark Thomson, "The Challenge of Coherence: Strategic 
Guidance, Capability, and Budgets,"  History as Policy, ed. Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher 
(Canberra: ANU ePress, 2007), 139.  
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Australia to maintain a defence force that is technologically advanced relative to potential 
adversaries, 24  has become entrenched in the way key policy-makers understand 
Australia’s strategic circumstances and needs. In this sense, it is an institutional idea: an 
idea which is embedded in the logic common to an institution which is self-reinforcing.25 
In Searle’s terminology, this situation represents an institutional fact: social facts which 
are common to a group and are often self-referential in the sense that they create the 
circumstances they represent.26 Thus, for an institutional fact to exist, it must be accepted 
as existing. This is different to objective facts, which are true without agreement or 
consensus.27 
 
Viewing relative advantage as an institutional idea or fact highlights the role that it may 
play in shaping perceptions of Australia’s circumstances. This is important because 
institutional facts underwrite the perceptions of key decision-makers.28 Political ideas in 
general, including institutional facts, also underpin constellations of concepts which 
frame the ways in which political actors interpret events. 29  Political leaders, like all 
                                                 
24 It is important to note that the specific adversaries envisaged in this concept have changed over time. This 
is discussed at greater length in chapter 2. 
25 Terrence J. McDonald, "Institutionalism and Institutions in the Stream of History," Polity 28, no. 1 
(1995): 132.; see also Vivien A. Schmidt, "Analyzing Ideas and Tracing Discursive Interactions in 
Institutional Change: From Historical Institutionalism to Discursive Institutionalism," American 
Political Science Association Annual Meeting (Washington, DC2010). 
26 John R. Searle, The Social Construction of Reality  (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 34. 
27 For example, a mountain remains the same geographical feature regardless of whether or not people agree 
what it is. Conversely, money has no inherent value and is only valuable to the extent that people 
in a community agree to attribute value to it. See ibid., 32-33. 
28  Marijke Breuning, Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction  (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), 54. 
29 Judith Goldstein and Robert O.  Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,"  Ideas 
and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O.  
Keohane (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 12-14. 
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human beings, have interpretive schemes which they use to understand policy issues.30 
These perceptions are influenced by institutional facts and contexts and, once entrenched, 
they often endure despite changing circumstances because they provide the basis for an 
individual’s conception of the world.31 The ideas which inform a leader’s worldview are 
important to understanding their decision-making process because ideas influence policy 
agendas, validate assumptions about political issues and can legitimate particular 
institutions or policies.32 
 
Because leaders approach policy challenges within the context of their individual 
worldview, knowledge, values and experience, political ideas like relative advantage can 
potentially be integral to key decisions even if they do not have a direct bearing on the 
issue at hand. A concept that reflects the scope of the influence that longstanding ideas 
can have on the policy process is Vickers’ appreciative system, which encapsulates the 
combination of ‘values, preferences, norms and ideas’ used by humans to understand the 
world.33 
 
The role of relative advantage in influencing policy it is not limited to a matter of 
perception. It is also active in shaping and influencing policy decisions, primarily through 
discourse. Leaders use terms which re-emerge in political rhetoric and can influence 
                                                 
30 Susan T. Fiske and Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition: From Brains to Culture  (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage, 2013), 6-7.; see also Geoffrey Vickers, Making Institutions Work  (New York: Wiley, 1973), 
122. 
31 Breuning, Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction, 54. 
32 Daniel Beland, "Ideas, Institutions, and Policy Change," Journal of European Public Policy 16, no. 5 
(2009): 704-05.; see also: Paul J. Quirk, "Book Reviews: Public Policy," Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management 5, no. 3 (1986). 
33 Martin Rein and Donald A. Schon, "Reframing Policy Discourse,"  The Argumentative Turn in Policy 
Analysis and Plannign, ed. Frank Fischer and John Forester (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1993), 146. 
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institutions by legitimating certain ideas and values.34 The rhetoric of speeches, memos 
and guidance delivered by leaders can legitimate specific terms and ideas in four ways: 
institutional or personal authority, by reference to value systems, by reference to goals 
and exercise of institutional action and through political narrative which reward 
legitimate ideas and punish defection.35 In particular, the legitimation of ideas and terms 
through policy narrative, which marginalises defection from key concepts,36 can create a 
dominant discourse in which it is difficult to challenge or alter ideas. In this context 
relative advantage represents a dominant discourse and potentially a self-fulfilling 
construct; a phenomenon which Michaels labels a ‘discourse trap.’37 A discourse trap 
occurs when rhetorical signals create expectation or obligations which constrain policy-
makers’ agency by delegitimising certain decision options or undermining the credibility 
of particular courses of action.38 This is significant because dominant discourses can be 
difficult to challenge or change and can limit the policy responses available to decision-
makers. 
 
                                                 
34 Martin Reisigl, "Rhetoric of Political Speeches,"  Handbook of Communication in the Public Sphere, ed. 
Ruth Wodak and Veronika Koller (Berlin and New york: Mouton de Gruyter, 2008), 246-47, 58. 
35 Theo van Leeuwen, Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Analysis  (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008).; see also Maarten A. Hajer and David Laws, "Ordering through Discourse,"  The 
Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, ed. Michael J. Moran, Martin Rein, and Robert E. Goodin 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). and Michael van Eeten, J. G., "Narrative Policy 
Analysis,"  Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods, ed. Frank Fischer, 
Gerald J. Miller, and Mara S. Sidney (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2006). 
36 Fairclough elaborates on this in his discussion of the technologisation of discourse, one aspect of which is 
the standardisation of discourse practices. See Norman Fairclough, "The Technologisation of 
Discourse,"  Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis, ed. Carmen Rosa 
Caldas-Coulthard and Malcolm Coulthard (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 73, 77. 
37 Michaels, The Discourse Trap and the Us Military. 
38 Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, "The Eu and Ukraine: Rhetorical Entrapment?," European Security 15, no. 
2 (2006): 116-18.; James Gardner March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The 
Organizational Basis of Politics  (New York: Free Press, 1989), 23. 
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Using discourse to shape the ideas used in institutions to create and implement policy 
represents a valuable aspect of control over a political discourse and the policy it informs. 
Such control is widely recognised as a symbolic resource which defines the powerbase of 
an institution.39 Political discourse becomes the basis for institutional ideas which, in this 
context, constitute lenses used by government agencies to interpret policy issues and 
potential solutions, thus reinforcing the discourse trap phenomena. For example, Michaels’ 
examination of US rhetoric in reference to the War on Terror demonstrates that ‘…the 
political-military discourse motivated and constrained, rather than merely reflected, the 
way in which strategy was formulated and operations were conducted.’ 40  Frequent 
reinforcement of a dominant discourse through pervasive institutional adoption makes it 
very difficult to challenge the political concepts associated with the discourse within a 
bureaucratic knowledge community.41  Because the discourse employs political concepts 
that contain the fundamental assumptions, conceptual tools and appreciative systems used 
to interpret policy issues and formulate policy, the range of options perceived by actors 
and the prioritisation of policy issues becomes skewed and this constrains policy action.42 
 
Political discourse is a powerful tool. It can legitimate and reinforce institutional ideas 
which underpin policy paradigms. Relative advantage can be conceptualised as an 
                                                 
39 Teun A. Van Dijk, "Critical Discourse Analysis,"  Handbook of Communication in the Public Sphere, ed. 
Ruth Wodak and Veronika Koller (Berlin and New york: Mouton de Gruyter, 2008), 355. 
40 Michaels, The Discourse Trap and the Us Military, 16. 
41 Tanja A. Börzel, "Organizing Babylon - on the Different Conceptions of Policy Networks," Public 
Administration 76, no. 2 (1998).; Jerald Hage, Jonathon E. Mote, and Gretchen B. Jordan, "Ideas, 
Innovations, and Networks: A New Policy Model Based on the Evolution of Knowledge," Policy 
Sciences 46, no. 2 (2013). 
42 Charlotte Linde, "Narrative in Institutions,"  Handbook of Discourse Analysis, ed. Deborah Schriffin, 
Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 519-21.; Ellen M. 
Immergut, "Institutional Constraints on Policy,"  The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, ed. 
Michael J. Moran, Martin Rein, and Robert E. Goodin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
565-67. 
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institutional idea that has been incorporated into the current approach to conceiving 
strategic issues and appropriate policy responses. That paradigm fundamentally shapes 
Australia’s strategic outlook and is, therefore, of paramount significance to understanding 
Australian defence policy. This raises several contingent questions. First, has relative 
advantage been used in discourse as a prescriptive concept or a descriptor? In other words, 
is relative advantage a concept that is applied in force structure planning and then 
reported on or is it shorthand used to explain decisions already made for other reasons? 
Second, is relative advantage used in rhetoric by policy-makers for reasons which are not 
related to force planning? Some other purposes for relative advantage could include 
reassuring or deterring other states and validating defence expenditure to the Australian 
public. Third, has relative advantage created a discourse trap in which Australia has 
explicitly linked its credibility and force structure planning to advanced military 
technology to the extent that opposition is discouraged or marginalised? 
 
There is no simple answer to any of these questions. However, they do raise an important 
avenue of inquiry for this research. As there has been surprisingly little debate about what 
relative advantage means in the Australian defence policy literature, it is important to 
understand the degree to which relative advantage has been used in policy discourse 
primarily for its ostensible purpose (a strategic concept used for planning purposes) or for 
other purposes. It is equally critical to examine how certain political actors may have used 
the concept to mean different things and may have contributed to the conceptual 
evolution of the idea. Most political rhetoric, public domain policy documents and 
external analyses have seemingly taken the premises of relative advantage for granted. 
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The combination of intuitive appeal and the employment of the concept as an intrinsic 
feature of sophisticated strategic debate have served to legitimate relative advantage in 
Australian strategic policy discourse. Relative advantage is sufficiently entrenched to 
circumscribe debate to its own terms and this circumstance warrants deeper exploration. 
There is no substantive debate about what relative advantage means in the twenty first 
century, how it has evolved since its introduction or what goals it is intended to achieve. 
But there ought to be. 
 
Research significance 
The questionable implications of assuming that a qualitative edge has inherent strategic 
value suggest that relative advantage is a dubious policy concept in these narrow terms. 
This begs the question: does the concept of relative advantage have other uses, beyond 
purely strategic imperative? The literature on strategy and strategic communication 
indicates that strategy plays various policy roles: some material, some functional and 
some communicative.43 A rhetorical view of conceptual change suggests that it is not 
possible to construct an autonomous history of concepts.44 Because concepts are imbued 
with meaning in their use, they contain no inherent meaning in themselves and can only 
be studied through their application in discourse.45 This approach has been employed in a 
similar way by Bousquet, who argued that technology ‘is first and foremost a tool and one 
                                                 
43 Stephen Biddle, "Strategy in War," Political Science and Politics 40, no. 03 (2007).; James P. Farwell, 
Persuasion and Power: The Art of Strategic Communication  (Washington, DC: Georgetwon 
University Press, 2012). 
44 Kari Palonen, "Quentin Skinner's Rhetoric of Conceptual Change," History of the Human Sciences 10, no. 
2 (1997): 72. 
45 Quentin Skinner, "A Reply to My Critics,"  Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics, ed. 
James Tully (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 283. 
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that only takes on meaning and purpose within the specific social and cultural formations 
in which it is deployed.’ 46  In this instance, the central concept under study is not 
technology, but the idea of relativity in the ability to wield technology for military 
purposes. 
 
Taking a rhetorical view supports a central contention of this thesis: that there is not one 
concept of relative advantage, but several. Firstly, the concept has transformed over time 
and different iterations of the concept have distinctive features that are related to other 
elements of policy. Secondly, even within periods in which the concept has remained 
reasonably consistent in conceptualisation, it has been deployed for different purposes 
when communicated to different audiences. This suggests that the use of relative 
advantage in rhetoric has a value of its own and that, in order to understand the concept of 
relative advantage, it is necessary to understand the ways in which it has been exercised 
in policy and strategic communication. Political concepts are transformed by changes in 
the meaning attributed to them by agents. Consequently, there can be no fixed meanings 
associated with concepts as they are relative to their context.47 Therefore, it is essential to 
examine the political use of the relative advantage concept in order to understand its 
transformation in policy. 
 
Understanding the evolution of the relative advantage concept is significant for three 
reasons. Firstly, there has been no investigation into the concept in order to define or 
                                                 
46 Antoine Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity  
(London: Hurst and Company, 2009), 2. 
47 Frank Fischer, Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 49. 
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conceptualise it; essentially it has been accepted as self-evident. However, the specific 
meanings of: a) the term strategic capability advantage; b) the strategic benefit that 
relative advantage provides; and c) the logic of the causal mechanism between quality of 
high-technology weapons and systems and military capability, are elusive. This in itself is 
a serious concern for future policy analysis within and outside government. If future 
defence policy is to include a conception of relative advantage, then it should be more 
clearly defined and rationalised than its precedents. Furthermore, if the use of the 
concepts related to relative advantage in former defence policy is to be examined, then 
understanding the origins and conceptual evolution of the concept is essential.  In addition, 
the validity of any future application of the concept is contingent on comprehensive 
analysis of transformations in the conceptualisation of relative advantage and the strategic 
context of conceptual changes.  
 
Secondly, although the concept of relative advantage has demonstrably changed over time, 
the change has not been overtly addressed in policy. This indicates that the relative 
advantage has been considered relevant to strategic guidance and communication in the 
same way despite conceptual changes that may have altered its relevance to or 
relationship with guidance. It is germane that the concept has varied in close parallel with 
shifts in Australia’s broader strategic policy. In particular, the way that the role of 
technology has been conceptualised in force structure planning and capability 
development has mirrored changes in the strategic policy context of relative advantage.  
Links between strategy, force structure, doctrine and the precept of relative advantage 
illuminate the political utility of frames used by various actors at different times 
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throughout the era of self-reliance. They also explain why fundamental changes in 
Australia’s approach to relative advantage were subsumed by broader strategic debates 
relating to strategy and force development priorities, particularly in the highly 
transformative decades on either side of the end of the Cold War. 
 
Thirdly, the ways in which the concept of relative advantage has been deployed in policy, 
strategic guidance and political communication throughout the period 1970-2010 has not 
been examined in any other study. Changes in the political discourse of relative advantage 
have not been analysed or explained. This is possibly the most significant aspect of the 
research, because the ways in which relative advantage has been communicated by 
government in policy and by political leaders in guidance and public communication 
contain distinct uses of the concept, often aimed at different audiences for divergent 
purposes. This is salient to the history of relative advantage because astute political agents 
are able to deliberately transform the political concepts they employ in order to ensure 
that their concepts cohere with their policy or politics.48  Understanding the chimeric 
nature of relative advantage in political discourse will enable deeper analysis of 
conceptual undercurrents in strategic guidance that influence and shape the development 
of defence policy. 
 
The current lack of a specific definition of relative advantage requires redress. The most 
useful way to holistically analyse the conceptual evolution of the idea of relative 
advantage is to examine its use as a strategic precept, a policy tool and a means of 
                                                 
48 Don Herzog, "Books in Review: Transforming Political Discourse," Political Theory 19, no. 1 (1991): 
141. 
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strategic communication. As a strategic concept, relative advantage has evolved alongside 
technological developments. This is consistent with Australia’s incorporation of 
technology into its strategy and its self-image as a small but highly capable military 
power, able to ‘punch above its weight’49  due to qualitative superiority. As a policy 
implement, relative advantage has enabled government to simultaneously reassure the 
public that the ADF is capable of defending Australia and justify expenditure on high-
cost and high-end major weapons. As a communicative tool, relative advantage has 
proven useful in signalling Australia’s intentions regarding the use of force and the 
ADF’s military expertise to security partners and potential adversaries alike.50 Knowledge 
of, firstly, each of the various facets of relative advantage and, secondly, how each of 
these facets cohere into a single concept will be important to historical and forward-
looking policy analysis regarding Australian strategy, force structure priorities and 
capability development debates. 
 
Chapter structure 
The thesis consists of five substantive chapters. The first chapter examines conceptual 
transformation in political discourse, reviews literature on Australia’s strategic policy to 
establish the ideational context of relative advantage and explains the research 
                                                 
49 Mark Thomson, "Punching above Our Weight? Australia as a Middle Power," (Canberra: Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute, 2005).;Paul Kelly, "Punching above Our Weight," Policy 20, no. 2 
(2004).; Albert Palazzo, "The Myth That Australia 'Punches above Its Weight',"  Anzac's Dirty 
Dozen: Twelve Myths of Australian Military History, ed. Craig Stockings (Sydney: New South 
Publishing, 2012). 
50 Australian Defence Force, "Australia's Approach to Warfare," (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 
2002), 19-20. 
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methodology and data collection and analysis methods. The remaining chapters present 
data and analysis from discrete time periods and constitute the main body of the thesis. 
 
Chapter one presents the concept of relative advantage as a political idea. It substantiates 
the basic premise of the research by establishing links between policy narratives and 
policy change in order to demonstrate that specific narratives can influence change in 
policy ideas and policies. Chapter one examines the methodological issues involved in a 
history of ideas approach to inquiry and discusses the challenges associated with 
interpreting policy narratives and identifying and analysing causation in political rhetoric. 
It then explains the rationale for the data used in the analysis and details the data 
collection and reduction methods used to process the data set into its final form. Finally, 
chapter one explains the methods used in the analysis by explicating the research 
questions and variables, detailing the coding scheme used to identify and track specific 
concepts throughout the data and providing data sheets which validate the research model 
used. 
 
The core chapters, two through five, each examine one period of conceptual 
transformation within the era of self-reliance. The relative advantage concept is not taken 
to be static in each period; rather periods are distinct due to fundamental differences in 
the way concepts of technology and advantage were conceptualised in political discourse. 
Chapter two covers the period from 1968, when self-reliance began to emerge, through 
the 1970s, where the concept of the technological level fuelled significant debate about 
the capacity of Australia to use high-tech weapons and military systems to defend itself, 
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to 1978. Chapter three begins in 1979 when the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan both 
shook and confirmed many assumptions which Australian defence policy community had 
held about the international strategic environment. It covers the extensive defence debates 
of the early 1980s through to1986, when the iconic Dibb review was submitted to 
government. Chapter four covers the period from 1987, beginning with the release of The 
Defence of Australia,51 through the force structure review and strategic policy debate of 
the 1990s, finishing in 1996 with the change of government. Chapter five covers the 
period from 1997, beginning with the release of Australia’s Strategic Policy,52 through 
the defence updates and renewed force structure debate of the 2000s,53 and concludes in 
2009, coinciding with the release of Force 2030.54 
 
Each core chapter contains five sections. The first section identifies relevant key political 
actors and their communication styles for each time period. The personal clashes and 
agendas of individual actors provides significant context for examining the content of 
their rhetoric in relation to strategic policy. The second section of each chapter provides 
an overview of the strategic context of the period under examination. The range of 
sources used to establish the political context of each period is wider than the data 
analysis. In addition to the Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) data set, it also includes 
academic literature, policy documents which were not immediately released to the public 
                                                 
51 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia. 
52 Australia's Strategic Policy  (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1997). 
53 Alan Dupont, "Transformation or Stagnation? Rethinking Australia's Defence," Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 57, no. 1 (2003); "Our Forces Must First Be Functional," The Australian, 14 
Apr 2009; Hugh White, "Australian Defence Policy and the Possibility of War," Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 2 (2002); "A Focused Force: Australia's Defence Priorities 
in the Asian Century," Lowy Institute Paper No 26 (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International 
Policy, 2009). 
54 Department of Defence, "Force 2030." 
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or widely disseminated, research generated by government or military agencies and think 
tank policy analyses. The chapters then analyse three elements of the political discourse 
regarding relative advantage in separate sections. The third section of each chapter is the 
policy context in which the concept transformed and measures the scope and referent 
actor(s) associated with relative advantage. The fourth section is a survey of the dominant 
institutional ideas 55  about the role of technology in Australia’s force posture which 
influenced the way in which relative advantage transformed. The final section is the 
strategic communication of the concept to international audiences for purposes of 
deterrence to potential aggressors and credibility to allies and to domestic audiences for 
the purpose of justifying defence policies and expenditure and reassurance that the ADF 
is capable of defending Australia. 
 
The purpose of each chapter is to capture the evolution of the concept of relative 
advantage in its strategic policy, institutional and communicative contexts within each 
period. As such, each coding node tree corresponds to one section of the core chapters 
and to one of the three subordinate questions identified in the research design. The data is 
presented in each subsection of the core chapters as a table of figures and illustrative 
examples of text from documents and transcripts to show the data in their original context 
and to allow deeper analysis of the data. 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 John L. Campbell, "Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy," Theory and 
Society 27, no. 3 (1998).; Robert C. Lieberman, "Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: 
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Chapter 1  
Research design 
The concept of relative advantage is not easily linked to policy action. Relative advantage 
represents a broad aim for force structure planning, yet there is little evidence of its 
impact on specific procurement decisions. At the same time the idea of relative advantage 
has been a recurring theme in Australian defence policy for decades. This supports the 
widely-held belief that ideas matter in policy,56 but it does not account for how much 
certain ideas matter to particular policies or political discourses. This research examines 
the evolution of a particular idea employed in Australia’s strategic policy discourse in 
order to understand how it has been conceptualised since its inception and what factors 
may have influenced its transformation. The research has been designed to identify and 
account for the process of conceptual change, but does not seek to determine causation at 
each stage of conceptual change.57 
 
                                                 
56 Alan Finlayson, "Political Science, Political Ideas and Rhetoric," Economy and Society 33, no. 4 (2004): 
530-36.; Frank R. Baumgartner, "Ideas and Policy Change," Governance 26, no. 2 (2013); Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, "Why and How Ideas Matter,"  Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, 
ed. Charles Tilly and Robert E. Goodin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
57 This is consistent with process-tracing methodology used to identify patterns and events in unstructured 
historical data and within the scope of the thesis. Identify causal explanations of conceptual is only 
become possible after process-tracing has occurred. 
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The need to identify and trace the process of evolution in relative advantage is an 
important first step towards understanding the causal processes which influenced the 
changes observed, particularly where political actors used the idea in contrary ways. For 
example, in the 1970s, relative advantage was seen as a way to mitigate Australia’s 
strategic limitations, in particular the lack of large numbers of personnel. By 1995, Robert 
Ray claimed that Australia ‘had a traditional technological edge within our region which 
has allowed us to have a small standing force.’58 The reversal of causation in the stated 
rationale for maintaining relative advantage indicates that the concept was understood 
very differently at different stages of its evolution. This is an important phenomenon 
because political statements can have significant effects in shaping and constraining 
policy by mapping specific concepts or values into policy objectives. Political statements 
can also create rhetorical entrapment,59 a situation in which political actors are held to 
account against their previous assertions or commitments and have, often inadvertently, 
linked their legitimacy or credibility to a particular path of action. 60  As such, 
understanding the narratives used to validate assumptions, expectations and value 
judgments represented in policy is an important component of understanding tides of 
policy change across decades. 
 
At the broadest methodological level, this research conducts an historical examination of 
the evolution of the concept of relative advantage. The historical examination of the 
                                                 
58 Robert F. Ray, "Defence into the Future: Maintaining the Edge," Address (Canberra: National Press Club, 
1995), 3. 
59 Michaels’ term discourse trap refers to a situation in which concepts in discourse legitimise certain 
actions and delegitimise others. Rhetorical entrapment is where actors’ credibility is challenged on 
the basis of their former commitments. 
60  Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern 
Enlargement of the European Union," International Organization 55, no. 1 (2001): 72-76. 
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evolution of a political concept in policy and discourse necessitates a form of process 
tracing methodology. The research design of this thesis incorporates a ‘history of ideas’61 
approach at the methodological level to capture the conceptual transformation of relative 
advantage throughout the period under study. A QDA research model is used to capture 
and analyse empirical data drawn from the official Australian defence policy discourse 
during the era of self-reliance. Finally, themes identified through narrative analysis are 
used to demonstrate correlations between conceptual transformations in relative 
advantage and contextual policy factors. 
 
The chapter begins by presenting relative advantage as a political idea and a unit of 
analysis. The first section reviews the key changes to the use of the relative advantage 
concept over time. It then examines relative advantage as an example of technocracy in 
political rhetoric and as a tool of strategic communication. This shows the concept in 
different perspectives to demonstrate the methodological utility of treating relative 
advantage as a political idea. The second section explains the rationale for using a history 
of ideas methodology to analyse the conceptual evolution of relative advantage in 
Australia’s strategic policy discourse. It explains the concepts used to examine policy 
narratives and strategic communication and used to substantiate the selection of data and 
use of methods. The third section explains the rationale for the data used, the data 
collected and the collection and reduction methods used to create the data set used in the 
analysis. The final section presents the research model used to analyse the data set in each 
                                                 
61 Mark Bevir, "Mind and Method in the History of Ideas," History and Theory 36, no. 2 (1997); Maurice 
Mandelbaum, "The History of Ideas, Intellectual History, and the History of Philosophy," 
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substantive chapter. It articulates the research variables used and provides a codebook for 
the QDA process.  
 
1.1 Relative advantage as a unit of analysis 
Despite significant variations in the conceptual elements of relative advantage, the 
concept is a single idea which has transformed in policy. This is informed by Fry who, in 
reference to the concept of regional security in Australian defence policy, noted that: 
This case rests on the observation that, while particular circumstances varied, the 
conceptual approach inherent in these doctrines- whether they influenced policy or not – 
remained the same.
62
 
 
This rests on the methodological premise that social reality, rather than having an 
objective existence independent of human perceptions, is constructed by humans. The 
implication of this premise is that the practice of policy and the interpretation of evidence 
within a narrative analysis framework are tempered by human perception, in accordance 
with a constructivist approach to political theory.63 Foster illustrates this point by noting 
that it is one thing to conclude from the historical record that the Soviet Union was 
considered to be an evil empire by some of its contemporaries, but it is another thing to 
ascertain why.64 To this Waltz adds that 
Evaluating a theory requires working back and forth between the implications of the 
theory and an uncertain state of affairs that we take to be the reality against which the 
theory is tested.
65
 
 
                                                 
62 Greg Fry, "Australia's Regional Security Doctrine: Old Assumptions, New Challenges,"  Australia's 
Regional Security, ed. Greg Fry (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991), 9. 
63 Maja Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002); ibid. 
64 Gregory D Foster, "A Conceptual Foundation for a Theory of Strategy," The Washington Quarterly 13, 
no. 1 (1990): 47. 
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This section examines three different conceptions of relative advantage as a policy idea 
throughout the period 1968-2009. It begins with an overview of the basic evolution of 
relative advantage as a discrete political concept. It then examines relative advantage as a 
representation of technocracy in Australian defence policy. Finally it examines relative 
advantage as a form of communication. This contrasts three different versions of the same 
idea in different political contexts which often cut across policy domains. 
 
Conceptions of relative advantage 
For four decades, Australian defence policy has featured a recurring theme emphasising a 
qualitative lead in military capability. The concept emerged in defence policy and 
discourse during the 1970s at roughly the same time as policy was adopting and then 
endorsing the notion of defence self-reliance. It has featured prominently in major open-
source strategic policy documents since. The importance of Australia’s technological 
level was stressed in the 1970s. The formal use of relative advantage began in a 
discussion about the technological level of Australia’s military forces in the 1975 
strategic basis of Australian defence policy. 66  The technological level had initially 
referred primarily to Australia’s industrial base and capacity for expansion to sustain 
conventional force generation. Based on ideas that had emerged in the early 1970s, the 
technological level debate sparked a larger discourse about the degree of relative 
advantage that Australia ought to pursue, precisely which countries that advantage should 
be relative to and whether high-technology capabilities were to be prioritised according to 
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their capacity for expansion, their deterrent value or their suitability for operational use in 
low-level ‘credible contingencies.’67 
 
The conceptualisation of military technology has been a key influence on Australian 
strategic guidance since at least the 1987 defence white paper, The Defence of Australia.68 
A ‘clear military technological advantage’ relative to Australia’s region69 was cemented 
in policy as a cornerstone of Australia’s capacity to defend itself and contribute to 
cooperative security arrangements in the 1980s.70 At this point, the role of technology in 
providing an advantage had been clearly linked to qualitative performance. This reflected 
not only a change in the role of technology in facilitating relative advantage, but also a 
significant change in the way self-reliant defence was conceptualised in policy. Paul Dibb, 
principal author of The Defence of Australia, noted that the two key features of the 
approach to strategic guidance offered by the 1987 defence white paper were the focus on 
strategic geography and the specific need for technology-based military advantage in 
Australia’s region. 71  A strategy of air and maritime denial coupled with a relative 
                                                 
67 John Osborne Langtry and Desmond J. Ball, Controlling Australia's Threat Environment: A Methodology 
for Planning Australian Defence Force Development  (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, 1979), 58-60.; Tony Godfrey-Smith, "Low Level Conflict Contingencies and Australian 
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(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1984). 
68 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia. 
69 Paul Dibb, "The Self-Reliant Defence of Australia: The History of an Idea,"  History as Policy, ed. Ron 
Huisken and Meredith Thatcher (Canberra: ANU ePress, 2007), 19-20. 
70  Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia.; Paul Dibb, "Review of Australia's Defence 
Capabilities," Report for the Minister for Defence (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
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capability advantage has become a staple feature of Australian strategic guidance and 
force structure planning since. 
 
Relative advantage was further expanded throughout the 1990s in tandem with the so-
called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 72  to incorporate popular Western ideas 
which emphasised information-superiority in the coordination of military forces, leading 
to an emphasis of what Australia termed the ‘knowledge edge.’ 73  Technology was 
considered to be a force multiplier, a critical enabler and a means for coordinating joint 
forces to disproportionately increase their combat effectiveness. By the 2000s, relative 
advantage included new military-scientific concepts, in particular Network-Centric 
Warfare (NCW) and Network-Enabled Capability (NEC),74 which feature prominently in 
Australia’s defence vernacular, 75  and the concept was termed strategic capability 
advantage in defence policy. 76  This evolution of relative advantage conceptualised 
technology as qualitatively superior weapons, essentially the ‘technological edge’ of the 
1980s, in combination with the communication and intelligence technologies that 
                                                 
72 Tim Benbow, The Magic Bullet? Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs  (London: Brassey's, 
2004).; Williamson Murray, "Thinking About Revolutions in Military Affairs," Joint Force 
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73  Department of Defence, "In Search of the Knowledge Edge: The Management Component," Media 
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facilitated the ‘knowledge edge’ of the 1990s and the technical and doctrinal expertise to 
maintain and operate a high-technology military.77 This conception of relative advantage 
has been validated by the latest defence white paper and has been widely disseminated in 
the public domain. Community consultation conducted by Defence in 2008 found that a 
majority of respondents supported the maintenance of a capability edge for the ADF in 
three areas: technology, information and training. The community consultation program 
also reported broad support for further investment in high technology force enablers, such 
as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets and electronic warfare systems.78 
 
Thomson suggests that the rationale for increasing focus on high technology military 
capabilities has largely been an outcome of the increasing availability of that technology 
rather than strategic concepts developed with defence. He argues that 
The clearest trend to emerge from our 40 year survey is that the level of preparedness and 
modernisation of the force (and the size of the Army) is driven largely by the operational 
tempo of the day. Far less clear is the existence of any nexus between strategic guidance 
and the evolution of the force structure. In fact, once the impact of technology and the 
changing face of warfare is taken into account, it is surprising how little has changed—
notwithstanding that our survey covers three distinct epochs of Australian defence 
thinking. Aside from the changes to disposition wrought by the 1980s incarnation of the 
‘defence of Australia’, the really significant changes to the force structure—the demise of 
the aircraft carrier and the rise of the amphibious force—are difficult to ascribe to a 
changed strategic vision of how to defend the country (or at least one that was articulated 
at the time). The result is that the basic defence force conceived and developed by Robert 
Menzies back in the 1960s under the doctrine of ‘forward defence’, persisted through the 
years of ‘defence of Australia’… Despite inflated rhetoric, since the Second World War 
Australia has been a regional maritime power with a boutique army. Although the 
narrative developed to explain why Australia needs to do so changes, the reality remains 
inviolate.
79
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This argument reduces emphasis on policy ideas and places it more firmly on available 
technology and internal drivers within the individual services of the ADF. Thomson notes 
that each of the services has a vested interest in acquiring the most advanced 
replacements for retiring systems that they can afford and that the bureaucratic politics 
within the ADF and the Defence Organisation more broadly make it difficult to 
significantly alter the whole-of-force distribution of capabilities and expenditure.80 
 
Nevertheless, politicians, bureaucrats and analysts are often preoccupied with searching 
for a solution to confounding policy challenges. Political concepts and policies are often 
presented to the public as solutions to problems. In practice, no policy has been an 
effective solution for long and no problem has been static for long enough for a policy to 
become a silver bullet.81 The record is dominated by incremental policy changes which 
have been shaped by unpredictable events. From an analytical perspective, the 
effectiveness of a policy is not only measured by its performance against its objectives, 
but also by the effect it had on the nature of the issue it was intended to address and by 
whether or not it opened new avenues for future action.82 However, the general policy 
impetus to search for a new solution when merged with the infatuation of Western 
militaries with high-tech military platforms leads to a technocratic imperative. This has 
manifested in Australian strategic policy as a penchant for high-tech solutions to 
                                                 
80 Ibid., 140. 
81 James A. Morone, "Seven Laws of Policy Analysis," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 5, no. 4 
(1986): 818. 
82 Ibid. 
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fundamental strategic and operational challenges, despite a rising potential for 
concomitant ‘technology traps.’83 
 
Relative advantage as technocracy 
Australia’s attraction to high-technology military weapons and systems reflects a 
technological romanticism that is widespread amongst Western allies and is strongly 
associated with America’s strategic culture.84 The scientific approach to warfare now 
popular around the world is underwritten by a techno-scientific regime of order that 
emerged alongside modernity.85 Smit notes that the legitimation of military technology in 
the West has largely paralleled the broad co-evolution of technology, politics and societal 
development in Western countries.86 The RMA is a natural extension of the industrial 
Western society because it ‘incorporates both a political preference for minimum risk 
warfare and a technological quest for continued military potency by advanced Western 
liberal societies.’87 While Australia was not as enthusiastic as America and some other 
allies about the possibilities offered by new military technologies, it was so enamoured 
with the RMA that it raised a short-lived Office of the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(ORMA) within the Military Strategy Branch of ADF headquarters. 88  The strategic 
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rationale that paralleled the emergence of defence self-reliance matured in capabilities-
based planning and culminated, thus far, with the theoretical adoption of the RMA 
concept. The increasingly technocratic conception of relative advantage entails six 
assumptions which need to be addressed in order to substantiate the strategic rationale for 
pursuing a technological edge. 
 
The first is that superior technology creates more capability. This is not necessarily the 
case.89 In a simple model, Lanchester’s square law90 demonstrates that a small numerical 
advantage requires a relatively larger qualitative advantage to offset.91 More complex 
combat modelling indicates that more capable individual units cannot necessarily be 
relied on to overcome numerically superior units of relatively poorer quality.92 This is a 
challenge for an ostensibly capabilities-based93 approach to force structure planning that 
relies on a qualitative advantage to offset a large relative gap in quantity. This does not 
suggest that Australia’s approach to defence procurement is blind to the non-linear 
relationship between materials and operational performance. This and a range of similar 
issues are dealt with extensively in Australian capability development and acquisition 
                                                 
89 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "A Common Misapplication of the Lanchester Square Law: A Research Note," 
International Security 12, no. 1 (1987).; John W. R. Lepingwell, "The Laws of Combat? 
Lanchester Reexamined," ibid. 
90 Alan R. Washburn and Moshe Kress, Combat Modeling  (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 79-85.; Robert L. 
Helmbold, "The Constant Fallacy: A Persistent Logical Flaw in Applications of Lanchester's 
Equations," European Journal of Operational Research 75, no. 3 (1994). 
91 James G. Taylor and Samuel H. Parry, "Force-Ratio Considerations for Some Lanchester-Type Models of 
Warfare," Operations Research 23, no. 3 (1975).; James G. Taylor and Gerald G. Brown, 
"Annihilation Prediction for Lanchester-Type Models of Modern Warfare," ibid.31, no. 4 (1983). 
92 Andrew Ilachinski, Artificial War: Multiagent-Based Simulation of Combat  (New Jersey and London: 
World Scientific Publishing, 2004).; James G. Taylor, "Solving Lanchester-Type Equations for 
'Modern Warfare' with Variable Coefficients," Operations Research 22, no. 4 (1974). 
93  Thomas-Durell Young, "Capabilities-Based Defense Planning: The Australian Experience," Armed 
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policies.94 However, while Australia has been vigilant at the policy implementation level, 
the tenuous link between highly capable individual platforms and increased capability has 
been pervasive at the strategic level and is reflected in Australian attempts to 
intellectualise high-technology adoption and doctrine. 
 
The second is that reliance on high-tech platforms assumes that incremental advances in 
technology will be the dominant form of innovation in military systems. However, history 
demonstrates that disruptive innovations, those that create disparities in defensive and 
offensive capabilities and circumvent capability advantages, 95  are unpredictable and 
devastating to existing platforms. Technological innovation is strongly correlated with an 
impetus to manage uncertainty. Rather than incremental responses to the technological 
advancement of others, innovation is related to the strategic uncertainty generated by the 
capability of others.96 This distinction is significant because it suggests that rapid shifts in 
the employment of weapons and systems can spur more innovation than incremental 
advancements which do not produce the same degree of uncertainty.97 Overreliance on 
technology is potentially dangerous because it emphasises technical performance above 
doctrinal adaption and operational initiative, thereby inhibiting the intellectual tenacity in 
                                                 
94 For example, see: Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, "Knowledge Systems Equipment 
Acquisition Projects in Defence."; Defence Material Organisation, "Building Defence Capability: 
A Policy for a Smarter and More Agile Defence Industry Base."; Department of Defence, 
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the military.98 An RMA is not typified by advancement in technology and weapons. 
Rather it is the by-product of military adaption to new technologies and weapons. Thus: 
[t]he central tenet of an RMA is that advances in technology must lead to significant 
changes in how military forces are organised, trained, and equipped for war, thereby 
reshaping the way in which wars are fought.99 
 
This implies that procuring the next generation of an existing capability may not be a 
bulwark against a disruptive innovation which employs a technology or doctrine that 
negates the former capability advantage. 
 
The third assumption is that staying one or more generations ahead of regional 
competitors is a sufficient technological edge to provide capability overmatch. 100 
Innovation cycles suggest that being generations ahead can also be very dangerous. 
Australia’s technological lead over much of Southeast Asia is at least one generation 
across virtually all high-tech weapons platforms and in some instances several 
generations ahead in certain niche capabilities, such as combat aircraft and surface 
combatants, although regional defence spending trends are not favourable. 101 
Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction 102  suggests that a new generation of 
innovation is easier to field for competitors with the resources to leapfrog innovation 
                                                 
98 Michael I. Handel, "Numbers Do Count: The Question of Quality Versus Quantity,"  The Strategic 
Imperative: New Policies for American Security, ed. Samuel P. Huntington (Cambridge, MA: 
Ballinger Publishing Company, 1982), 198. 
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cycles, as was the case with the British Dreadnought. 103  Having the most advanced 
capabilities, but in fewer numbers means that Australia places itself in a potentially 
precarious situation. Unlike other high-technology military forces, which generally enjoy 
a favourable force-to-space ratio, although some European states are exceptions, the ADF 
is small relative to its geographical scope and relies on its skill and high-tech capabilities 
to a greater extent. Moore’s law means that capabilities that cost large sums to develop 
become relatively less expensive for others to adopt and allow for competitors to catch up 
rapidly, an experience which is supported by Australia’s experiences in procuring 
established US platforms, such as the F/A-18 Hornet. 
 
The fourth is that where Australia relies on high-technology capabilities, it should procure 
cutting edge replacements because regional powers will have the ability to adopt ageing 
systems at the same rate as they are superseded. However, this straightforward inference 
assumes that regional states that are inclined to modernise to legacy platforms are able to 
afford and integrate numerous logistical, support, training and maintenance systems that 
are required to sustain ageing systems. The adoption-capacity of individual states is 
relative to their material and financial ability to acquire, operate and sustain new 
capabilities.104 For example, some high-tech weapons platforms may become available 
and affordable quickly while the information networks and technical expertise required to 
                                                 
103 The dreadnought was invented when the Royal Navy enjoyed naval supremacy, but it was so advanced 
that it rendered the rest of the RN obsolete. When Germany copied the Dreadnought (which was 
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operate them might be far behind. Adoption of new systems might also require a state to 
commit to undesirable supply contracts105 or might necessitate the purchase of other high-
end capabilities in the future to ensure interoperability and complementarity of systems. 
An example of this is Australia’s decision to purchase the F-35 Joint Strike fighter (JSF). 
In some roles, the JSF is shaping up to be an inferior platform to what had been originally 
expected, but it is the only fifth generation multirole aircraft with the necessary 
C4ISR(EW) 106  infrastructure 107  for Australia to realise its Future Joint Operating 
Concept.108 
 
The fifth is that once the technology becomes available, states will be able to incorporate 
them into their doctrine and utilise them efficiently. This underestimates the challenges 
presented by the organisational changes needed to effectively employ new capabilities in 
operations. 109  Military organisations have varying levels of ability when it comes to 
change management, transformation and innovation.110 A common generalisation is that 
‘the complexity of an innovation, as perceived by members of a social system, is 
negatively related to its rate of adoption.’111 One critical success of Western military 
organisations has been their ability to adapt to new technologies, new doctrines and new 
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strategic challenges. 112  The rapid reformation of the US military to conduct hybrid 
warfare in the post-9/11 era is testament to an underappreciated capacity for 
organisational change that is not present in many military forces,113 especially those of 
Australia’s neighbours. 114  While Australia has invested substantial intellectual and 
technical expertise into adopting high-technology weapons and systems into its 
military,115 such resources have been lacking in the region. In general, Southeast Asian 
states have not been enthusiastic about technological and doctrinal adoption in the region 
and have viewed widespread adoption of the RMA as a poor fit for their strategic 
priorities.116 
 
The sixth assumption is that high-technology weapons and systems reduce the manpower 
required to conduct military operations. This logic is frequently repeated in Australian 
policy in support of investing in expensive capabilities in order to pursue relative 
advantage. However, high-technology platforms and systems come with personnel costs 
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in other areas. The numbers of operators relative to the combat lethality of particular 
weapons may be lower, but the expertise required to operate and maintain the weapon 
may be higher.117 Consequently, the costs of military preparedness, in terms of the level 
of readiness, measured in personnel numbers, training levels, material capabilities, and 
expenditure,118 can be much higher for high-technology militaries than for larger, lower-
technology militaries. More sophisticated major platforms generally necessitate the 
recruitment and retention of more intelligent and better trained personnel. This can be 
debilitating because the personnel required to operate and maintain high-technology 
capabilities might not always be available and any significant manpower deficit can have 
a disproportionate impact on operational effectiveness.119 
 
The link here is that technocracy underpins every aspect of Australia’s infatuation with 
the concept of qualitatively-based relative advantage in military capability. For relative 
advantage to be justified as a central element of Australian strategic policy it must be the 
case that maintaining technological superiority affords the ADF with the maximum 
capability for the associated opportunity costs. This logically entails that broad force 
structure guidance to maintain an edge is the most effective way to equip and structure 
the ADF to perform its military role. In some areas this is almost certainly correct. For 
example, C4ISR(EW) and enabling capabilities, provide niche opportunities to the ADF 
that cannot be achieved through other means. Technologies that enable wide-area 
maritime surveillance and rapid communication amongst force elements form various 
services operating in the same space are critical to the functionality of the ADF in the 
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contemporary security environment. However, some staples of relative advantage, such as 
the incremental modernisation of some major platforms may yield a less significant return 
on investment in terms of a capability edge. The validity of relative advantage as a 
strategic concept used to justify the acquisition of cutting edge military technology across 
the spectrum of major platforms in under question. 
 
Relative advantage as communication 
Relative advantage has been used for a variety of purposes in Australian strategic policy 
since the 1960s. It has also performed several key signalling roles in Australia’s defence 
policy discourse. This study identifies three themes in the strategic communication used 
in the Australian defence policy discourse. The themes are based on the type of signal and 
the intended audience of that signal. The first theme is deterrence, which is comprised of 
signals sent to potential adversaries for the purpose of dissuading them to undertake a 
certain course of action, in this instance any kind of armed attack against Australia for its 
interests. The second theme is reassurance, which is aimed at existing or potential 
security partners or allies to persuade them that Australia is willing and able to meet nay 
commitments it has made to them. The third theme is validation, which constitutes signals 
sent to the Australian public to assure them that the government and the ADF are capable 
of deterring or defeating armed aggression against Australia; to bolster morale and appeal 
to nationalism; and to justify the significant expenditure required to maintain the Defence 
Organisation and to acquire new equipment and assets. 
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In Australian defence policy, deterrence is largely aimed at regional states. The ADF 
emphasises its credibility as a fighting force for the purposes of deterring military 
operations against Australia.120 Deterrence and dissuasion are forms of coercion, which 
entails ‘efforts to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action.’ 121  Deterrence 
requires the threat of harm to manipulate a potential adversary’s behaviour.122 Deterrence 
is more specifically focused on defensive and retaliatory capabilities of a political actors. 
Dissuasion is less specific and is used to raise costs of undesirable actions without 
necessarily making threats. Dissuasion still involves overt signalling which is directed at 
framing the undesired issue and often requires significant publicity in order to succeed.123 
In either conception, the efforts of these signals are coercive in nature. Signals to potential 
adversaries about the ADF’s relative military capability are focused on the 
disproportionate costs that the ADF can impose on would-be aggressors in relation to the 
potential gains to be made through military operations against Australia. 
 
Coercion is often conceived of in defensive terms and discussed with terms associated 
with defence rather than offensive actions or capabilities. Coercion can be conceptualised 
in two distinct ways. One is the use of threats (implied or explicit) to influence an 
adversary’s decision-making.124 The other is the use of what Schelling calls brute force,125 
the resort to armed violence, to convince an adversary to adopt or refrain from a particular 
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course of action. Coercion can be considered the successful manipulation of an 
adversary’s decision-making. This means that the adversary has not been materially 
defeated, but instead makes a deliberate decision to desist while further resistance 
remains within their capacity. 126  The essential element is deliberately altering an 
adversary’s perception of events in order to affect their strategic calculations.127 These 
calculations can relate to perceived costs or benefits because it the relationship between 
these calculations that policy actors base their decisions on.128 Therefore, coercion relies 
on the manipulation of symbols and information. 129  This involves ‘perceptions 
management’ which includes ‘statements, decisions, and actions taken by one state in 
order to influence another state’s assumptions about the first state’s intentions and 
capabilities.’130  
 
A similar approach to perceptions management occurs when states want to reassure their 
partners and allies about their intentions, commitment to promises and expectations of 
their relationships. The Australian Government has often been preoccupied with ensuring 
that it maintains defence credibility in the eyes of other nations.131 Morrow outlines the 
strategic choice rationale for maintaining credibility in the eyes of security partners: 
The strategic-choice approach suggests that alliances are signals or commitment devices. 
They might operate as signals of mutual interest among the allies, deterring threatening 
powers. The threatening power’s uncertainty about the allies’ willingness to come to one 
another’s aid is reduced by an alliance precisely because forming an alliance is costly. 
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Alliances might serve as commitment devices so that leaders will live up to their 
commitment if push comes to shove. National leaders intervene on behalf of their allies 
because they will be punished if they do not intervene.
132
 
 
For Australia, relative advantage has been an important means to emphasise the ADF’s 
strengths in response to limitations in Australia’s population size and force projection 
capabilities which have at times been perceived as strategic inadequacies. The rationale 
for maintaining a high technology defence force was directly linked to reassuring regional 
security partners that Australia’s commitments remained credible after the US and UK 
reduced their respective levels of engagement in Southeast Asia during the late 1960s.133 
 
The final way relative advantage is used in strategic communication by the Australian 
government is validating the ADF and broader Defence Organisation to the public. This is 
done in three key ways: a) establishing the ADF’s credibility as a force that can provide 
security to Australia; b) promoting morale and nationalism by inspiring pride in the ADF 
and casting the ADF as a representative of desirable national values; and c) providing 
justification for major force structure decisions and defence expenditure. Relative 
advantage is promoted to the Australian public as desirable in many of the same ways that 
it is promoted to security partners and potential adversaries. An ADF operating high 
technology weapons is presented as necessarily more capable than a low technology force 
and the degree of advantage offered by high technology also appeals to the popular notion 
of Australian soldiers, sailors and airmen as qualitatively superior to others. This 
promotes a sense of national security. This is linked to morale, which is characterised by 
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the degree of confidence Australians have in the ability of the ADF to adequately defend 
Australia from armed attack. The need to maintain a high technology force structure and 
to invest heavily in emerging technology to maintain a qualitative relative advantage is 
supported by these signals and was sometimes mentioned directly when governments 
have proposed significant increases to defence expenditure. 
 
1.2 A history of ideas methodology 
This section examines the established methodological approaches to historical 
investigation of conceptual transformation. Inquiry into origins and changes of specific 
concepts is based on a fundamental approach to understanding the history of ideas. To 
study the history of an idea is to examine the meaning attributed by humans to their 
knowledge, culture and experiences, from a historical perspective. 134   Examining the 
social meaning of ideas across disciplines allows for ‘illuminating and explanatory’ 
relationships between ideas, interpretations and actions through time to be traced in a 
more comprehensive context.135 In this context history is conceived less as a ‘body of 
knowledge’ and more as ‘a way of (or approach to) embodying knowledge.’136 Moreover, 
the history of communication is equally important to understanding conceptual 
transformation. Communication is used for specific strategic purposes to influence 
politics and ‘without common concepts there is no society, and above all, no political 
                                                 
134 Mark Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1.; 
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37, no. 3 (2012): 401-02. 
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field of action.’137 The narratives used to explain policies create a system of assumptions 
and expectations which embed causal ideas and value judgments into policy views and 
paradigms. A history of ideas methodology accounts for both the evolution of political 
ideas and the processes through which political statements shape and influence 
conceptual change. 
 
An idea in history 
Tracing the evolution of a political concept begins with the study of the process of 
evolution of an idea or ideas that are central to the concept. The history of ideas as a 
methodological approach to historiography involves examining how ideas were expressed 
and represented in historical discourses. In general terms, this is a deceivingly simple 
proposition: an idea that is expressed in the present must have evolved in some way from 
earlier ideas.138 However, the specification of variables, even simple ones such as the 
meaning of the term idea, is a source of controversy in the discipline.139 The word idea is 
ambiguous in meaning140 and has itself changed over time. The theory of ideas has been a 
recurrent theme in the history of philosophy since it emerged as a point of difference 
between Plato and Aristotle.141 More contemporary philosophical debate has focused on 
                                                 
137 Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. Keith Tribe (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1985), 74. 
138 King, "Introduction," 3. 
139 Bevir, "Mind and Method in the History of Ideas," 167.; Judith Squires, "Introduction: The Dynamics of 
Ideas," Economy and Society 33, no. 4 (2004): 427. 
140 For example, see Melissa Lane, "Why History of Ideas at All?," History of European Ideas 28, no. 1-2 
(2002): 33-41. 
141 Gail Fine, On Ideas: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 
20-21, 34.; see also Henry Jackson, Plato's Later Theory of Ideas  (London: Macmillan, 1885). 
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similar issues, particularly on whether words directly signify ideas or things 142  and 
whether or not ideas are reducible to things.143 Three dominant conceptions of an idea 
consider the term to mean: a) an expression of knowledge; b) a ‘fact’ in either objective 
or subjective terms; and c) a plan of action. 
 
When used as an expression of knowledge, in order to refer to that which is known, the 
word idea is employed in two senses: the first being a statement of truth which may be 
accepted or falsified and the second being an object or a person.144 To know in each 
instance is a distinct proposition. One may know the Prime Minister of Australia in the 
first sense without knowing them in the second. Similarly, we cannot know that two plus 
two equals four in the second sense; we can only know it in the first sense. We know 
some things, but we can only know about others. The distinction is analogous to the 
difference between objective knowledge and subjective experience.145 Much of what we 
know is based on models: systems of understanding based on the evolution and 
accumulation of knowledge and methods of interpreting that knowledge.146 Subjective 
experience can enable us to know an object or person without necessarily understanding 
or knowing about it. This explains why two people with a similar degree of familiarity 
with an idea can disagree vehemently about its meaning.147 
 
                                                 
142 E. J. Ashworth, "'Do Words Signify Ideas or Things?' The Scholastic Sources of Locke's Theory of 
Language," Journal of the History of Philosophy 19, no. 3 (1981): 301. 
143 Louis O. Mink, "Change and Causality in the History of Ideas," Eighteenth-Century Studies 2, no. 1 
(1968): 9. 
144 George Boas, The History of Ideas: An Introduction  (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), 3-4. 
145 Ibid., 4-5. 
146 Bruce Schneier, "The Security Mirage," TEDxPSU (2010).; Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About 
Security in an Uncertain World  (New York: Copernicus Books, 2003), 28-29. 
147 Boas, The History of Ideas, 4-5. 
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When dealing with political ideas, a further complication emerges. An idea of knowledge 
could be a matter of fact or a matter of political advocacy. Ideas may be represented as 
factual statements, for example something which is or is not true, or as declaratory 
statements, for example something that should or should not be done.148 These categories 
are not mutually exclusive because policy is conditioned by facts. However, facts of 
realisation are often omitted from declaratory statements.149 For example, a policy that 
individuals are entitled to total equality omits the facts of inherent disparities in physical 
and mental attributes which prevent the full realisation of such a policy.150 The opposite 
may also be true. There are no immutable facts in policy because facts can be and often 
are conditioned by existing interpretations, policies or beliefs.151  A salient Australian 
example is the paradoxical interpretation of Australia’s strategic geography encapsulated 
by the phrase ‘oceans divide, oceans unite.’152 Perceptions of isolation and distance153 
have been more instrumental in crafting Australian security polices than the objective fact 
of geographic location and disposition. This is clear in the interpretation of Australia’s 
geography as the primary source of its inherent indefensibility for much of the twentieth 
century and as the primary source of its defensibility through strategic denial from the 
1980s onward.154 
 
                                                 
148 Ibid., 5. 
149 Ibid., 5-6. 
150 Jamie Whyte, Crimes against Logic: Exposing the Bogus Arguments of Politicians, Priests, Journalists, 
and Other Serial Offenders  (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 48-49. 
151 Fischer, Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices, 13.; see also Boas, 
The History of Ideas, 6. 
152  Carolyn O'Brien, "Oceans Divide, Oceans Unite: The Concept of Regional Security in Australian 
Defence Planning," Australian Journal of Politics and History 25, no. 2 (1979). 
153  Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia's History  (Sydney: 
Macmillan, 2001).; Michael Evans, "The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s Strategic Culture and 
Way of War 1901–2005," Working Paper No 306 (Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2005). 
154 Paul Dibb, "Is Strategic Geography Relevant to Australia's Current Defence Policy?," Australian Journal 
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Applying a history of ideas methodology to a political idea necessitates interrogation of 
the role of conceptual change in political discourse. This in itself is an enduring challenge 
as various historical methods used to examine conceptual change stem from various 
meanings of the term concept.155  Clearing differentiating between political concepts can 
be difficult because a single word often refers to multiple concepts.156 For example, the 
word security is used to express two different and distinct concepts: a situation of relative 
threat in a particular situation and a perception of relative risk in a particular situation.157 
The empirical is objective and measurable; the perception is almost impossible to 
measure as it is subjective, influenced by a broad range of biases and can be the product 
of inaccurate or irrational thought. 158  Consequently, differentiation between the two 
concepts of security is essential to rigorous analysis. Understanding the definition of a 
term being used is subordinate to an understanding of the concept represented in the use 
of the term.159 Differences among underlying ideas influence the application of political 
concepts because of the value that actors place on the system of interpretation they 
infer.160 
 
Conceptual transformations occur across time and can be identified through the shifting 
use of language in a particular political context. The transformation of political concepts 
                                                 
155 Ola Hallden, "Conceptual Change and the Learning of History," International Journal of Educational 
Research 27, no. 3 (1997): 201. ; James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning: 
Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language, Character, and Community  (Chicago: University 
Of Chicago Press, 1984), 89-91. 
156 Felix Oppenheim, Political Concepts: A Reconstruction  (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), 3. 
157 Bruce Schneier, Schneier on Security  (Indianapolis: Wiley Publishing, 2008). 
158 Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World, 25-28. 
159 Quentin Skinner, "Langauge and Political Change,"  Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, ed. 
Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
7.; ibid., 46-47. 
160 Goldstein and Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," 12-13.; William E. 
Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse  (Oxford: Martin Robertson and Company, 1983), 
190-92. 
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is underpinned by changes in the shared social meaning attributed to specific concepts by 
a political community.161 As such, there can be no fixed meanings associated with the 
concepts, actors or events within a particular political context. Longevity of political 
concepts is entirely possible, but even enduring concepts are relative to their context.162  
Such relativity means that political concept cannot be interpreted universally or 
objectively because social meaning is inextricably linked to a particular context in which 
it was created.163 While an idée fixe, a fixed notion, along with the social institutions 
founded on it, may prolong or forestall conceptual shift, it can also add impetus to the 
formation of new ideas which have great persuasive and mobilising power.164 
 
Marx famously noted that people do not live in self-selected circumstances, but under 
conditions left to them from the past.165 This highlights the long shadow cast by the 
institutionalised ideas of previous generations and how those ideas may influence the 
ways in which later ideas are formed. The ideas of the past are reference points from 
which the evolution of ideas and concepts can be evaluated and through which the social 
and natural world is interpreted.166 Past ideas further influence conceptual change by 
framing beliefs that need to remain consistent with changes in ideas. Beliefs and values 
need to be consistent with one another at a fixed point in time, but also need to be stable 
                                                 
161 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality  (New York: Basic Books, 
1983).; Samuel H. Beer, "Political Science and History,"  Essays in Theory and History: An 
Approach to the Social Sciences, ed. Melvin Richter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1970). 
162 Fischer, Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices, 49.; Melvin Richter, 
The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction  (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 9. 
163 Fischer, Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices, 49. 
164 Neta C. Crawford, "How Previous Ideas Affect Later Ideas,"  Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political 
Analysis, ed. Charles Tilly and Robert E. Goodin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 266. 
165  Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, trans. Daniel De Lion (Rockville, MD: 
Serenity Publishers, 2009 [1852]), 9. 
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across time in order to be considered rational.167 The conceptual priority of coherent 
beliefs over time is contingent on an assumption that beliefs only change in response to 
new evidence or reasoning. 168 Key ideas which are central to political institutions within 
a society infer particular norms which are founded on beliefs that are not easily rejected.  
 
Framing and policy narratives 
The rise of central ideas, beliefs and attitudes to prominence within a particular social and 
political context is often linked to particular ways that individuals attribute meaning to 
issues and events. These frames are founded upon, and influenced by, socially 
constructed meanings that are imposed on subjective experiences of the world. 169  A 
policy frame is a ‘normative-prescriptive story that sets out a problematic policy problem 
and a course of action to be taken to address the problematic situation.’170 Policy frames, 
considered as distinct representations of knowledge, are key tools in shaping 
interpretations and constructing shared knowledge in political discourse. The act of 
framing is important to the extent that it is 
…a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality to 
provide guideposts for knowing, analysing, persuading, and acting.
171
 
 
Framing can be used to cultivate or reinforce a collective worldview in relation to a 
specific issue or discourse. In this way frames can foster a group identity which is 
                                                 
167 Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," The Journal of Philosophy 60, no. 23 (1963): 685. 
168 Bevir, "Mind and Method in the History of Ideas," 180-84. 
169 Frank Fischer, "Reconstructing Policy Analysis: A Postpositivist Perspective," Policy Sciences 25, no. 3 
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underwritten by a ‘subjective sense of belonging.’172 Deeply embedded frames can be so 
familiar to a political community that they appear to be fundamental truths, but human 
agency is required to interpret political issues in the terms of a frame.173 
 
Frames are an important component of political discourse for three key reasons. First, 
frames give different answers to the same questions. This is primarily a product of the 
divergent worldviews, value and assumptions that are associated with frames. Second, 
each frame attributes different significance to particular types of political issues. This is 
because frames uniquely define political challenges, value judgments and modes of 
interpretation. 174  Third, by propagating acceptance of particular values, beliefs and 
assumptions about the world, frames empower agents within a certain discourse. In this 
sense, discourse theory moves away from the idea that actors within institutions influence 
or shape interests and towards the view of discourse as a medium of power in its own 
right.175 
 
Part of political and conceptual change is policy argument, which occurs largely at the 
edges of conflicting frames. The construction and reconstruction of policy problems 
through different and evolving frames is necessary to ensure that policy processes and 
                                                 
172 Yves Surel, "The Role of Cognitive and Normative Frames in Policy-Making," Journal of European 
Public Policy 7, no. 4 (2000): 500. 
173 Rein and Schon, "Reframing Policy Discourse," 158. 
174 John S. Dryzek, "Policy Analysis and Planning: From Science and Argument,"  The Argumentative Turn 
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University Press, 1993), 222. 
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outcomes remain relevant to changing circumstances and to deal with varying degrees of 
uncertainty which are associated with policy challenges.176 One method for imposing 
order on uncertain policy situation is through discourse.177 Frames are a strong ordering 
device, particularly when policy actors have the capacity to define policy problems and 
convince others to accept their problem definitions.178 Frames serve as a basis for both 
discussion and action. 179  The power of narrative is that it is at once objective and 
subjective. A collective narrative, presented as objective, becomes subjective to the 
individual through their experience and interpretation of it. The narrative is 
simultaneously unique to the individual and common to the social unit which created or 
endorsed it.180 
 
Narratives can be framed in two ways which roughly align with the types of discourse 
they employ. The first is coordinative discourse which allows policy actors to manage 
procedural policy and to organise some aspects of substantive policy processes. The 
second is communicative discourse which allows communication of policy ideas between 
institutions and between the government and external parties, including the public.181 This 
is more closely related to substantive policy and attracts most interest on policy narratives 
                                                 
176 "Deliberative Policy Analysis as Practical Reason: Integrating Empirical and Normative Arguments,"  
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because it is where debates about policy issues and instruments are usually played out. 
Policy narratives are used to legitimise both procedural and substantive policies, but 
attract the most attention when used to communicate political accounts of events, policy 
action or changes to policy instruments. These political accounts are central to politics 
and policy because they outline actors’ responses to contested issues and emerging 
circumstances.182 Therefore, policy narratives require proposing solutions within domain-
specific and institutional constraints, but can also involve stretching the boundaries of 
what is considered to be possible in relation to a policy issue.183 
 
However, narratives are rarely overtly innovative. One reason for this is that political 
language tends to be banal, predictable and reassuring. 184  It standardises problem 
definitions and perceptions of policy issues, introduces familiar policy instruments to the 
policy process and provides reassurance during crises.185 This is central to the act of using 
political speech to impose order on contested political issues. Another reason is that 
policy change tends to be incremental and slow to change.186 Narratives are constructed 
with a specific political purpose in mind, but are construed in reference to events. Roth 
offers the caveat that 
A narrative is not determined by sequencing some prior set of events. Rather, what comes 
first is some more general view of what counts; the particular events—the elements 
relevant to one’s narrative—emerge from this.187 
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This indicates that narratives are used to select and order events and information for the 
purpose of ascribing meaning to, rather than to understanding, them. This is consistent 
with the overarching purpose of a policy narrative which is intended to legitimise 
preferred courses of action and engender support or tacit acceptance of a particular policy 
agenda.188 
 
Narratives often appeal to and rationalise policy status quos to societies because familiar 
cognitive structures are readily accepted by both those who benefit from existing social 
institutions and those who do not necessarily benefit from the status quo, but use it as a 
reference point for their identity or self-esteem, or who have been socialised to accept it 
as essentially benevolent. 189  As a result, narratives rely on familiar terms and non-
contentious proposals, which explains the pervasive ambiguity and contradiction of 
concepts employed in mainstream policy frames.190 This approach allows actors to tailor 
a general narrative to affect specific ideas in a policy domain. Table 1191  shows the 
intersection of narrative influence on causal and normative idea types on different levels 
of policy debate. 
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Table 1: Narrative influence on policy ideas and debate 
Level of policy debate affected 
L
ev
el
 o
f 
id
ea
s 
af
fe
ct
ed
 
 Concepts and theories 
(foreground of policy debate) 
Underlying assumptions 
(background of policy debate) 
Causal ideas 
(cognitive) 
Program ideas 
Ideas as prescriptions that aid 
policy-makers in selecting a 
clear course of action from 
available alternatives within a 
policy paradigm 
 
Policy paradigms 
A set of ideas in a policy 
subsystem that form a doctrine or 
school of thought that shapes the 
goals that policy-makers set and 
pursue 
Value ideas 
(normative) 
Symbolic frames 
Ideas, symbols and concepts 
used in political discourse to 
legitimise policy solutions to 
the public and to exogenous 
actors 
Public sentiments 
Normative background 
assumptions that constrain policy 
by limiting the range of 
alternatives which are perceived 
by policy-makers as acceptable to 
the public 
 
 
 
Narratives are commonly used to explain policy issues and are often highly resistant to 
change, even when challenged with contradictory evidence, because they have value to 
policy actors. This value arises from their utility in creating stability in uncertain, volatile 
or ambiguous policy situations. 192  The starting point for analysing narratives is 
identifying policy stories which dominate a political issue and counterstories which 
challenge the dominant view. 193  The end point is to examine metanarratives which 
differentiate between dominant narratives and other secondary or contrary narratives 
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across a debate in the same policy domain. This essentially creates an overriding narrative 
which analyses the interaction of policy narratives. 194  The relevance of narratives to 
policymaking is apparent in the centrality of familiar stories in a metanarrative. Policy 
actors use storytelling as an interpretive and explanatory device to make claims, propound 
arguments and contest contrary ideas.195 By examining how policy actors narrativise their 
actions, objectives and rationales, an observer can identify what was important to that 
actor and what was marginal.196 This is a central feature of political communication and 
enables policy actors to broadcast deliberate signals to their audiences. 
 
Inquiry and causation in narrative analysis  
Analysis of the transformation of political concepts and political discourses necessitates 
particular methodological aims. Three are relevant to the study of relative advantage in 
Australian strategic policy discourse. The first aim is to determine which concept or 
concepts in particular had their meanings altered during the period of study. The second 
aim is to explain how these changes occurred over time. The final aim is to identify the 
influence of the conceptual change on the discourse.197 This study uses narrative analysis 
to show how politically and socially meaningful actions, objects and practices came to be 
socially constructed and what influence they have on socio-political institutions and 
interactions.198 Roe specifies two objectives for conducting narrative policy analysis: 
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198 Fischer, Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices, 73.; Martin Rein, 
Social Science and Public Policy  (New York: Penguin Books, 1976). 
Chapter 2 
Research design 
 
 
 
 
73 
 
…first, to underscore the important and necessary role that policy narratives have in 
public policy everywhere and, second, to establish the usefulness of narrative analytical 
approaches that allow one to reformulate increasingly intractable policy problems in ways 
that make them more amenable to the conventional policy analytical approaches of micro-
economics, statistics, organizational theory, law, and public management practice.199 
 
The central objective of narrative policy analysis is to identify how power and politics are 
articulated and realised in a particular policy domain and how actors employ narratives in 
controversial and contested debates which revolve ‘around issues of extreme uncertainty, 
complexity, and polarization.’200 Narrative analysis enables for a close inspection of the 
role of instrumental policy narratives in both ‘shaping and determining major 
policymaking controversies.’201  The purpose of the discourse analytical method is to 
explain ‘how the discourses, which structure the activities of social agents, are produced, 
how they function, and how they are changed.’202 This approach to explanation implies 
the possibility of explaining policy action and inaction and conceptual changes within a 
particular discourse. 203  However, it also invites the causation problem: there is no 
satisfactory explanation of the cause and effect of ideas. At best, intellectual historians are 
able to trace the emergence, dissemination and evolution of ideas in detail.204 Yet, ideas 
matter in policy analysis. The role of ideation and framing in policy formation and 
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implementation is widely accepted in the social sciences, but sometimes contested in 
naturalism-oriented political science.205  
 
Establishing and validating causation in the social sciences is a difficult task. In the social 
world causes are often multiple, complex and indeterminate. Consequently, ideation is 
generally only one factor of many likely partial causes that influence conceptualisation of 
ideas that frame policy formation.206 Measuring causal connections between ideas and 
ideation on one hand and political concepts and policy on the other is a difficult 
proposition because each variable is differentiated and reducible to distinct sub-
variables.207 This suggests that causation in the strict logic of analytical philosophy208 is 
exceptionally difficult to substantiate in social and political science. Functional relation 
provides a more flexible measure of causation in social behaviour than explicit, or 
mechanical, causation.209 Relative causation, measured as the intensity of association of 
concepts, entails constructing a ‘pattern of knowledge’ which substantiates the strength of 
partial causal relationships between variables.210 This study uses a large qualitative data 
set to examine the functional relation of coded concepts to demonstrate the evolution of 
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relative advantage while avoiding more difficult causal questions which would be needed 
to explain precisely why changes occurred as they did. 
 
1.3 Research data 
This section explains the data analysed in the study. It begins by examining the role of 
strategic communication in shaping public policy discourse. It then explains the rationale 
for specifying the Prime Minister and Minster for Defence as representative policy actors 
for the data set. Finally, it provides an explanation of the data collection process and a 
rationale for the preliminary analysis and data reduction techniques used to validate the 
data set used in the primary analysis. 
 
Strategic communication 
Deliberate communication is a central function of political leadership and is central to 
policy-making processes and to policy action. Policy actors use communication to 
influence the views of others, to create and respond to policy arguments, to issue 
statements of intent and to deliver tailored signals to specific audiences.211 Turnbull takes 
functional and structural views of government communication,212  which differentiates 
between communication aimed at fulfilling policy aims and communication aimed at 
structuring debates and framing issues. Chilton simplifies this dichotomy by focusing on 
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the strategic use of language. 213  Strategic communication has two elements: validity 
claims and strategies. Chilton uses Habermas’ four main validity claims include appeals 
to understandability, truth, telling the truth and righteousness. These claims assert that a 
speaker makes sense, is speaking an objective truth, is sincere in their subjective belief of 
that truth and has the normative authority to make a valid argument. Strategies are used to 
dispute validity claims and include coercion, legitimisation and delegitimisation, and 
representation and misrepresentation. 
 
A key aim of strategic communication is to establish the legitimacy of their policy 
narrative. Theo van Leeuwin proposes four categories of legitimation which can be used 
to examine political discourse. The first is authorisation, which is achieved through 
reference to a tradition, custom, institution or law which possesses a recognised authority 
in a policy domain. The second is moral evaluation, which is legitimacy derived from 
reference to value systems. The third is rationalisation, which appeals to social norms and 
goals which are accepted to be valid in a political system. The fourth is legitimacy 
achieved through rewarding preferred actions and punishing others.214 This final form is 
similar in content to Foucault’s domination in that powerful actors are able to moralise 
through coercion.215 Similarly, representation of political information allows policy actors 
to insert frames and normative judgments into ostensibly factual statements.216 These 
strategies enable an actor to use power to compel certain behaviour, to appeal to or 
                                                 
213  Paul A. Chilton, Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice  (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2004), 42. 
214 van Leeuwen, Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Analysis, 105-06. 
215 David Howarth, "Power, Discourse, and Policy: Articulating a Hegemony Approach to Critical Policy 
Studies," Critical Policy Studies 3, no. 3-4 (2010): 316. 
216 John Wilson, "Political Discourse,"  Handbook of Communication in the Public Sphere, ed. Ruth Wodak 
and Veronika Koller (Berlin and New york: Mouton de Gruyter, 2008), 399-401. 
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declare the legitimacy or illegitimacy of an issue or event and to exert control over the 
availability of information used to frame policy issues.217 
 
Often the kinds of messages embedded in strategic communication are complex and 
interwoven with a policy narrative. For example, a political leader could use a budgetary 
announcement to several political purposes simultaneously. The same call for increased 
defence spending could serve to: criticise a previous government, garner support from a 
sympathetic constituency, reassure the public, divert attention from another politically 
sensitive issue, or comfort or caution foreign governments.218 In addition, political speech 
often uses conceptual metaphors to influence the way that specific ideas and concepts are 
received by audiences. For example, political actors use concept mapping to use 
properties from one domain to explain another. The use of metaphors maps one 
conceptual schema, the schema being elements of a policy paradigm in this instance, onto 
another. The purpose is to create a situation in which the intended audience understands 
and experiences one argument or account in terms of another experience or policy 
frame.219 This process influences common understandings of policy issues and can help 
create strong narratives even in the face of new information, changing circumstances or 
contradictory evidence. 
 
                                                 
217 Chilton, Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice, 42-47. 
218  James Farr, "Understanding Conceptual Change Politically,"  Political Innovation and Conceptual 
Change, ed. Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), 27. 
219 Goerge Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By  (London: Chicago University Press, 2003), 
5.; Dvora Yanow, "Interpretation in Policy Analysis: On Methods and Practice," Critical Policy 
Studies 1, no. 1 (2007): 115-17. 
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However, the expectations established in political communication can also constrain 
political action and discourse often has unintended consequences. This can create 
rhetorical entrapment for policy actors when their previous statements serve to either 
compel them to take certain actions and not others or undermine their credibility.220 
Common instances are mandatory sentencing and red line issues which contain 
conditional warnings. A further obstacle is what Michaels terms a discourse trap. This 
occurs when an entire policy discourse creates rhetorical entrapment or steers a policy 
process in an unintended direction.221 Cimbala uses the US security guarantee to Taiwan 
as an example of policy ‘self-entrapment.’222 He notes that American policymakers ‘have 
held this contradictory and anachronistic view for so long, we cannot reconsider that 
commitment even if conditions have changed without appearing to be weak.’223 Discourse 
traps serve as a demonstration of the power of political communication. They may be 
subtler and wider in scope than rhetorical entrapment, but discourse traps represent the 
same fundamental process of communication influencing deliberate policy decision-
making. As a consequence, discourse can be discounted as purely rhetorical in the 
absence of clear commitments to states principles. 
 
Although rhetoric can be a powerful tool, statements of intent can lack credibility if they 
appear to be over-reaching in scope or beyond a policy actor’s ability to action. 
                                                 
220  For examples of this phenomenon, see Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, 
Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union."; Jean-Frederic Morin and 
E. Richard Gold, "Consensus-Seeking, Distrust and Rhetorical Entrapment: The Wto Decision on 
Access to Medicines," European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 4 (2010).; Roger C. 
Aden, "Entrapment and Escape: Inventional Metaphors in Ronald Reagan's Economic Rhetoric," 
Southern Communication Journal 54, no. 4 (1989). 
221 Michaels, The Discourse Trap and the Us Military.; Adam Hodges, The 'War on Terror' Narrative: 
Discourse and Intertextuality in the Construction and Contestation of Sociopolitical Reality  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
222 Cimbala, Military Persuasion in War and Policy, 242. 
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Consequently, strategic communication often involves demonstration of commitment to 
establish credibility.224 The bigger the claim, the greater the show of commitment might 
need to be. 225  This distinguishes ‘cheap talk’ which lacks credibility from credible 
signals.226 Credible or ‘costly’ signals can require generating ‘audience costs’ for the 
sender.227 This involves making statements and commitments which deliberately entrap 
actors and will impose costs on them if not upheld.228 Another means of establishing 
credibility through signalling is by demonstrating the stated capacity to undertake 
particular policy responses. An extreme example would be nuclear weapons tests, but a 
more common example would be demonstrating military capabilities to external 
audiences. Many countries try to actively influence external perceptions of the 
professionalism and abilities of their military forces. Australia sees this as a key 
component of its strategic signalling, stating that  
A nation's 'strategic posture' is the expression of how it seeks to secure its strategic 
interests, including by reducing the risk of conﬂict in the ﬁrst place, and how it would 
potentially use force in relation to its strategic interests.
229
 
 
This combines the capacity to undertake specific tasks and the political commitment to do 
so in certain circumstances. In addition, the ADF carefully considers it appearance as a 
                                                 
224 Schelling, Arms and Influence.; Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military 
Threats  (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007). 
225  Valentin Krustev, "Strategic Demands, Credible Threats and Economic Coercion Outcomes," 
International Studies Quarterly 54, no. 1 (2010).; Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young, 
"Terrorism, Democracy, and Credible Commitments," ibid.55, no. 2 (2011). 
226 Press, Calculating Credibility, 8, 15.; James D. Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands 
Versus Sinking Costs," Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 1 (1997): 69. 
227 "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs," 69.; Joe Clare, "Domestic 
Audiences and Strategic Interests," The Journal of Politics 69, no. 03 (2007). 
228 See Vesna Danilovic, "The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence," Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 45, no. 3 (2001); James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of 
International Disputes," The American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994). 
229 Department of Defence, "Force 2030," para. 6.1. 
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formidable opponent to other militaries in order to maximise its credibility as a fighting 
force. 
 
The ADF uses the term ‘defence posture’ to describe itself, in terms of size, disposition, 
capabilities and activities, and also Australia’s political disposition regarding the use of 
armed force.230 Equal to the physical determination of military capability is the signalling 
of Australia’s intentions for the use of military capability. Therefore, Australia’s defence 
posture needs to be consistent with strategic guidance set by government.231 Accordingly, 
the ADF aims to master the profession of arms and also to be perceived internationally as 
a formidable and responsible fighting force. In order to maximise credibility as a fighting 
force, the ADF focuses its training and force structure on high-intensity conventional 
warfare.232 Australia will promote international recognition of the ADF’s proficiency in 
military operations in order to maximise its credibility as a deterrent force. Defence will 
also respond to military threats to Australia. 233  Defence and ADF policies and 
publications further intend to signal to the international community that the ADF is: able 
to defend Australia from attack without assistance from another country’s combat forces; 
able to control or deny Australia’s air and maritime approaches; primarily defensive in 
nature; and able to contribute to international coalitions and similar contingencies as they 
arise.234 The emphasis placed on signalling indicates that communication is deliberately 
considered in the formulation of Australia’s strategic policy. 
 
                                                 
230 Australian Defence Force, "Australia's Approach to Warfare," 19-20. 
231 "Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine," Australian Defence Doctrine Publication-D (Canberra: 
Defence Publishing Service, 2005), para. 2.30. 
232 "Australia's Approach to Warfare," 20. 
233 "Addp-D," para. 2.33. 
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Actors in Australian policy rhetoric  
Australia is a Westminster styled parliamentary democracy in which the Executive has a 
large amount of influence and discretion regarding foreign policy and diplomatic 
affairs.235 The Prime Minister is the central voice of foreign and defence policy guidance 
to government departments, the Australian public and international audiences. Through 
their position as the central exponent of Australian foreign and security policy, the Prime 
Minister plays a more significant role than any other individual politician in articulating 
the Commonwealth government’s policy objectives and priorities.236 The Prime Minister 
has historically played a large role in defence policy debates by framing security issues 
and delivering statements about defence issues to the public. The Prime Minster is the 
most authoritative source of strategic level signalling of Australia’s political intentions 
because they are recognised both domestically and internationally as the highest political 
authority in the Commonwealth Government.237 This means that their statements have the 
most validity to various audiences and can be taken as important policy guidance to 
government departments. 
 
The second most prominent political voice in defence policy is the Minister for Defence, 
who is responsible for the Department of Defence, ADF238 and much of the Defence 
Organisation apart from Defence Materials. The Minister for Defence is the central voice 
                                                 
235 Alan J. Ward, Parliamentary Government in Australia  (London and New York: Anthem Press, 2014), 
129-35. 
236  Paul Strangio, "Prime Minsterial Government in Australia,"  Contemporary Politics in Australia: 
Theories, Practices and Issues, ed. Rodney Smith, Ariadne Vromen, and Ian Cook (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 238-40. 
237 Patrick Weller and Jenny Flemming, "The Commonwealth,"  Australian Politics and Government: The 
Commonwealth, the States and the Territories, ed. Jeremy Moon and Campbell Sharman 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 18, 34-39. 
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of defence policy decisions and regularly announces changes or additions to Australian 
defence priorities, capabilities and policies. The Minister for Defence sets the agenda for 
the Defence Organisation by framing policy issues and assigning priority values to 
particular objectives and tasks. They also reflect core institutional ideas embedded in the 
bureaucracy of the Defence Organisation because the way that briefs and advice 
generated within the institution are framed and filtered.239 The Prime Minister and the 
Minister for Defence collectively account for the vast majority of policy statements 
regarding capabilities, technology and relative advantage. They are also the most 
respected authorities due to their role in overseeing the governance of defence policy. 240 
For these reasons, the Prime Minister and Minister for Defence have been selected as the 
focus of the political discourse regarding capability advantage. 
 
It is important to note that other political actors have also participated in the political 
discourse of capability advantage. Most notably, Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Minister 
for Defence Material, leaders of the opposition, and Shadow Ministers for Defence, 
Foreign Affairs and Defence Material. However, their statements have not been included 
in the study for three interrelated reasons. First, other ministers have made relatively few 
statements regarding capability advantage. The Minister for Defence Material often 
discusses military capability, force structure decisions and procurement projects. 
However, due to the scope of the portfolio, they frequently discuss capability and 
procurement issues from a technical or project management perspective rather than a 
                                                 
239 Maria Maley, "Politicisation of the Executive,"  Contemporary Politics in Australia: Theories, Practices 
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defence policy perspective. Second, other politicians in government have made 
substantially fewer statements on capability advantage than the Prime Minister and 
Minister for Defence. This presents two challenges for inclusion: consistency of data and 
relevance of statements to decision-making and agenda-setting. Third, shadow ministers 
and to a lesser degree minsters from other portfolios lack comparable domain-specific 
authority in government. They engage in debate in ways that influence public and 
external opinions about Australia, but they do not have the ability to make and enforce 
decisions in the government of the time. Shadow ministers may reflect political ideas 
which later come to prominence, but they also have domestic political incentives to 
criticise government policies which they may not intend to change if they come to power. 
 
Data collection and reduction 
The data set used includes all principal policy documents released in the public domain 
and selected public speeches and statements made by the Prime Minister and Minister for 
Defence, as the two most authoritative sources of credible signalling of Australia’s 
strategic policy, and Parliamentary statements and responses by the Minster for Defence 
regarding military capability and relative advantage.241 Selection criteria for inclusion in 
the data set was reference to any issue relevant to: existing or planned military capability 
at the strategic level, capability development and force structure planning, the role of 
technology in force posture or employment decisions, the use of military technology to 
provide security to the Australian public, the adoption of military capabilities or 
                                                 
241  Only primary sources which originated during the period of study are included in the data. This 
preserves the consistency of data used, ensures relevance to establishing historical events in their 
original context and prevents issues of hindsight, bias and self-interest from affecting recollections 
of events in reflective research methods such as interviews, questionnaires and surveys. 
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technologies that influenced concepts of operations or military doctrine, Australia’s 
strategic interests or objectives, the scope of Australia’s military interests and the 
signalling of Australia’s intentions vis-à-vis any of the above. Not included in the data set 
were items which related to: specific operational-level policies,242 policy implementation 
and specific material procurement projects. The scope of the discourse was delineated by 
the relevance of modes of communication in influencing common conceptions of political 
concepts.243 Thus, strategic-level communication is more likely to influence strategic-
level political concepts than discourse reflecting policy machinations.  
 
The data set includes 2,189 documents. These were drawn from a larger body using the 
data reduction techniques explained in the data collection section of this chapter. The data 
set is comprised of all key policy documents which were released to the public at the time 
of publication or, in the case of the 1989 Strategic Planning document, soon after initial 
publication. Table 2 lists the sources included as policy documents in the data set. The 
data set includes statements made by Prime Minsters during the period 1968-2009 
regarding capability advantage. The kind of statements used in the data set include 
speeches, prepared policy statements, transcripts of television or radio interviews and 
transcripts of responses to media questions during public announcements and doorstop 
interviews.  Table 3 lists all Prime Minsters during the period of study in chronological 
order and the number of sources attributable to each one. 
 
                                                 
242 The term operational is used here in the public policy sense, rather than the military sense. The military 
equivalent would be the tactical level of analysis. See Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, Making 
Australian Foreign Policy  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 33-35. 
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Finally, the data set includes statements made by all Ministers for Defence throughout the 
period 1968-2009, concluding with Joel Fitzgibbon’s departure in late 2009. The period 
in late 2009 where John Faulkner became Minister for Defence is not included in the data 
set as it did not produce sufficient data to be significant. The kind of statements used in 
the data set include speeches, prepared policy statements, statements made to Parliament, 
transcripts of television or radio interviews, Hansard extracts and transcripts of responses 
to media questions during public announcements. Table 4 lists all Minsters for Defence 
during the period of study in chronological order and the number of sources attributable 
to each one. 
 
The data set is organised into four periods to reflect major changes in the defence policy 
discourse through the period 1968-2009. The first period, 1968-1978, includes the earliest 
clear discussion of self-reliance issues with reference to technology through the 
development and articulation of the technological level concept in the 1970s. It begins 
with an Australia still reeling from the withdrawal of Britain from Southeast Asia, 
through the latter half of the Vietnam War and into the vigorous defence debates of the 
mid-1970s that culminated in the first white paper. The second period, 1979-1986, begins 
with the year of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This was a major international event 
with significant influence on the Australian defence discourse. It brought sharp focus to 
some aspects of the defence policy debate and was a catalyst for a change in policy actors’ 
approaches to discussing defence issues. This continued into the early 1980s, with 
renewed discussion of Australia’s force projection needs with the impending retirement 
of HMAS Melbourne and infighting and stymied progress on long term force structure 
planning priorities. The third period, 1987-1996, follows the debate from the watershed 
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1987 defence white paper through the early 1990s and up to the Howard government’s 
strategic policy paper of 1997. The late 1980s and early 1990s was a tumultuous period 
for Australia’s defence policy, with the reimagining of defence self-reliance, the end of 
the Cold War, several crises in North Asia and a change of government all in the space of 
a decade. The final period, 1997-2009, begins with the Howard government’s document 
Australia’s Strategic Policy and its conceptual successor, the 2000 white paper. It also 
includes Australia’s post-9/11 policy responses, including three defence policy updates, 
up to the Rudd government’s 2009 defence white paper Force 2030, which returned much 
of Australia’s defence policy debate to key principles outline in the 2000 white paper. 
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Table 2: Key policy documents in data set 
Period Documents 
1968-1979 Defence Committee (1968). Strategic basis of Australian defence policy. 
Canberra, Department of Defence. 
Defence Committee (1971). Strategic basis of Australian defence policy. 
Canberra, Department of Defence. 
Department of Defence (1972). Australian Defence Review. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service. 
Defence Committee (1973). Strategic basis of Australian defence policy. 
Canberra, Department of Defence. 
Department of Defence (1975). Australian defence: major decisions 
since December 1972. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing 
Service. 
Defence Committee (1975). Strategic basis of Australian defence policy. 
Canberra, Department of Defence. 
Department of Defence (1976). Australian defence. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service. 
Defence Committee (1976). Strategic basis of Australian defence policy. 
Canberra, Department of Defence. 
1980-1986 Dibb, P. (1986). Review of Australia's defence capabilities. Report for 
the Minister for Defence. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing 
Service. 
1987-1996 Department of Defence (1987). The defence of Australia. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service. 
Department of Defence (1989). Australia's strategic planning in the 
1990s. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service. 
Department of Defence (1991). Force structure review. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service. DPUBS 35/91. 
Department of Defence (1993). Strategic review. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. 
Department of Defence (1994). Defending Australia. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service. 
1997-2009 Department of Defence (1997). Australia's strategic policy. Canberra, 
Commonwealth of Australia. 
Chapter 2 
Research design 
 
 
 
 
88 
 
Department of Defence (2000). Defence 2000: our future defence force. 
Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia. 
Department of Defence (2003). Australia's national security. Canberra, 
Defence Publishing Service. 
Department of Defence (2005). Australia's national security: Defence 
update 2005. Canberra, Defence Publishing Service. 
Department of Defence (2006). Explaining NCW: Network Centric 
Warfare. Canberra, Defence Publishing Service. 
Department of Defence (2007). Defence ISR roadmap 2007-2017. 
Canberra, Defence Publishing Service. 
Department of Defence (2007). Australia's national security. Canberra, 
Defence Publishing Service. 
Department of Defence (2008). Looking over the horizon: Australians 
consider Defence. Canberra, Defence Publishing Service. 
Department of Defence (2009). NCW roadmap 2009. Canberra, Defence 
Publishing Service. 
Department of Defence (2009). Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific 
century: Force 2030. Canberra, Defence Publishing Service. 
Total = 24 
 
Table 3: Prime Ministerial speeches in data set 
Prime Minister Date Number of documents 
Gorton 1968-1971 144 
McMahon 1971-1972 86 
Whitlam 1972-1975 146 
Fraser 1975-1983 257 
Hawke 1983-1991 327 
Keating 1991-1996 185 
Howard 1996-2007 365 
Rudd 2007-2009 273 
Total = 1,783 
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Table 4: Minister for Defence speeches in data set 
Minister for Defence Date Number of documents 
Fairhall 1968-1969 8 
Fraser 1969-1971 21 
Gorton 1971-1971 1 
Fairbairn 1971-1972 5 
Barnard 1972-1975 5 
Morrison 1975-1975 6 
Killen 1975-1982 29 
Sinclair 1982-1983 32 
Scholes 1983-1984 7 
Beazley 1984-1990 34 
Ray 1990-1996 47 
McLachlan 1996-1998 5 
Moore 1998-2001 13 
Reith 2001-2001 21 
Hill 2001-2006 108 
Nelson 2006-2007 26 
Fitzgibbon 2007-2009 14 
Total = 382 
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The data collection process involved identifying all available records of policy documents 
and transcripts or recordings of relevant statements made by Prime Ministers and 
Ministers for Defence. The initial data set comprised a total of 3,418 documents. These 
were reviewed for relevance and the data set was manually reviewed and reduced to 
2,995 documents based on relevance of content. Documents were then entered into QDA 
software and thematically free coded. 244  Free coding was conducted in line with 
Grounded Theory open coding approaches which identify concepts and then organise 
them into categories.245 This allowed data reduction techniques, such as simplification 
and structural coding, 246 to reduce the data set down to 2189 documents. 
 
A Key Word In Context (KWIC) analysis247 was run on the free coded data set to validate 
and refine the initial coding schema developed. A simple Content Analysis (CA) was also 
used to validate the key concepts used in the coding scheme. These analyses identified 
some necessary conceptual changes to the initial coding scheme and led to some 
reorganisation of the QDA model subsequently used for data analysis. The declassified 
strategic basis from the 1960s and 1970s documents were then removed from the final 
data set because they were not publicly released policy statements at the time they were in 
use and were not comparable to publicly released policy guidance documents. The 
                                                 
244 Greg Guest, Kathleen M. MacQueen, and Emily E. Namey, Applied Thematic Analysis  (Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications, 2011). 
245 H. Russell Bernard and Gerry W. Ryan, Analyzing Qualitative Data: Systematic Approaches  (London: 
Sage, 2010), 271-73.; Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 541-45. 
246 Matthew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook  
(Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1994), 10-12.; Emily E. Namey et al., "Data Reduction 
Techniques for Large Qualitative Data Sets,"  Handbook for Team-Based Qualitative Research, ed. 
Greg Guest and Kathleen M. MacQueen (Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 140-44. 
247 Bernard and Ryan, Analyzing Qualitative Data, 192-93. 
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unavailability of current classified policy planning documents with in defence meant that 
the strategic basis papers would also create an inconsistent data set. 
 
The complete data set was then coded from scratch using the new coding scheme. The 
number of document from the data set which contained directly useful information was 
730. These documents were coded and used in the data analysis because they contain 
information identified as directly relevant to the study. Documents which were not coded 
were retained in the data set because they give context to the coded documents in two 
ways. First, they allow a simple metric of sources which discuss defence policy issues 
compared to the proportion of sources which directly discuss capability advantage. This is 
a useful comparison because it demonstrates the prevalence of capability in broader 
defence policy discourse. Second, they offer context to specific decisions and issues 
which arose during the period of study. This means that at any point where a significant 
policy is announced, there are documents which show what other issues were prominent 
in the defence discourse at the same time. This is useful because it shows the relative 
weight of capability advantage issues compared to other important policy priorities at the 
same time. 
 
It is also important to note that the starting data set of 2,189 documents is significant 
because it shows the number of times relevant defence issues were raised. This is a useful 
benchmark when examining the final data set of 730 documents as it gives a crude 
indication of the proportion of defence statements which actively discussed relative 
advantage and the related concepts or issues identified in the coding scheme. The 
frequency of usage is presented as numerical data in Appendix B: Data Sheets, but the 
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numerical data are not considered as evidence in their own right. Although the data set is 
empirical and often uses numbers to demonstrate frequency of coding in the data, the 
analysis is qualitative and not quantitative in nature. As such, numerical data are used 
only for illustration and not for quantitative analysis of statistically significant trends. 
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Table 5: Key policy documents (coded) 
Period Documents 
1968-1979 Department of Defence (1972). Australian Defence Review. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service. 
Department of Defence (1976). Australian defence. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. 
1987-1996 Department of Defence (1987). The defence of Australia. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service. 
Department of Defence (1989). Australia's strategic planning in the 
1990s. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service. 
Department of Defence (1991). Force structure review. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service. DPUBS 35/91. 
Department of Defence (1993). Strategic review. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. 
Department of Defence (1994). Defending Australia. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service. 
1997-2009 Department of Defence (1997). Australia's strategic policy. Canberra, 
Commonwealth of Australia.  
Department of Defence (2000). Defence 2000: our future defence force. 
Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia. 
Department of Defence (2003). Australia's national security. Canberra, 
Defence Publishing Service. 
Department of Defence (2005). Australia's national security: Defence 
update 2005. Canberra, Defence Publishing Service. 
Department of Defence (2007). Australia's national security. Canberra, 
Defence Publishing Service. 
Department of Defence (2009). Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific 
century: Force 2030. Canberra, Defence Publishing Service. 
Total = 13 
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Table 6: Prime Ministerial speeches (coded) 
Prime Minister Date Number of documents 
Gorton 1968-1971 39 
McMahon 1971-1972 25 
Whitlam 1972-1975 33 
Fraser 1975-1983 59 
Hawke 1983-1991 70 
Keating 1991-1996 49 
Howard 1996-2007 103 
Rudd 2007-2009 38 
Total = 416 
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Table 7: Minister for Defence speeches (coded) 
Minister for Defence Date Number of documents 
Fairhall 1968-1969 6 
Fraser 1969-1971 18 
Gorton 1971-1971 1 
Fairbairn 1971-1972 3 
Barnard 1972-1975 5 
Morrison 1975-1975 3 
Killen 1975-1982 23 
Sinclair 1982-1983 24 
Scholes 1983-1984 6 
Beazley 1984-1990 33 
Ray 1990-1996 39 
McLachlan 1996-1998 4 
Moore 1998-2001 11 
Reith 2001-2001 16 
Hill 2001-2006 75 
Nelson 2006-2007 23 
Fitzgibbon 2007-2009 11 
Total = 301 
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1.4 Research model  
The research method used in the core chapters is a QDA model which allows for thematic 
and narrative analysis of policy documents and Ministerial speeches and statements. It is 
quite powerful in that it uses a large volume of data to create a substantial empirical basis 
for comparison. However, it also faces two key limitations. The first is that interpretive 
policy analysis requires some degree of informed interpretation regarding the intended 
message of a particular statement.248 This inferred meaning is accounted for in the coding 
scheme, but may not be entirely accurate in application due to researcher error, 
ambiguous, unclear or misspoken statements. The second is that narrowing the scope to 
public discourse of a policy prevents uncovering the ‘real story’249 of what happened 
behind closed doors in sensitive policy domains such as defence. 250  This is not a 
significant limitation for this study as relative advantage has been a concept which was 
discussed publicly, signalled deliberately and directly to the public and to external 
audiences and used in open source literature to explain policy. Although there may be a 
real story 251  of what happened within the Department of Defence, the story being 
examined here is strictly the public discourse of relative advantage. Although the policy 
machinations within Defence would doubtlessly tell an interesting story about the use of 
                                                 
248 Dvora Yanow, Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis  (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2000), 
14-23. 
249 Marten D. Shipman, The Limitations of Social Research  (Essex: Longman, 1997), 58-59, 67-70. 
250 Although public policy studies often gravitate toward behind-the-scenes ‘real stories’ from involved 
parties, the viewpoint of practitioners is not objective and cannot be considered to be the only 
relevant account for historical events. 
251 The term ‘real story’ is used here to refer to the perspective that Defence officials would have, which 
would be based primarily on information available in their workplace, including secret information 
which was not shared with the public, rather than on the public discourse of strategic policy. 
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the concept of relative advantage in policy, that story would answer fundamentally 
different research questions.252 
 
This section explains the research model used in the core chapters. It begins by detailing 
the three core variables used to thematically differentiate concepts in the data. It then 
explains the coding scheme developed and applied to the data set. Finally, it provides the 
QDA data sheets which were used as validity tests and which demonstrate the broad 
trends in the discourse which support the main arguments of the thesis and justify the 
specific periodisation used to compartmentalise the data and separate it into chapters. 
 
Research variables 
The central purpose of the research is to examine the conceptual evolution of relative 
advantage in Australian strategic policy in the era of self-reliance. This research objective 
entails four subordinate questions. First, how has relative advantage been defined 
throughout the period? This question needs to be answered in several contexts: time 
period, medium of communication, political agent and referent actors. Second, have 
related political ideas influenced or coincided with conceptual change? Answering this 
question requires an examination of the correlation between conceptions of technology 
and, more specifically, the role of technology in Australian strategy and force structure 
planning within the Defence Organisation and shifts in the ways relative advantage was 
conceptualised. Third, how has the concept of relative advantage been deployed as a tool 
of strategic communication? This question differentiates between the communication of 
                                                 
252 The reason for this being that perspectives of bureaucrats on specific policies they worked on is a very 
different object of study to the public discourse of policy. 
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relative advantage as a policy implement and the rhetoric of relative advantage as a tool 
of communication for signalling purposes. Any answer to this question requires several 
typological contexts, including: audiences, overarching signal types and time period. 
Finally, has relative advantage been used in discourse as a prescriptive or descriptive 
concept? In other words, has the evolution of the concept occurred in response to 
changing strategic circumstances that warranted differing conceptions of relative 
advantage, or did evolution describe changes that occurred for other reasons? 
 
The analysis is based around three core variables. The first variable examines the policy 
context in which relative advantage has been used and elements of that context which 
correspond with conceptual changes within and across periods. The first step in 
establishing the policy context is a qualitative examination of the use of key terms in 
discourse. Specifically, terms which relate to technology, capability and advantage are 
counted and analysed. The CA is followed by a KWIC analysis of key terms to verify 
contextual usage. This indicates the meaning attributed to key terms by political 
organisations and leaders in each period. The second step is an examination of the scope 
of Australia’s strategic interests and objectives as communicated in official documents 
and by political leaders in public addresses and Parliamentary questions. This indicates 
the potential strategic reach of relative advantage. The final step involves measuring the 
emphasis placed on referents of relative advantage. The referent actor(s) for the concept 
are the state or states that a military advantage is intended to be relative to. This 
determines the quality and type of capabilities required to maintain an advantage relative 
to the capabilities of the states identified. 
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The second variable is the role of institutional ideas, specifically strategic concepts, in 
shaping conceptual change.253 The most important institutional ideas to relative advantage 
are dominant approaches to force structure planning and force employment concepts of 
operations. These ideas may also indicate the degree of influence that the availability of 
new technologies had on force structure planning and whether strategic objectives 
determined capability needs or available capability influenced Australia’s strategic 
ambition. Another key institutional idea is the role of technology in how the purpose of 
relative advantage is conceptualised, what technology or capability is intended to do 
within the concept and what the purpose of relative advantage was in achieving the 
strategic objectives of the time. The role of technology in institutional thinking 
establishes the purpose of the concept: what it is intended to do in terms of strategic 
objectives. It also conceptualises how technology is intended to be used to achieve this 
purpose. These considerations are interrelated. For example, if the technological level is 
primarily about a) an expansion base for the capability that is actually desired and b) 
signalling Australia’s industrial strengths to adversaries, allies and the Australian public, 
then there is a discrete relationship between the purpose of technology, as an expansion 
base, and the purpose of generating and sustaining the terminal force.  
 
The third variable is communicating and sending strategic signals. At the highest level, 
this is performed by the Prime Minister and Minister for Defence. At the organisational 
level, strategic signalling is performed by the Department of Defence and the ADF. The 
combination of policy statements which signal political intent with demonstrations that 
                                                 
253 Lieberman, "Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change."; John L. Campbell, 
"Ideas, Politics, and Public Policy," Annual Review of Sociology 28(2002). 
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show the ADF to be a skilled and formidable military creates the ADF’s force posture.254 
For example, then-Minister for Defence, Lance Barnard signalled that Australia’s 
‘…defence force in being should be adequate to indicate our resolution and our ability to 
defend Australian interests and to support others, should the need arise.’255 The political 
communication of the relative advantage concept demonstrates themes in the discourse 
that are directed toward three audiences: potential adversaries, allies and regional security 
partners, and the Australian public. This variable examines signalling themes that relate to 
deterring potential adversaries or competitors, reassurance of allies and regional security 
partners, and validation of Australia’s capacity for self-reliant defence to the public.256 
Validation to the public also involves justification for significant defence procurement 
expenditure and provides a discursive mechanism in the public policy process. 
 
These variables examine the way that relative advantage has been discussed and 
communicated in open source political discourse in Australia to shape perceptions of 
Australia’s defence credibility among three target audiences: potential aggressors, 
security partners and the Australian public. Each of the core chapters analyse these three 
elements of the political discourse regarding relative advantage in separate sections. The 
first is the policy context in which the concept transformed and measures the scope and 
referent actor(s) associated with relative advantage. The second is a survey of the 
                                                 
254 Australian Defence Force, "Australia's Approach to Warfare," 19-20. 
255 Lance Herbert Barnard, "Ministerial Statement," House of Representatives Hansard (1974), 1. 
256 McAllister and  Makkai hypothesise that individuals characteristics, such as status and values, combined 
with political and partisan preferences influence public attitudes towards defence policy. See: 
McAllister, Ian, and Makkai, Toni, ‘Changing Australian Opinion on Defence: Trends, Patterns, 
and Explanations,’ Small Wars & Insurgencies 2(3), 1991: 196. 
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dominant institutional ideas257 about the role of technology in Australia’s force posture 
which may have influenced the way in which relative advantage transformed. The third is 
the strategic communication of the concept to international audiences for purposes of 
deterrence to potential aggressors and credibility to allies and to domestic audiences for 
the purpose of justifying defence policies and expenditure and reassurance that the ADF 
is capable of defending Australia. The purpose is to capture the evolution of the concept 
in its strategic policy, institutional and communicative contexts within each period. As 
such, each coding node tree corresponds to one section of the core chapters and to one of 
the three subordinate questions identified in the research design. 
 
Coding scheme 
The coding scheme used in the thesis is based on the above three core variables, dealing 
with policy context, strategic concepts and strategic signalling. Each of the variables 
represents one major node in the coding scheme, with each of these major nodes being the 
top of a three level node hierarchy. Each major node is broken down into three 
subordinate nodes and each subordinate node has a number of nodes below it, ranging 
from two to six, which represent attributes of each subordinate node. 
 
Policy Context 
The policy context node represents the first variable examined in the research design. It 
captures the context in which relative advantage was expressed across the four time 
                                                 
257 Campbell, "Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy."; Lieberman, "Ideas, 
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periods studied. Policy context is broken into three key nodes: content analysis, referent 
actor and policy scope. 
 
CA (Content Analysis) 
The content analysis node records the instances of key terms and concepts used in 
the data set. It measures the concepts of advantage, capability and technology. 
 
 
 
 Advantage 
The advantage node records the number of references to the concept of 
reltive advantage, often expressed as an edge, in the data. 
   
Capability 
The capability node records the number of references to military capability 
(capacity) or capabilities in the data. 
 
Technology 
The technology node records the frequency of references to technology or 
technological level in the data. 
 
Referent 
The referent node captures a range of attributes associated with the type of actor 
referred to in claims regarding relative capability or material resources. This 
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identifies the actors who were considered benchmarks for Australia’s relative 
advantage. 
  
Great Powers 
The great powers node records references to maintaining a technological 
level relative to great power alliance partners or other major powers. It 
includes references to interoperability in situations where high-technology 
systems were deemed necessary to match the material capability of 
alliance partners. 
Indonesia 
The Indonesia node records instances where Indonesia was referred to, 
either explicitly or as a separate actor to the rest of the region, as a referent 
object of relative advantage. 
 
Neighbourhood 
The neighbourhood node records inferences to an advantage relative to 
states of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, often termed Australia's 
‘immediate regional neighbourhood’ in policy documents. 
 
Regional 
The regional node refers to regional actors in the wider Asia-Pacific region, 
rather than the immediate neighbourhood. 
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Policy Scope  
The policy scope node records the scope of Australia's publicly stated strategic 
interests and signalled intentions for the acquisition and use of military capability. 
 
  DOA 
The DOA node captures instances where strategic objectives were related 
to the security and defence of Australia. 
  
Global 
The global node records instances where the scope of strategic policy 
statements extended to expeditionary operations or complementarity with 
allies for the purpose of conducting coalition warfare. 
 
  Regional 
The regional node records instances where the scope of strategic policy 
statements related to regional security and stability. 
 
Concept 
The strategic concepts node includes the policy ideas and strategic concepts used in 
defence and strategic policy documents or statements.  It records the rationales offered in 
policy statements about the reasons for Australia’s pursuit of relative advantage. The 
concept node is broken into the edge, posture and rationale nodes. 
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Edge 
The edge node records the type of 'edge' proposed in policy statements and the 
role that technology is presented as playing in facilitating that edge. 
 
Coordination 
The coordination node records instances where the type of edge identified in 
policy statements was information or knowledge based or involved 
communications technology or Network Centric Warfare. 
 
Core Force 
The core force node records instances where the type of edge identified in policy 
statements was based on technology as an enabler for a core force or force-in-
being with significant existing capabilities and the potential for expansion within 
accepted warning timeframes. 
 
Expansion 
The expansion node records instances where the type of edge identified in policy 
statements presented technology, or a level of industrial or technological 
development in society, as a base for rapid expansion of the ADF into a terminal 
force which could take a range of forms to meet emerging threats. 
 
Material 
The material node records instances where the type of edge identified in policy 
statements involved a technological edge in the ADF’s existing military 
platforms, including force multiplication capabilities. 
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Posture 
The posture node examines force posture and force structure signalling, including 
signalling of intentions and interests and dominant force structure considerations. 
  
Contingencies 
The contingencies node records signalling of force structure planning for 
‘credible contingencies’ of armed aggression against Australia. 
 
Core Force 
The core force node records signalling of force structure priorities that emphasise 
a core force as an expansion base for a terminal force. 
 
Denial 
The denial node records signalling of force structure planning that emphasises a 
clear deterrent or intention to control Australia’s threat environment. 
 
Expeditionary 
The expeditionary node records signalling of force structure planning that 
emphasises expeditionary capabilities and/or complementarity with allies for 
forward deployment purposes. 
 
Self-reliance 
The self-reliance node records signalling of force structure principles which 
emphasise self-reliance in the defence of Australia 
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SSTR 
The SSTR node records signalling of force structure planning for low-intensity 
security, stability, transition and recovery type operations, including regional 
stabilisation and humanitarian missions. 
 
Rationale 
The rationale node examines the technological and political justifications presented for 
Australia’s claimed need for relative advantage. 
Cutting Edge 
The cutting edge node records references to Australia materially possessing high 
technology military weapons and systems. 
 
Industry 
The industry node records references to the role of Australian defence industry in 
Australia’s relative advantage or a stated need to support the Australian defence 
industry to supply high-technology weapons, equipment and systems. 
 
Mitigating 
The mitigating node records references to high-technology platforms or relative 
advantage to offset costs of Australia’s strategic disadvantages, such as 
population and quantity or military personnel.   
 
Relative 
The relative node records references to a need for capability or military 
technology to create or sustain a relative advantage over any other actor. 
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Signals 
The signals node examines references to defence interests, force posture and capability 
edge in public statements and documents intended to signal or communicate a political or 
policy message to an audience. The signals node is broken into the deterrence, 
reassurance and validation nodes. 
 
Deterrence  
The deterrence node examines signals sent to potential adversaries to emphasise 
Australia's military capability in order to dissuade or deter military action against 
Australa or its interests 
 
Force Employment 
The force employment node records deterrence signals based on the 
employment of force elements such as force multipliers, doctrine and 
training advantages as well as enhanced co-ordination offered by advanced 
C4ISR(EW). 
 
  Platform 
The platform node records deterrence signals based purely on the 
qualitative capability advantage associated with specific major weapons 
systems and platforms. 
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Reassurance  
The reassurance node examines signals intended to reassure allies and regional 
security partners of Australia’s security commitments and defence capabilities. 
   
Credible Ally 
The credible ally node records signals that Australia is a credible security 
partner with a defence force able to deter aggressors and offer support to 
security partners and allies in a conflict or crisis. 
   
Response 
The response node records signals that Australia has the intention and/or 
capability to provide assistance in response to a security crisis, such as 
SSTR operations and humanitarian assistance and internal stability support. 
   
Support 
The support node records signals which support Australia’s intention and 
capacity to provide niche skills and equipment, such as logistics, 
intelligence and special operations forces, to security partners and allies. 
  
Validation 
The validation node examines signals intended to justify the need for (and costs of) 
relative advantage to domestic audiences. 
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Justification 
The justification nodes records signals validating significant public 
expenditure on high-technology defence capability or platforms or 
equipment specifically intended to create or maintain relative advantage. 
 
Morale 
The morale node records signals which appeal to the morale and sense of 
nationalism of the Australian public, including the representation of the 
ADF as an inherently and qualitatively superior fighting force to other 
states’ militaries. 
 
Security 
The security node records signals which discuss the security (to Australia 
and Australian citizens) provided by the ADF and claims that a high-tech 
ADF is more capable of providing security to the Australian people. 
 
Chapter conclusions 
This chapter presents a framework for analysis designed to examine data on Australian 
defence policy discourse. It began by conceptualising relative advantage in three distinct 
ways: as an evolving concept, as a representation of technocracy in Australian defence 
policy and as a means of communication and strategic signalling. It then explored the 
methodological issues involved in a history of ideas approach to process tracing and the 
challenges associated with interpreting policy narratives and identifying and analysing 
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causation in political rhetoric. It then explained the rationale for the data used in the 
analysis and detailed the data collection and reduction methods used to process the data 
set into its final form. Finally, the chapter explained the methods used in the analysis by 
explicating the research questions and variables, detailing the coding scheme used to 
identify and track specific concepts throughout the data and providing data sheets which 
validated the research model used. The data sheets also support two central arguments of 
the thesis: that specific aspects of relative advantage and broader concepts in Australian 
defence policy have been emphasised at different times and for different reasons; and that 
the progression from one form of relative advantage to another was not a linear 
progression but rather the result of a haphazard reformulation of various policy objectives 
and strategic interest which made sense in their own contexts but so not cohere into a 
sensible pattern in the context of relative advantage. 
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Chapter 2  
1968-1978: Emergence of the technological level concept 
In 1968-1970 Australia’s great power allies began to rethink their commitments to the 
Asia-Pacific. Britain announced that it was withdrawing its forward based forces from 
Southeast Asia and the US raised the threshold for military assistance to its allies in 
Southeast Asia. Although Australia continued to receive support from its allies, the 
possibility of maintaining the existing policy of Forward Defence without the presence 
and material contributions of at least one great power ally was remote. Then-Prime 
Minster John Gorton believed that the British withdrawal underpinned a ‘fundamental 
change’258 in the basis of Australia’s strategic planning. He believed that the combination 
of the accelerated withdrawal from Malaysia and the uncertainty of British commitments 
to return to militarily support the defence and stability of the region. In Gorton’s view, a 
significant consequence for Australia was that: 
…a concept of forward defence by troops stationed outside Australia, valid when based 
upon participation with local forces of a major power, needed minute examination when 
the forces of that major power were to be withdrawn and the circumstances of their re-
entry were unknown.
259
 
 
                                                 
258 John Grey Gorton, "Speech by the Prime Minister, Rt. Hon. J. G. Gorton, M.P.," National Press Club 
(Hotel Canberra Rex, Canberra1968). 
259 Ibid., 2. 
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 With Forward Defence becoming untenable, Australia began to view itself for the first 
time as a more independent actor in its own defence. The prospect of self-reliance was 
daunting at first, but by the late 1970s Australian defence policy had completely reversed 
the previous perspective of indefensibility and replaced it with self-reliant policy and 
force structure. Part of that conceptual change was the emergence of technology as a 
means to enhance the military credibility of the ADF. 
 
This chapter examines the emergence of the ‘technological level’ concept, which was 
based primarily on the utility of Australia’s industrial base as a platform for force 
expansion, and its relationship to the political need to promote Australia’s credibility as a 
security partner within the region. It begins with the domestic political context of 
Australia’s defence policy during the period 1968-1979, which was characterised by 
tension between traditional policy goals and waning support for the long-incumbent 
Coalition government on one side and the broadly reformist policy agenda of the Labor 
opposition, which embraced the changing ideals and attitudes of a dissatisfied electorate. 
The chapter then examines the emergence of defence self-reliance in Australian strategic 
policy which was spurred by perceptions of British and American equivocation on their 
commitments to regional security in Southeast Asia and which had been building 
momentum through the 1960s.260 The chapter then analyses the data from this period, 
concluding that the concept of relative advantage which emerged in the late 1960s and 
throughout the 1970s was a distinct political concept which was qualitatively different to 
later conceptualisations of advantage. 
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2.1 A break from tradition 
The late 1960s and early 1970s was a tumultuous period in Australian politics. The 
disappearance of Harold Holt and elections which followed, combined with personality 
clashes within the coalition and mounting public opposition to national service and the 
Vietnam War created a challenging environment for political actors to navigate. The 
Coalition entered the 1970s with two decades of leadership experience behind it, but 
struggled to match the pace with the reinvigorated Labor party and it ambitious agenda 
for widespread policy reform.261 Although it was ultimately short-lived, the Whitlam 
Government introduced number of key principles into Australian politics, particularly in 
relation to equity issues, and which reflected the contemporary electorate’s attitudes 
towards social and political issues. The Coalition reclaimed power in the mid-1970s 
under the leadership of Malcolm Fraser and found itself managing a number of Labor’s 
ambitions. These broad trends are reflected in the development of Australia’s strategic 
policy, particularly in the emergence of relative advantage, as the Commonwealth 
negotiated the gap between the more aspirational policies that the electorate desired and 
the pragmatic limits on what the government could deliver. Seen in this light, Australia’s 
rapid journey from a junior partner in a security partnership between regional and major 
powers to a self-reliant and credible security partner in its own right appears to be less a 
reaction to defence policy circumstances than a parallel to the machinations of domestic 
politics and the interplay between politicians and the bureaucracy. 
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The coalition at war 
Harold Holt’s disappearance in December 1967 allowed simmering tensions between key 
members of the Coalition to rise to the surface. John McEwen served briefly as Prime 
Minister in the interim, but was replaced after only 19 days in office when the party held 
a leadership vote. McEwen supported John Gorton in the leadership vote, laying an 
effective veto against William McMahon by announcing that the Country Party would not 
serve in the Coalition under McMahon. This marked the beginning of a dark period for 
the Coalition during which internal squabbling and occasionally outright hostility 
between members drew attention from Labor’s emerging voice as a serious challenger to 
the Coalition’s traditional approach to policy. When McEwen retired from politics, in 
1971, Gorton was replaced by McMahon. However, the Coalition’s internal focus 
compounded popular perceptions that Cabinet had become too reliant on the bureaucracy 
to develop policy and became a thorn in McMahon’s side when he ran against Whitlam in 
the 1972 election. 
 
Gorton had become Prime Minister as the British and American commitments to 
Southeast Asia were waning and popular support for the Vietnam War had stalled. 
Defence was a hot political issue and Gorton recognised that substantial changes to the 
way that Australia planned for its defence were on the horizon. Nevertheless, he was 
known to draw heavily on the advice of his bureaucracy and often circumvented long 
lines of communication and decision-making.262 In 1969 both Allen Fairhall, Minister for 
Defence, and Sir Henry Bland, Secretary of the Department of Defence, retired, leaving 
Gorton with the task of finding suitable replacements. He appointed Malcolm Fraser 
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Minister and together they sought out Sir Arthur Tange for Secretary.  Tange’s 
appointment to Defence undercut McMahon, who was serving as Minister for External 
Affairs, and who had also intended to appoint Tange as Secretary.263 Tange was seen as a 
reformer, capable of continuing the administrative restructuring undertaken by Bland 
before his retirement. 264  Tange took over a department in the process of instituting 
unpopular but necessary reforms. However, instead of adopting the same approach as his 
predecessor, Tange was intent on taking his own stock of the vast Defence empire and 
beginning a long-tailed restructuring which would ultimately take decades to realise.265 
 
One of Tange’s first observations as incoming Secretary was that, after only weeks in 
office as Minister for Defence, Fraser’s frantic tempo was already taxing the senior 
Defence staff. 266  Tange and Fraser initially butted heads, exchanging terse notes 
regarding Fraser’s intrusion into the Department of Defence and the demands he placed 
on Tange’s staff. In September 1970, during a personal meeting between Fraser and 
Tange, a formidable relationship emerged. Fraser and Tange became powerful allies and 
began a program sweeping reforms to Defence in a short period of time. Tange continued 
the work even after Fraser was replaced as Minister for Defence in 1972. 267  Tange 
respected Fraser’s strategic outlook, but came to see Fraser’s policy vision, encapsulated 
in the 1970 Defence Statement, 268  as a victim of a vicious cycle in which liberal 
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governments made defence commitments for good reasons but later failed to follow 
through with, often expensive, capabilities needed to realise their earlier ambitions.269 
 
A cornerstone of Fraser’s thinking on Defence reform was to ‘ensure that each of the 
services prepares for the same kinds of conflicts, in the same places and in the same time 
scale.’270 In effect, Fraser foreshadowed the kind of joint operational planning which 
would later come to define many of Australia’s defence policies and doctrines.271 But he 
had to balance the program of change within Defence which he had promised to the 
Australian public with the unpopular deployment of Australian troops in Vietnam and the 
technical issues and fierce diplomatic rows which plagued the F-111 project.272 
Within Defence, Fraser found himself at odds with the Army and at the centre of political 
dispute involving the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Daly, 
and Gorton.273 Outside of it, he had to contend with the growing popularity of proposed 
reforms emanating from Whitlam’s shadow government. 
 
Although Gorton and Fraser had worked together well at first, their relationship quickly 
soured. Fraser became disillusioned with Gorton’s authoritarian approach to management 
and, despite backing Gorton’s bid for leadership of the Liberal Party in 1968 and having a 
mixed relationship with McMahon, Fraser was instrumental in Gorton’s downfall as 
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Prime Minster in 1971.274 When McMahon came to power, he attempted to refocus the 
Coalition’s message on the stalwarts of conservative policy. His reliance on staying the 
course emphasised the Coalition’s long tenure in government and his own experience in 
Parliament. However, this approach did little to alleviate concerns that the coalition was 
not up to the task of meeting the challenges that the 1970s presented, especially with 
regard to foreign and defence issues.275 Sullivan notes that: 
While Labor in the late 1960s and early 1970s enjoyed one of the most creative policy 
eras in its history, the Liberal–Country Party Coalition locked itself into the status quo, 
prepared to consider only minimalist and incremental policy change. Thus the McMahon 
Government withdrew some combat troops from Vietnam but retained unpopular, and 
probably unnecessary, conscription legislation which Labor readily turned to its political 
advantage.276 
 
Exogenous events reinforced perceptions that the Coalition was falling behind the times.  
Alongside a suite of domestic reforms, most notably Medibank and a number of expanded 
Commonwealth social responsibilities, Whitlam promised to abolish national service, 
recognise the People’s Republic of China, withdraw Australian troops from Singapore 
and oppose French nuclear tests in the Pacific. McMahon’s government slipped further 
behind as the Vietnam War spiralled out of control and the US sought Rapprochement 
with China, allowing the Opposition to present itself as better prepared to engage with 
emerging policy issues.277 The McMahon Government suffered in public debates because 
of its commitment to traditional policies. Tange characterised the policy position in terms 
of rhetorical entrapment, stating that ‘the McMahon government had become hostage to 
its doctrinal attachment to ‘forward defence’ and to the associated deployments in 
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Malaysia and Singapore.’278 McMahon was further hamstrung by the Coalition’s record 
of commitment to its traditional policies. Not only was his government ill-equipped to 
deliver the kind of radical new policy initiatives which would be needed to counter 
Labor’s challenge, but the attempt would undermine the Coalition’s position. Any 
dramatic shifts in policy to match Labor’s narrative would have been an indictment of the 
Coalition’s existing policy and a tacit agreement that the record of leadership which 
McMahon had staked his credibility on was, in fact, hollow.279 
 
The Whitlam interregnum 
The 1972 election saw the end of an era of Australian politics. After more than two 
decades of coalition leadership, the electorate broke from tradition and took Whitlam up 
on his many offers to create change. Whitlam was well received. So too were his 
promises to establish new standards of social equity to match society’s changing values 
and his ambition to pursue modern ideals which reflected a keen understanding of politics, 
politicians and voters alike. The prospects of universal medical care, urban renewal, more 
accessible higher education and more independent foreign and defence policies gained a 
lot of traction with an electorate which was at least partially disenfranchised from 
conservative politics and which was deeply divided by Australia’s participation in the 
Vietnam War.280 Whitlam had a gift for agenda setting and, like many great innovators 
past and present, knew that people often had interests which they weren’t aware of or 
could not easily articulate. His intent to ‘make the issues which are important to the future’ 
created demand for policy which was either non-existent or too quiet to be heard in 
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previous political debates. 281 However, demands necessitate supply and as soon as Labor 
formed government it faced the challenge of delivering on its promises. 
 
One of the Whitlam government’s first public acts was to enact its popular election 
promise to abolish national service and to complete Australia’s withdrawal from 
Vietnam. 282  Whitlam also had other designs for defence policy. Despite steadily 
increasing total defence expenditure in each of its three budgets, 283  the Whitlam 
government sought to limit overall defence expansion and change focus from materials to 
service personnel by improving their pay and conditions.284 Whitlam saw the Liberal 
Party’s approach to defence as unduly fixated on forward deployment capabilities. He 
believed that ADF equipment and training was excessively focused on the jungles of 
Southeast Asia and ill-suited to the defence of Australia. Whitlam’s government instituted 
‘an equipment program designed to provide Australia’s forces with a modern 
technological weapons system.’285 Whitlam argued that Australia could not match the 
personnel available to other regional states and that the ADF would be best served by ‘the 
sophisticated weaponry which a professional defence force backed by a technologically 
advanced community can deploy.’286 
 
Whitlam’s vision for the ADF was not universally popular and the Government had to 
invest time and resources in reassuring both the electorate and a handful of key 
international allies that Australia continued to observe its alliances and that it was not 
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withdrawing from its international security commitments. In late 1973 and early 1974 
Barnard travelled extensively abroad in his capacity as Minister for Defence, in part to 
visit Washington and calm some of the Pentagon’s apprehensions about the Whitlam 
Government.287 At the same time Nixon sent a very senior State Department official, 
Marshall Green, to take up the post of US Ambassador to Australia and to closely monitor 
the political relationship with Canberra.288 Nevertheless, in July 1974, the Defence policy 
debate ran hot in the media. Fraser, as Leader of the Opposition, widely criticised the 
government’s defence policy while James Killen, then-Shadow Minister for Defence, 
made theatrical statements about the Coalition’s defence policy ambitions. 
 
Despite the general tendency for dramatic flair in statements of policy intentions from a 
shadow government, Fraser and Killen intimated that the Coalition was moving away 
from its earlier fixation on garnering US support and toward a platform of a more self-
reliant defence posture.289 By occupying what had previously been Labor’s exclusive 
policy territory, Fraser obviated the defence policy dichotomy which had worked against 
the Coalition in the previous election. Just as Howard would reframe the Coalition’s 
position in the 1996 election, Fraser reinvented the Coalition’s policy platform, eroding 
Labor’s self-styled monopoly on hot-button issues and policy innovation. As the gap 
between the Whitlam Government’s policy aims and policy outcomes widened, the 
sudden burst of rapid reform soured and the electorate seemed almost evenly divided by 
the allure of the new and the stability of the familiar. 
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A dangerous ally 
The dismissal of the Whitlam government was a central moment in Australian politics. 
Whitlam had been immensely popular with much of the public, so Fraser’s campaign 
focused on management rather than popularity. In an attempt to appease the disgruntled 
manufacturing industry, Fraser made an ambiguous statement about protecting Australian 
industry to contrast Whitlam’s reduction of entry barriers to the Australian market. 
Protection of industry was a key component of both the election campaign and the Fraser 
government, aligning closely with the increasing focus on Australia’s industrial base as a 
Defence resource. 290  Fraser aligned the Government’s interests in the manufacturing 
sector and defence policy with the concept of maintaining Australia’s technological level 
in order to ensure that the military remained a professional fighting force capable of 
timely expansion in a contingency. This was a minor adaptation of statements developed 
for the 1976 white paper, which had been prepared largely under the Whitlam 
government, and was ultimately released by the Fraser government. Fraser also continued 
the Defence reorganisation which had begun under Barnard and Tange’s leadership in 
1972 and had been passed as the Defence Force Re-organization Bill in 1975.291 
 
Despite the long-term goals of Defence reorganisation, the public debate was skewed 
towards matters of controversy rather than substantive policy. While the media often 
focused on trivial concerns, such as whether civilians or military officers would win from 
the reorganisation or from particular policy contests and which service had won the most 
items from its inventory wish list, Fraser began a campaign to change some long-standing 
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attitudes in the electorate.292 The 1976 defence white paper represented a major step in 
challenging embedded attitudes towards defence politics in Australian society. In 
particular, it presented a more measured view of Australia’s ability to use its military 
capability to secure desired political objectives and placed less emphasis on the US 
alliance as a zero-sum counterpart to a more self-reliant force posture.293 
 
However, Fraser did not always respect the views of his bureaucracy. Contrary to 
limitations which Defence largely accepted as operational constraints, such as force 
projection, logistics and political opposition to conscription, some of Fraser’s more 
ambitions Defence statements exceeded Australia’s military capacity to reasonably 
deliver. Along with then-Foreign Minister, Andrew Peacock, Fraser often publicly 
discussed concerns about the increasing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and included 
the balance of power in the IOR as a threat against which the ADF should be prepared to 
respond.294 These wider ambitions were reined in by the broad cuts to planned Defence 
spending necessitated by high inflation rates in the late 1970s. 
 
In 1979, Killen accepted advice from his Department to link the capability requirements 
of defence self-reliance with alliance obligations, both in contributing to defence in the 
Pacific region and in avoiding free-riding behaviour. Killen justified his focus on self-
reliance and the necessity of budget cuts along two lines. The first was the successful 
introduction of stand-off weapons and surveillance systems, which would offset 
Australia’s personnel limitations. This was consistent with the increasingly technological 
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focus of Australia’s defence acquisition priorities. It also reaffirmed the renewed focus on 
Australia’s approaches and near neighbourhood as the primary area of operations for 
ADF force structure planning. The second justification was defence warning time. Killen 
argued to the public that the capability to project sufficient military power against 
Australia to overwhelm the ADF and to also maintain logistical chains to sustain 
operations in Australia’s approaches was beyond the means of all but the most powerful 
of nations. In the event that one of those powers developed hostile intentions towards 
Australia or that another power developed sufficient capability to threaten Australia, the 
warning time would allow the ADF to prepare accordingly. Although that line of 
argument would be contested throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s, the symbolic 
value of these statements was well-received. Tange recalls seeing… 
…a cause for satisfaction in that, subject to the ebb and flow of simplistic political 
rhetoric, there emerged at last a consensus that Australia should make defence of its own 
territory the first duty of a self-respecting nation without looking first to others.
295
 
 
2.2 The emergence of defence self-reliance 
This section reviews the wider strategic and political situation during the period 1968-
1978. It examines the emergence of self-reliance in Australian defence thinking and the 
precursory events that build up to the shift to self-reliance in later policy. It also examines 
the shift from forward defence towards the new concept of defence self-reliance, focusing 
on the emphasis on technology in defence policy discourse and the emerging priority of 
credibility in defence policy documents. 
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The Forward Defence era 
From Federation through to the Second World War Australia’s defence was conceived 
largely in terms of Imperial Defence. Ostensibly, Australia’s interests were subordinated 
entirely to its role in securing the British Empire. Initially, Australia continued to see 
itself as dependent on the Empire, as it had been as individual colonies prior to Federation. 
Australia’s distance created the geographical dichotomy ‘oceans divide, oceans unite.’296 
Australia felt isolated by distance, so pursued Imperial unity to close the distance between 
itself and its allies. One consequence of this approach was that Australia’s regional 
interests were pursued as a component of Britain’s global interests, limiting Australia’s 
scope of action. However, during the inter-war years Australia began to view itself more 
as an outpost of the Empire that gave it reach into the Asian region. This transformation 
led to the formulation of independent Australian interests in Southeast Asia and the South 
Pacific. 297  By the 1920s, precursors of Forward Defence had begun to emerge in 
Australian defence policy. For example, the Singapore guarantee was seen as a 
compromise between Australia’s regional and Britain’s global interests.298 For Britain, 
Singapore was a link in the Imperial highway,299 but to Australia, the Singapore strategy 
appeared to be a great power supported barrier against intrusion afield from the continent 
and a means of security.300 
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In the aftermath of World War Two, Australia faced a new strategic environment and a 
new diplomatic reality. Great Britain was no longer able to play a significant role in the 
defence of Australian territory or interests. In particular, the Royal Navy was no longer 
positioned to protect maritime trade routes in the Asia-Pacific which were essential to 
Australia’s long-term prosperity. Because Australia envisaged Southeast Asia as the first 
line of defence against communist intrusion,301 it sought to bind America, its new great 
power ally, and Britain to the region. The strategy that would become known as Forward 
Defence involved encouraging an allied presence in Southeast Asia to act as a buffer 
between Australia and potentially hostile near neighbours.302 The purpose of this buffer 
was to keep potential adversaries as far from the Australian continent as possible. Any 
conflict would be fought on other countries’ territory rather than Australia’s own and 
would be fought in concert with major power allies and local states also threatened by an 
intruder.303  
 
Forward Defence is often perceived in terms of grand ambitions in the scope of 
Australian defence policy in the period from Federation to the Vietnam War. Australia’s 
emphasis of Imperial and Cold War interests obscured a policy which also contained 
more self-serving and locally focused inclinations.304 For two decades after the end of the 
Second World War, Australia aligned its interests and policies closely with its major 
power allies and largely subordinated its force structure decisions to interoperability 
needs, which necessitated armed forces that were tactically proficient and easily 
                                                 
301 Defence Committee, "1956 Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy," (Canberra: Department of 
Defence, 1956), para. 12. 
302 Thomas Bruce Millar, "The Defense of Australia," Daedalus 114, no. 1 (1985): 266. 
303 "Trends in Australian Defence Policy," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 2, no. Special Issue 01 
(1971): 49. 
304 White, "Four Decades of the Defence of Australia," 164. 
Chapter 2 
1968-1978: Emergence of the technological level concept 
 
 
 
 
128 
 
integrated into allies’ command structures.305 Defence policy stated that Australia was 
‘unable to defend herself unaided against a major power’306 and that ‘her dependence on 
outside assistance, compels her to accept that the strategic employment of her forces will 
be governed by considerations wider than those of a purely regional nature.’307 Forward 
Defence implied that Australia’s best means for ensuring its security involved meeting 
any threat where it arose in cooperation with allies. 308  This complicated Australia’s 
freedom of action due to a relatively minor influence on coalition operations. Emery 
Reves argued that small powers often face such constraints because 
All great powers act like gangsters and all small powers act like prostitutes. They must. 
Under present conditions (not unlike those of the wild West), each great power mistrusts 
the others, must be permanently armed, keep his gun loaded and within easy reach to 
shoot it out with the others, if he wants to survive and keep his position. And the smaller 
powers, who have no guns and who would never dare shoot it out with one of the big 
fellows, must go with those who promise them the most, and in return for this protection, 
do whatever is demanded of them.
309
 
 
Such sentiment was reflected in the 1968 strategic basis of Australian defence policy, 
which notes that 
…it been a case that we have deliberately, doubtless in our own interests and perhaps 
inescapably, tied Australia to the strategy of others…Like all small countries we can best 
ensure our security by participating in regional security arrangements; as a result we find 
ourselves involved in situations not of our choosing and in the formation of which we 
have negligible, if any, influence.
310
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This statement was made as the rationale for Forward Defence was eroding. The rationale 
had first been undermined by Britain’s indifference to opposing Konfrontasi.311 It was 
further weakened by the 1967 announcement of Britain’s decision to withdraw from 
Southeast Asia.312 The final blow came in 1969 with Nixon’s announcement of the Guam 
Doctrine.313 
 
As much as Forward Defence was the manifestation of Australia’s sense of insecurity and 
inclination toward great power allies, it was also a response to regional security concerns. 
Many of these concerns were precipitated by the political upheaval in Southeast Asia and 
the Western Pacific that resulted from decolonisation and by the seemingly pervasive 
spectre of Communism. 314   Forward Defence was an attempt to focus great power 
attention to issues that threatened Australia’s interests. This was acceptable to Australia’s 
great power allies because they had interests of their own to pursue in the region and 
welcomed Australia’s political and military support.315 Yet, even throughout the era of 
Forward Defence, the reliability of allies was questioned and the need for some degree of 
self-reliance was revisited in successive defence policy documents. As early as 1959, the 
Defence Committee articulated a need for Australian forces to be primarily shaped toward 
independent action rather than designed specifically for ease of integration into coalition 
operations.316 By the early 1960s, absent a formal change in declared policy, the Menzies 
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Government had begun thinking about transforming the ADF into a force that could 
defend Australia unaided.317 Although Forward Defence could be observed to continue 
until the Australian withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972, it had become impractical with the 
departure of US and British forces from mainland Southeast Asia.318 Having seen the 
writing on the wall, Menzies had put into motion acquisition decisions that would enable 
the ADF to become more self-reliant in defending Australia and its regional allies without 
immediate assistance from major power allies.319 
 
From self-assurance to self-reliance 
In 1968, Australian policy began to specifically consider independent defence capability 
in the context of limited self-reliance. A ‘self-contained’ force was deemed to be best 
suited to both Australia’s collective security arrangements and the possibility of 
sustaining independent joint service operations.320 At first, the possibility of self-reliance 
was alien to the Australian public and then-Prime Minister John Gorton argued 
vigorously that the need to establish a self-reliant ADF was politically imperative and 
economically necessary, stating that: 
 
…we find ourselves in Australia in a completely changed world situation. For almost two 
hundred years we lived under the protection of the British Navy and England, and we did 
little or nothing to help ourselves in between the crises that occurred in the world. We left 
it to others to protect us, except, of course, that when the Boer War broke out, or the First 
World War broke out, or the Second World War broke out, or the Malayan emergency 
broke out, or the Korean war broke out, then we came in as a people, wholeheartedly and 
completely… But that has changed. We do not have and will not have this protection 
from abroad any more. We ourselves must protect ourselves, and this calls for resources 
which I do not myself wish or like to give resources that must be diverted to ships and 
soldiers and aircraft and guns and ammunition resources I would prefer to devote to 
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development and to social progress. But these resources must be diverted, according to 
the judgment of your Government if we are, in the changed situation of the world, to be 
able to take the first brunt of any attack which in the future may fall upon us and to help 
in maintaining stability in the area to our north a situation which has never faced this 
nation before but which now faces us in all stark reality.321 
 
 
This precursor to self-reliance is qualified by the concurrent needs for self-reliant 
capability for the purposes of conducting independent operations and fielding sufficient 
independent capability to avoid charges of excessive alliance free-riding. Despite the new 
emphasis on greater self-reliance, the 1968 strategic basis of Australian defence policy 
also stipulated that the most likely deployment of Australian forces would be in the form 
of a coalition operation led by a major power ally.322 Australia continued to define its 
interests in terms of the security of neighbouring states, lines of communication through 
maritime Southeast Asia and underwriting regional confidence in collective security 
measures.323 The need to reassure regional security partners was evident in the language 
of the 1972 Australian Defence Review, which stipulated requirements for an 
‘increasingly self-reliant’ defence force able to ‘project Australian strength’ beyond the 
continent.324 It further stipulated that Australia had allies in the region that shared its 
interests and could be strengthened through political and military support.325 
 
A significant aspect of the emerging concept of self-reliance in Australian defence policy 
was a repeated emphasis on reassuring regional states, both friendly and potentially 
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hostile, of Australia’s military capability. Initially, this emphasis was directed toward the 
issue of deterrence.326  In the early 1970s the tone of Australian policy changed and 
documents began to emphasise credibility rather than deterrence. The earliest example is 
the 1971 strategic basis of Australian defence policy, which pinned ‘Australia’s political 
and military credibility’ to its ability to defend Australian territory, independence and 
identity. 327  The 1972 Australian Defence Review specified that Australia’s capability 
must be both ‘evident to other countries’328 and balanced between offensive and defensive 
capabilities to ensure that ‘considerations of credibility and or long term deterrence’329 are 
substantiated. Demonstrating the credibility of Australia’s defence capability and 
commitment to collective security was as an important policy imperative.330  Defence 
policy underscored the need to use Australia’s technical and industrial strength, political 
stability and military capabilities to reassure regional allies and assuage their misgivings 
regarding Australia’s ability and intention to influence their security in the event of a 
crisis.331 
 
In 1973, policy linked Australia’s ability to ‘demonstrate a military capability that lends 
credibility and authority to [its] foreign policy’332 with technological advantage. In this 
view Australia’s unique position in the region was underpinned by its ‘resources, 
technology, and ability to operate and maintain more advanced military equipment’333 
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than local states. The issue of Australia’s increasingly independent foreign policy became 
a political football, with the criticism that Australian policy ‘lacked credibility if based on 
a weak or misplaced defence policy.’ 334  The Senate Standing Committee further 
introduced the concept of warning time as a condition of credibility, stating that: 
Since the lead times for introducing equipment and training highly skilled manpower are 
sometimes longer than strategic warning times, Australia needs to maintain forces ‘in 
being’ capable of meeting limited threats to our security.335 
 
The result was that ‘assured defence strength in being’336  was held to be integral to 
legitimating self-reliance and the foreign policy positions that were based on Australia’s 
military posture and commitments. 
 
Meanwhile, Sir Arthur Tange was substantially reforming the Department of Defence and 
recommended changes in the way Defence prioritised capability decisions to ensure that 
procurement served Australia’s self-reliance needs.337 Successive strategic basis papers 
further reinforced that Australia’s technological and industrial base afforded it greater 
credibility as a military power. They emphasised Australia’s ability to sustain military 
expansion through economic, industrial and technical advantages, stating that: 
Military strength and credibility depend not only on forces in being, but also on the 
strength of the national economy, its rate of growth and capacity for technological 
advance, and the skills of the population.
338  
 
The Defence Committee also noted that Australia enjoyed relative wealth and 
technological advantage over the countries of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. In 
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combination with Australia’s privileged access to advanced military technology, 
Australia’s wealth enabled it to field military capabilities beyond the reach of its regional 
neighbours.339 
 
Technology and credibility  
What had begun as an observation in the late 1960s became a discrete policy objective 
towards the middle of the 1970s. Earlier policy documents had noted Australia’s ability 
offset its small population and defence force with more advanced weapons, efficient 
operation of military systems, logistical support networks and effective command and 
control infrastructure.340 Later documents discussed technological advantage as an overt 
objective of Australian defence policy. The 1975 strategic basis of Australian defence 
policy, determined that 
...because of Australia’s greater domestic industrial, scientific and technological base 
compared with countries in our neighbourhood, selective adoption of a suitably high level 
of military technology in our weapons, equipment, training of men and support which 
satisfy certain objectives.
341
 
 
A broad gauge for the desired level of technology to maintain was to: reduce recurring 
manpower costs and/or lifecycle costs, retain a favourable comparative position in the 
neighbouring region, ensure that the technological base was sufficient to support rapid 
expansion if required and provide interoperability, although not necessarily technical 
parity, with major allies’ systems. 342  The 1976 strategic basis of Australian defence 
policy further refined this aim, stating that 
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Advanced technology should be favoured where it offers measurable compensating 
advantages – e.g. in simplicity of operation and support, or sufficient savings in additional 
equipment, manpower and life-cycle costs, or is otherwise peculiarly suitable to 
Australia’s assessed strategic situation.343 
 
Advanced capabilities were desirable so long as they were relevant to neighbouring 
regional, but not global military capabilities. Defence policy limited the scope of the 
technological level to ensuring that Australian was ‘in a position to increase selectively 
the technological level of its forces in order to maintain a favourable position relative to 
countries in its neighbouring region and the weapons they might acquire.’344 
 
The language used in 1976 in Australia’s first defence white paper introduced a new tone 
to the discussion of the technological level of military capability. The white paper noted 
that Australia ought to be ‘seen as a nation that takes defence matters seriously’ and that 
the newly formed Australian Defence Force should have ‘capabilities and competence’ 
that commanded respect.345 It further stated that, as a requirement for defence capability, 
the ADF ‘should at all times demonstrate Australia’s serious attitude to defence matters, 
military competence and capacity to absorb and operate high-technology equipments.’346 
The white paper exuded a new confidence in the ability of Australia to pursue a self-
reliant approach to defence. Australian policy now saw a technological edge in military 
capability, relative to neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, 
as a means of self-realisation as a regional power. The paper went on to confirm that 
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Australia ‘should exploit the capabilities of advanced military equipment rather than rely 
on masses of men’347 to pursue its interests. 
 
At the same time, Sir Arthur Tange announced that the new Department of Defence 
would be concerned with fielding the mix of defence capabilities which were best suited 
to meet Australia’s requirements. Those requirements included self-reliance and a focus 
on defending Australia and its interests which truly reflected the needs of an independent 
Australian defence policy. 348  By the late 1970s defence policy reduced its previous 
emphasis on validating Australia’s commitments through demonstrations or assertions of 
credibility. Instead it had begun to consider Australia as a serious contender in the 
regional neighbourhood, even absent the presence of a great power ally, and was 
redefining its abilities and interests. A significant element of this transition was the 
technological edge that Australia had over its neighbours and the ability to reinforce 
regional security policies with military capability. This concept ushered the self-assuring 
narratives of credibility from Australian defence policy in the early 1970s and replaced it 
with a narrative of strength and proficiency. However, this narrative brought with it a new 
set of challenges in finding the right force structure and capabilities to realise the self-
reliance that Australia now aspired to. 
 
2.3 Policy context 
The policy context for the late 1960s through to the mid-1970s was one of substantial 
change. Key concepts such as technological level and a focus on military forces capable 
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of independent action replaced concepts of forces designed primarily to contribute to 
operations of major power allies. As the US and Britain reduced their presence on 
Southeast Asia, Australia began to emphasise technology as a means to increase its 
profile as a regional actor. For the first time, Australia began speaking of self-reliance in 
defence and a shift away from forward defence and towards greater independence in 
military capabilities and as a regional player. 
 
Key concepts 
During the first period the concept of capability was most frequently used. This was 
particularly true of policy documents, which tend to skew results across all periods due to 
their liberal usage of the concept of capability, but was also present in Ministerial 
statements. Technology was also used substantially, often in the context of industrial 
capacity and technological level although sometimes also in the context of military 
platforms or support capabilities. The concept of advantage was rarely employed in 
policy documents or in Ministerial statements, reflecting a broader tendency to frame 
technology and capability issues in terms of credibility rather than superiority. 
 
Both documents and debate focused largely on the kinds of military capabilities which 
would be required for Australia to transition from a supporting role in allies’ forces to an 
independent and self-reliant military actor. In the late 1960s and early 1970s much of the 
debate centred on the acquisition of the F-111 strike aircraft for the RAAF. This major 
capability project was seen as a means to revolutionise Australia’s defence credibility as 
it would afford the RAAF a long range strike capability. Capability was often used to 
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denote both the capacity to perform an operational task and a specific military platform 
which could be deployed. 
 
Technology was mentioned substantially more in policy statements than in the 1976 
defence white paper. It was primarily referred to as a technological base for expansion 
which would afford Australia a strategic advantage over regional militaries who would 
not be able to expand or sustain operations at a similar level. In 1968 Fairhall argued that 
capital expenditure was not a high priority and that defence spending could be better 
directed towards other outputs, such as infrastructure and munitions. However, the 
priority of sustaining the technological base meant that defence spending needed to focus 
on assets and capabilities which would enable expansion rather than a high technology 
force-in-being which would use technology to increase the performance of specific 
military platforms or increase coordination between force elements to increase the joint 
force’s overall effectiveness. 
 
Conversely, Fairbairn framed technology as crucial to defence planning: 
Programming reconciles, as far as possible, all the pertinent criteria such as the rate of 
obsolescence of existing equipments, the time needed to bring new equipment into service, 
the development of new technology, the strategic outlook, our industrial situation, the 
financial situation at the time, and the extent of the long term financial commitments that 
would be entered into and handed on to future governments and parliaments.
349
 
 
Similarly, the 1972 ADR emphasised capability development projects which would give 
Australia access to ‘the world's most advanced military technology.’350 The 1976 white 
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paper emphasised Australia defence credibility through the ADF’s ‘high standards in the 
professional employment of forces using modern technology.’351 It further argued that 
Australia's forces should use suitably high technology in Australia's weapons systems, 
equipment, training and support. Because Australia has close affiliations with the United 
States and Western Europe, and sufficiently developed technology to make use of those 
links, a wide choice is available.
352
 
 
The 1976 defence white paper further advocated that technology should be exploited to 
increase the precision and effectiveness of weapons and increase the relative military 
strength of ADF force elements at a reasonable cost to government: 
Advances in the guidance of weapons offer prospects of precise direction from far off at 
modest cost. Using this ability to attack crucial targets selectively, it is possible to 
increase military power but decrease unnecessary destruction. Of particular interest to 
Australian scientists is the breadth of evolving technologies in propulsion, in new forms 
of microelectronics, in materials, in warheads, in guidance and in sensors to seek out and 
identify targets in adverse conditions. These new technologies may transform the nature 
of warfare and it is important that Australian scientists can both absorb them and exercise 
careful selection of areas within our resources. We are looking into the capabilities that 
sophisticated and highly accurate missiles or 'smart weapons', including lasers, will 
confer.
353
 
 
 
However, technology was not always presented as inherently superior and many caveats 
were presented in documents and speeches. For example, the 1976 defence white paper 
cautioned against overstating the role of advanced technology in providing superior 
individual capabilities and instead made the case that many individual platforms did not 
need to be state of the art. It claimed that the technological level should focus on 
providing niche high technology capabilities which would give the ADF a substantial 
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advantage in key operational asks and focus on creating the capacity to expand and to 
support expansion if it occurred.354 Similarly, Killen noted in 1977 that 
When it comes to technology a country like Australia has to be highly selective. Not only 
can advanced technology be very expensive to buy; it can be more suited to the 
requirements of powers in very different strategic circumstances from Australia. At the 
same time, however, advanced technology can often offer us important advantages, for 
example in greatly increased accuracy of firepower. We must also be able to move to 
higher levels of technology should this become necessary, and be able to operate together 
with the advanced systems of allies.
355
 
 
Referent actors 
Given that the period 1968-1978 coincides with the Vietnam War, the withdrawal of 
British forces from Southeast Asia and the announcement of the Guam doctrine, it is 
unsurprising that the most frequent referent of military capability and technology is great 
powers. It is interesting, though, that the Southeast Asian region was close behind even in 
the 1970s.356 Despite its lagging military modernisation and industrial technology, the 
region was largely regarded in the data set as an important benchmark for the 
development of the ADF.  
 
As Minister for Defence, Fraser recalled that the F-111 order was made at a time when 
the British were still stationed in Singapore and reflected that the British withdrawal had 
created a capability gap for Australia in Southeast Asia that the new strike aircraft were 
intended to fill. 
I reminded the United States that when we originally ordered this aircraft the British had a 
significant strike capability stationed in Singapore. It is a capability that will no longer be 
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committed to the region and I argued that this made it all the more important for this gap 
in Australia's weapon systems to be adequately overcome.
357
 
 
Shortly after that the 1972 ADR explicitly distanced Australia form its former Forward 
Defence predilections and focused instead on regional security 
This positive outlook upon our environment is seen to be the more necessary because, in 
the new world balance, Australia would be prudent not to rest its security as directly or as 
heavily, as in its previous peacetime history, on the military power of a Western ally in 
Asia. As for other nations, self-reliance in situations of less than global or major 
international concern will lay claim to being a central feature in the future development of 
Australia's defence policy.
358
 
 
The 1972 ADR also made specific reference to Indonesia when discussing Australia’s 
security interests, noting that ‘Indonesia, our immediate neighbour, with a population 
roughly nine times our own, is by far the greatest of our northern neighbours in size, in 
resources and in regional influence.’359  
 
Yet defence policy retained a keen interest in global events, as evidenced by then-Prime 
Minister Fraser’s statements about great power influence on regional security. Speaking 
in reference to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), he noted that the prospect of a declared 
neutral zone was contrary to Australia’s interests because it could alter the balance of 
forces there, tacitly linking Australia’s force structure to regional force levels. 
It would certainly not be in Australia's interests to see an uncontrolled build-up of naval 
forces in this region, and, what we advocate is a policy of balance and restraint the 
achievement of a balance at the lowest practical force levels.
360 
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The 1976 defence white paper further linked global strategic circumstances to the 
potential for regional security concerns which might affect Australia’s defence policy, 
stating that 
…regional rivalry and confrontation between external powers could develop. Prolonged 
regional tension could lead the regional states to develop capability for conventional 
military operations on a regional scale.
361
 
 
Policy scope 
During 1968-1978 Australia largely abandoned references to global interests in its 
defence planning. Many statements and documents refer to the possible of global or great 
power war destabilising the region and threatening Australia’s security interests. However, 
emphasis on any need to pursue security objectives wider than the Asia-Pacific region is 
rarely apparent.362 Instead, the scope of Australia’s security interests is limited primarily 
to the region. Meanwhile, the defence of Australian territory and interests began to build 
momentum from the early 1970s onwards. Defending Australia became a prominent 
concept in the 1976 defence white paper, although region interests and credibility as a 
security partner remained central to defence policy guidance. Table 10 provides an 
overview of the coding frequency of the policy scope node. 
 
In 1968 Prime Minister Gorton framed Australia’s national security interests in broad 
terms: 
For I believe, and I suggest to all you Australians that what best promotes our national 
security and the national security of other small States, what best guarantees our national 
survival, along with the survival of other small powers as truly Independent nations, Is 
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that we should have a world in which aggression by one nation or part of one nation 
against another is shown to be unsuccessful and does not succeed in whole or in part. 
363
 
 
In the context of the Australian commitment to the Vietnam War, this is understandable 
and despite its significant discussion of global security issues, the 1972 ADR articulated a 
primarily regional scope for Australia’s policy interests. 
The future stability of Australia's broad strategic environment in the decades ahead 
became much more uncertain when, during the 1960s, the previously dominant economic 
and military strength of the United States and the Soviet Union began to be challenged by 
other nations and groups of nations.
364
 
 
It linked a regional focus to force development priorities which were the first example of 
a geographical approach to defining strategic interests: 
…the kind of forces Australia needs in the 1970s and 1980s derives from four broad 
influences: first, the geography of our environs and Australia's tangible interests located 
in our homeland and dependencies, on the continental shelf, and on and under the seas 
and in the air spaces that link us with trading partners and military allies; second, the 
expectations that Allies and friends have of us and we of them to contribute to collective 
security; third, the degree of probability of a threat or resort to force in the area of 
Australian concern, the magnitude of the threat from time to time, the nature of the 
environment in which it would require to be countered, and the likelihood of Australian 
involvement; fourth, the options we would wish future governments to have as to the 
nature of our involvement in foreseeable or contingent situations of conflict.
365
 
 
The 1976 defence white paper similarly framed Australia primary security interests as: 
For practical purposes, the requirements and scope for Australian defence activity are 
limited essentially to the areas closer to home - areas in which the deployment of military 
capabilities by a power potentially unfriendly to Australia could permit that power to 
attack or harass Australia and its territories, maritime resources zone and near lines of 
communication. These are our adjacent maritime areas; the South West Pacific countries 
and territories; Papua New Guinea; Indonesia; and the South East Asian region.
366
 
 
However it also issued the caveat that the potential for global war between the 
superpowers remained a central strategic concern for Australia: 
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The global powers of the modem era, the US and the USSR, maintain strategic nuclear 
forces at a level of destructive capability unprecedented in history. Their relations directly 
affect the security of all nations. Military conflict between them would risk widespread 
devastation by nuclear weapons.
367
 
 
…because they alone in the contemporary era are able to project military power on a 
significant scale into regions distant from their homelands and relevant to Australia's 
strategic circumstances.368 
 
 
2.4 Strategic concepts 
The defence policy discourse from 1968-1978 saw significant change in the strategic 
concepts employed. The type of advantage sought was largely principled on the notion of 
technological level as Australia’s mitigating advantage for the ADF. Force posture debate 
ranged from assertions in 1968 that defence self-reliance was implausible and unrealistic 
to formal statements of policy that self-reliance was not only possible, but achievable. 
Concurrently, the rationale for technological advantage was centred largely on defence 
industry and Australia’s general industrial capacity for the purposes of expansion. This 
was entirely consistent with the emergence of the technological level concept and reflects 
the challenges that Australia faced in the dramatic reshaping of its approach to defence 
policy. 
 
Type of advantage 
It is important to note that the concept of advantage was still largely tied to the emerging 
notion of an Australian approach to defence founded on self-reliance. The consequence of 
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this is that relative advantage was not directly mentioned very much in the first period 
and that its use was quite diverse.369 
 
The technological level of Australia’s industrial base and the concept of a technology-
based core force for the purpose of expansion were equally emphasised across the entire 
period. Gorton linked Australia’s increasing capacity to conduct military operations to an 
increasing technological level when he said that ‘Australia's capacity to fight will increase 
and the industrial capacity to back our fighting forces will also expand.’370 
 
As Minister for Defence, Fraser commented as early as 1971 that an expansion base alone 
was not sufficient for defence planning. Rather than relying on the capacity to exploit 
Australia’s industrial base to create a useful terminal force, Fraser argued that the ADF 
needed to have a material ability to conduct military operations on short notice in order to 
be a useful national asset and to deter potential adversaries and to reassure regional and 
great power allies. He articulated this position to the Australian Institute of International 
Affairs (Victorian Branch), noting that ‘defence arrangements can only have validity if 
we have forces in being.’371 The 1972 ADR echoed this sentiment, stating that 
The balance between capabilities in being, those in reserve, those sustained on a limited 
'State of the Art' basis, and those whose acquisition may be deferred, will need continuing 
review with an eye to changes in technology, and in operational concepts and to the 
strategic uncertainties of the longer term.
372
 
 
 
                                                 
369 See Appendix C, Table 11 
370 John Grey Gorton, "Appropriation Bill (No. 1) 1968-69. ," Parliamentary Debates: Budget Debate 
(1968), 3. 
371 John Malcolm Fraser, "Background to Defence: An Address by the Hon. Malcolm Fraser, M.P., Minister 
for Defence," The Australian Institute of International Affairs (Victorian Branch) 
(Melbourne1971), 12. 
372 Department of Defence, Australian Defence Review, para. 57. 
Chapter 2 
1968-1978: Emergence of the technological level concept 
 
 
 
 
146 
 
Meanwhile, it also pronounced that the ADF should maintain ‘a regular force, versatile 
and highly trained, mobile… supported by reserve forces with the potential for expansion 
should the situation require.’373 
 
The core force rationale became more influential after the review was released and in 
1974 Barnard argued that 
…the defence force-in-being should be adequate to indicate our resolution and our ability 
to defend Australian interests and to support others, should the need arise. In times of 
low-threat probability, as at present, the basic concept is that of a viable core force 
capable of timely expansion.
374
 
 
Barnard further claimed that 
Developing military technology and Australian technological strength also give guidance. 
The force will not be manpower- intensive, and should continue to contain a core of 
sophisticated military components and skills.
375
 
 
 
The1976 defence white paper was a tipping point for this aspect of the defence debate as 
it sees a significant turn from a technological level logic toward the core force and 
expansion model which was based more on warning times than industrial capacity and 
became prominent in the 1980s. However it cautioned that Australia should use 
technology selectively, mainly due to the costs of cutting edge equipment across the 
entire force, noting that 
To acquire high-level technology in weapons and equipment now throughout our forces 
may give us advantages in effectiveness, but it would be very expensive. Advanced 
technology should be favoured where it offers compensating advantages, for example, in 
simplicity of operation and support, or avoidance of early obsolescence, or sufficient 
savings in additional equipment, man-power and life-cycle costings or is otherwise 
particularly suited to Australia's assessed strategic situation. Australia should aim to 
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maintain its present relatively favourable position, and be prepared to increase selectively 
the technological level of its forces if this should be called for.
376
 
 
 
After the 1976 white paper, Ministerial statements frequently considered the force-in-
being in relation to defence warning times and the ADF’s capacity for timely expansion. 
As Prime Minster, Fraser still used the phrase technological level, but it was now directly 
linked to specific capabilities in the force-in-being as well as part of Australia capacity to 
expand the ADF 
…advantage will be taken of the enhanced capabilities made possible by new techniques 
which have produced weapons with unsurpassed accuracy. Examples of this may be seen 
in the capabilities that will be available in the new long range maritime reconnaissance 
aircraft and the new destroyers. The weapons system associated with these two purchases 
will herald a significant advance in the technological level of Australia' forces.
377 
 
 
In 1978 Killen further demonstrated this view, emphasising the force-in-being and not 
only a core force for later expansion: 
We said in the White Paper in 1976 that we saw no credible threat in the short term of an 
attack upon our territory. But we concluded that we needed to maintain a defence force so 
structured that it would be capable of timely expansion, should longer term international 
uncertainties develop unfavourably. For a country determined to possess a capacity to 
defend itself, we must have in our three Services a wide variety of skills- albeit in modest 
quantities at a time when we are not living in the shadow of a direct threat. We said in the 
White Paper that we must have a core of readily available forces possessing the ability to 
respond promptly to lesser military contingencies involving Australian national interests- 
contingencies which could arise at shorter notice than could the threat of direct attack 
upon our country.
378
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Force posture 
The type of force posture envisaged in the 1968-1978 period was diverse and saw 
expeditionary capabilities and self-reliance compete for prominence. When combined 
with credible contingencies of an armed attack against Australia (including its offshore 
assets), the defence of Australia is clearly the most often emphasised force posture 
priority.379 
 
This period saw the emergence of self-reliance as a legitimate concern in defence policy. 
In 1968 Gorton could not envisage defence self-reliance ever being a realistic goal for 
Australia and bluntly stated that 
…in no future that I can foresee can we in Australia rely on ourselves alone, or remain 
secure without alliance with some friendly and significantly powerful ally… No small 
nation such as ours can, in the world as it is today, I suggest to you, live with happiness 
and security and safety without protection of that kind.
380
 
 
Less than a decade later the concept of defence self-reliance would be cemented in the 
policy debate and affirmed in a publicly released policy document. The 1976 defence 
white paper stated that ‘the force-in-being and planned should have a substantial 
capability for independent operations.’381  It also set self-reliance as a benchmark for 
capability development and as a minimum requirement for the ADF, declaring that 
…our forces and associated capabilities should be able to operate with substantial 
independence in our own environment. We should avoid development of defence 
capabilities that are not relevant to our own requirements.382 
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A concomitant concern was developing a force structure for the ADF which provide an 
adequate force-in-being to act as a deterrent to potentially adversaries and which could 
meet credible contingencies at short notice. As Minister for Defence, Fraser cats this in 
simple terms of preparedness, stating that 
The whole purpose of defence preparedness is to establish circumstances in which you 
will not have to go to war; to provide a capability which will do much to help achieve 
stability in your own region. You do not wait until you have a specific target before you 
equip your air force with a strike bomber capability.
383
 
 
Soon after, the 1972 ADR specifically referred to the need to meet contingencies in 
Australia’s force structure planning 
…Australia's force structure should be built partly to meet evident and foreseeable needs, 
some of which are referred to below, and partly to provide readiness against threats of 
varying orders of probability or intensity which cannot be predicted so far ahead and are, 
therefore, best described as estimated contingencies.
384
 
 
Barnard further elaborated on the force-in-being concept, stating that 
No regional power has or is likely to acquire for many years the capability and motive 
that might require an Australian defence response. The possibility of low-level situations 
on relatively short notice, for example in our maritime resources zone, continues; insofar 
as these were not susceptible to political handling, they must be met by our defence force 
in being.
385
 
 
…we are now required by strategic and international political developments - and we 
ourselves wish - to deal on our own with any local situations that may arise, to assert an 
independent strategic influence, and to pursue political- policies more independently of 
United States views and interests. Therefore, we must keep in being a viable national 
defence force with manifest capability for expansion, and maintain its development at the 
modest rate now required by the assumption of larger national responsibility, by the 
current strategic guidance, and by longer term uncertainties.
386
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1976 defence white paper further refined the force-in-being concept and also expanded 
the kinds of contingencies set as a benchmark for preparedness. 
The force-in-being should be capable of performing current and foreseeable tasks and 
dealing with selected shorter-term contingencies - for example, maintenance and 
expansion of the training base; sea control in areas of Australia's maritime jurisdiction; 
quick detection of and response to any maritime or coastal harassment; aid to the civil 
power in counter-terrorist operations, as requested and appropriately authorised; 
exercising with allies and regional defence associates; maritime surveillance and display 
in areas of Australian interest; support for defence co-operation programs; and 
contributing to UN peace-keeping.
387
 
 
The force should be of a size and versatility and possess or have under development or 
acquisition the structure, equipments and professional skills adequate for timely 
expansion against a range of contingencies of various types and timings, as indicated by 
the strategic guidance from time to time and having regard to the long lead times of 
certain equipments and skills.
 388
 
 
 
Killen also noted the impact of the expansion base rationale on the force-in-being: 
…let me say here and now that we shall always need an army large enough to embrace 
and keep abreast of the most modern skills of land warfare and to provide a basis for 
expansion, while being ready for lesser contingencies that may require the deployment of 
some part of it. We have a total army of 54,000 today- 32,000 regulars and 22,000 
reserves. It is highly professional and so regarded internationally. It trains hard. It is the 
core of leadership and skill around which, in some future defence emergency, we would 
build.
389
 
 
This is interesting because it clearly articulates the warning time idea as a determinant of 
a core force structure decision to keep the ADF top-heavy. Killen further elaborated that 
A core force concept such as we have will not work unless it embraces also the concept of 
that core force maintaining exceptionally high professional standards. I would like to 
comment here about a related matter which is not widely understood. It is sometimes said 
that our peacetime defence force is 'top heavy'. Of course it is. I do not think this is an 
area where we can indulge ourselves in parsimony. There is a long lead time for 
producing senior commanders, staff officers, top-flight NCOs upon whom we would 
depend to lead an expanded force in war.
390
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Rationale for advantage 
During the first period the rationale for an advantage was largely based on industry 
interests and state of the art technology. Relatively little attention was given to mitigating 
Australia’s strategic constraints and maintaining capabilities relative to other actors 
compared to later periods.391 
 
As Minister for Defence, Fraser emphasised relative advantage in his desire for the ADF 
to acquire the F-111, stating that ‘we need the strike bomber capability in the Australian 
Force Structure. Without it our policies will lack credibility.’392 He elaborated that 
No other aircraft embodies such highly developed and proven technological equipment to 
ensure the delivery of its weapons precisely on target day or night; and there is no other 
aircraft which can equal the F-111 in its designed ability to carry a heavy weapon load 
over such a wide radius of action and penetrate the most sophisticated enemy defences 
under any weather conditions.
393
 
 
Fraser further argued that advanced forces were needed to deter and defeat attacks against 
Australia. 
I would like to restate and emphasise that it is the Government’s view, strongly supported 
by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, that an air strike force is an essential element of a 
balanced defence force for Australia. Without a strike force, we could not carry out 
effective counter air operations against aircraft on the ground, air bases and supporting 
installations. Counter air operations are a critical element in any air defence capability. 
An air strike force has deterrent value. The U. K. deterrent force will have gone from 
South East Asia. The last decade demonstrated the rapidity with which threats can change. 
The lead-time involved in reintroducing an aircraft, assuming one is available, into actual 
operational readiness could be several years from the decision date.
394
 
 
Meanwhile, the 1972 ADR presented a rationale for a technological edge based on 
mitigation, advocating an ADF which takes ‘… full advantage of military skills and 
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technology to compensate as much as practicable for limitations of manpower…’ 395 
However this was an exception to the emerging confidence in Australia’s ability to 
defend itself. In 1975 Whitlam spoke with bravado as he emphasised Australia’s military 
advantage over Southeast Asia: 
….there is no airforce within thousands and thousands of miles of Australia which could 
compete with the R.A.A.F. There is no navy within thousands and thousands of miles of 
Australia which could compete with the R.A.N. and there are no armed forces which 
could land in Australia which the Australian Army couldn't promptly eliminate.
396
 
 
However, the 1976 defence white paper largely emphasised the technological level as a 
means for expansion, noting that Australia’s advantage was contingent on its capacity to 
match the force expansion of a potential adversary on short notice. 
A further objective is the progressive development of a range of basic technologies and 
capacities which would facilitate an intensification and diversification of present activities 
to match force expansion, should the need arise.
397
 
 
 
2.5 Strategic signalling 
This period was quite narrow for Australia’s strategic signalling. There was little 
discussion of deterrence while Australia was still finding its feet as a self-reliant actor in 
matters of defence. Reassurance focused almost exclusively on convincing regional 
countries that Australia retained the capacity to assist them even absent the British 
presence. Similarly validation was largely aimed at convincing the Australian public that 
the ADF was capable of adequately defending Australia from external threats, which was 
a stark break from long-held belief about Australia’s indefensibility and an alien concept 
to most of the Australian public. 
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Deterrence 
Statements which stressed Australia’s military proficiency to potential adversaries were 
relatively rare during the period 1968-1978. Deterrence emanated almost exclusively 
from Ministerial statements and not from publicly released policy documents. 
Furthermore, when deterrence was mentioned, it was rarely a significant proportion of a 
statement and was more often mentioned in passing.398 For example, Fraser, as Minister 
for Defence, stated that 
…the ability of modern strike aircraft to deliver significant weapon loads on deep 
penetration missions, with relative immunity from even the most sophisticated defences 
gives them the offensive capability which is an essential requirement of effective 
deterrent forces. Any sustained attack against Australia or its Territories would have to be 
supported over sea lines of communication and through ports and base areas. The 
possibility that ports and base areas could be interdicted by a strike force would be a 
significant deterrent to any foreign power considering such an attack.
399
 
 
Similarly, McMahon argued that Australia ‘must maintain a defence capability that is 
evident both to friendly countries and to potential enemies, and which we could develop 
in adequate time should more immediate threats arise.’400 
 
The 1972 ADR linked long term force structure planning to both deterrence and 
credibility, stating that 
…an opportunity exists for Australia to move progressively in the 1970s and 1980s 
towards a more independent and improving national defence capability which, while 
meeting current continuing requirements, is shaped also to equip us for the longer term 
military threat situations which are contingencies in that period, indefinite though these 
may now seem… The balance between capabilities in being, those in reserve, those 
sustained on a limited 'State of the Art' basis, and those whose acquisition may be 
deferred, will need continuing review with an eye to changes in technology, and in 
operational concepts and to the strategic uncertainties of the longer term… The balance 
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between essentially defensive capabilities and weapons of attack also requires review. 
Considerations of credibility and of long term deterrence suggest modification in favour 
of the latter.401 
 
By the mid-1970s, deterrence became a clearer theme in policy statements and documents. 
For example, the 1976 defence white paper noted that the ADF ‘should at all times 
demonstrate Australia's serious attitude to defence matters, military competence and 
capacity to absorb and operate high-technology equipments.’ 402  It also emphasised 
strategic strike force elements for the Navy and Air Force specifically to ‘deter potential 
adversaries’403 and that ‘Australia's strategic and geographic circumstances call for strike 
forces that can deter attack.’404 The 1976 white paper also came to the sober conclusion 
that Australia 
…may have to rely upon military force to deter a threat to our interests, it is important 
that we be seen as a nation that takes defence matters seriously and that our military 
capabilities and competence should command respect.
405
 
 
Reassurance 
Reassurance coding frequency demonstrates that the vast majority of statements made to 
allies were based on asserting Australia’s credibility as a security partner. 406  This is 
consistent with sources not eligible for inclusion in the data set, particularly the strategic 
basis series of papers, which strongly emphasised credibility throughout the early 1970s. 
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An early example of credibility statements to security partners is Gorton’s reassurance 
that Australia would not be impotent in the absence of a strong British presence in 
Southeast Asia: 
Australia, the most industrially and technically advanced nation in the region, surely 
would not wish, in these circumstances, to refrain from helping the region in all ways. We 
could not turn our backs on our neighbours, refuse to help provide forces for their security, 
and wash our hands of the possible consequences to them and to ourselves.
407 
 
Gorton later outlined his view on Australia’s role in Southeast Asia at length: 
Well, I would answer that question as to how I saw our role there. And I see it this way. I 
see it in the need to show a real involvement in the area and a willingness to participate 
and help in all kinds of ways to give economic help, to give technical help, to assist with 
development, to try and open trade channels and also to be prepared to show that we are 
interested in helping to counter any military attack which may be launched on the area. 
Up until the present and perhaps still for a short time Britain has been responsible for the 
defence of Malaysia and Singapore and has accepted fully that responsibility herself as a 
major power and has looked to assistance from Malaysia, from Singapore, from ourselves, 
from New Zealand. Now, we can't accept responsibility for the defence of the area and 
look for assistance. Rather must the area defend itself and look to assistance from us and 
from New Zealand. There is a change in emphasis there.
408
 
 
He further noted that 
One of the ways in which we decided to do so is by the retention of some Australian 
forces in the area, a visible presence, a continuing visible presence, a presence which has 
been described - not by me but I see the validity of the description as something which 
may appear to others - at any rate to be the tip of the iceberg. We are retaining ground 
forces which will, for the best military, logistic and financial reasons and for great reasons 
of common sense, be based in Singapore, provided Singapore wishes them to remain in 
the area; forces which will not, however, be confined to operations or exercises in 
Singapore, forces which are there under the concept that defence against external attack is, 
as far as Singapore and Malaya are concerned, in our view indivisible.
409
 
 
Then-Minister for Defence, Fraser frequently reiterated the need for an ADF capacity to 
contribute to military operations to protect the security of the Southeast Asian and 
Western Pacific region. 
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Within our resources, our military capability must be geared for deployment in the region 
of which Australia is part when this is demanded by our concepts of regional security, as 
well as to meet possible threats to Australian territory.
410
 
 
McMahon reaffirmed this sentiment, saying that 
We are too developing all those skills that the technological age demands and through the 
combination of all these qualities and virtues we are becoming a middle power. I think we 
have a significance in the Pacific theatre that is out of all proportion to the wealth that is 
being produced in my country. I believe we are getting into this position of trust, a 
position where people consult us because they know that over the years we have been a 
completely trustworthy and reliable ally.
411
 
 
McMahon further signalled Australia’s interests in supporting its regional neighbours in 
order to promote security and stability in the region. 
Asia remains a critical area of the world in which the quest for peace and security will be 
concentrated in the future…  I want to emphasise Australia’s growing and continuing 
interest in the South-East Asian region. Australia is deeply interested in the wellbeing of 
our Asian friends and we are anxious to assist them in their search for economic growth 
and regional security.
412 
 
The 1972 ADR took a more ambiguous tone, stating that 
Australia should avoid concepts limiting its military interest and potential military 
involvement to within the nation's coastline, and should contribute, explicitly without 
provocation, to confidence and security in our region of the world.
413
 
 
…it would be an unwarranted optimism to assume that events will never take a course 
which requires Australian military support for countries… …our defence preparations 
need to be such that future Australian Governments are not deprived of the practical 
option to offer quick and effective support of a military nature, if that is what is 
required.
414
 
 
In similarly loose phrasing it also suggested that Australia would use its advanced 
technology to support its security partners 
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In our defence co-operation with countries in South East Asia, Australia's relatively 
advanced military technology enables us to offer contributions in forms which mutual 
strategic needs suggest.
415
 
 
As Prime Minister, Fraser presented a strong view that ‘our first concern must be to 
ensure that Australia is seen as a nation that is militarily competent, capable of 
independent effort and that has a realistic understanding of its strategic situation.’416 
 
Validation 
In the late 1960s Australia’s efforts to reinforce the idea of security to the Australian 
public were palpable.417 Then-Prime Minister Gorton stressed the significant change in 
Australia’s security environment in the aftermath of the British announcement that it was 
withdrawing from Southeast Asia. He further iterated that Australia was no more 
vulnerable as a result of the change to the regional security environment 
Well, I don't think Australia is any more vulnerable at all, if you're talking in the terms of 
an invasion or a likely incursion across the borders of Australia by some hostile power. I 
believe without question that the ANZUS Treaty covers Australia and New Zealand and 
we have ourselves increased our own capacity to defend ourselves. So if that is the sense 
in which one is talking I believe we are no more vulnerable at all.
418
 
 
Gorton followed this closely with the caveat that the region was destabilised by the 
British withdrawal and US interest in distancing itself from the region, nothing that 
But nevertheless, it would be true to say that Britain's accelerated withdrawal and the 
debate going on in the United States as to the extent of involvement and the kind of 
involvement that country should have in South-East Asia, would have created conditions 
there less stable than before these things happened.
419 
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He reiterated the impending need to reorient Australian strategic outlook and defence 
planning away from reliance on great power allies and towards independence in the 
defence of Australia and its approaches. 
…we have entered a new period in Australia's history, a time of change, a need to 
contribute constantly to our own defence, more than I personally like to contribute 
because I have always in my mind the knowledge of what could be done with what must 
be put into this defence expenditure. But I have also in my mind, and your Government 
and its supporters have in their mind that in this time of change we must keep up the 
enormous expansion of resources for our own defence as an insurance policy, and if we 
are with some measure of safety to own what we have and progress in the way that is 
possible.
420
 
 
This required going to lengths to reassure the Australian public and Australia’s regional 
allies that the ADF was able to deter attacks, provide national security and contribute to 
regional security. Gorton also frequently asserted that the Commonwealth government 
had an inherent responsibility to defend the country.  This extended to defence funding, 
with Then-Prime Minister Gorton stating that Australia ‘shall progressively increase the 
sums spent on defence in the years ahead, for to do less would weaken our own security 
and invite the suspicion of our allies both within the region and without.’421 
 
Fairbairn later said that 
In so acting Australia must be able to protect its interests beyond, as well as within, its 
continental boundaries; to support its friends and its allies in the protection of mutual 
interests in the region; and, having these capabilities, to be able to continue to contribute 
responsibly to the development of a climate of confidence and security in the region and 
to the deterrence of threats generally.
422
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Barnard discussed expenditure in alternate terms, countering threat perceptions held by 
others and arguing for expenditure restraint whilst promoting security 
I mentioned the increasing uncertainty in our strategic assessments the further ahead we 
try to look. Our defence policy and force structure must have regard to this. However I do 
not share the attitude, apparent in some public comment on our defence posture, that 
change in our strategic environment means that we shall necessarily be less secure, and 
that we must now act on the assumption that, when uncertainties resolve, things will be 
worse. We have external developments under continuous review, and I see no reasons at 
this time to modify the strategic prospect that I presented last year. I shall not be pushed 
into much larger demands on the taxpayer to satisfy those who are either unwilling or 
unable to state a case for defence expenditure that we may all examine and debate, but 
rely instead on vague assertions about future possibilities of threat and shaky analogies 
from the past.423 
 
Chapter conclusions 
The data show that Australia’s approach towards relative advantage emerged throughout 
the 1970s and was qualitatively different to later conceptualisations of advantage. Policy 
context was strongly anchored in establishing Australia’s credibility as a more self-reliant 
actor than it had previously been. The key concepts used were capability and technology. 
Advantage was rarely used because Australian was trying to position itself as an 
independent security actor for the first time in its history. The primary referents of 
Australia’s defence capability interest were global but at the same time its interests had 
become far more regionally focused. This indicates a divergence between where the 
defence policy discourse was heading in terms of long term interests and objectives and 
how the defence organisation and Ministers conceived of Australia’s military capabilities 
and proficiencies.  
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The use of strategic concepts was fairly narrow in the first period. The role of technology 
was initially linked to industrial capacity and the technological level but later became 
more focused on military capabilities. However, even where this occurred the advantages 
of technology were conceived largely in terms of being state of the art rather than through 
mitigation or maintaining a lead which was specifically relative to other actors. Policy 
statements often discussed technology in absolute terms of the best available technology. 
Meanwhile, Australia’s force posture was still split between the capacity to conduct 
expeditionary or overseas contingency operations and the defence of Australia and 
capabilities in which Australia could maintain defence self-reliance. 
 
Strategic signalling was heavily dominated by a reaction to Australia’s new self-reliant 
circumstances.  Deterrence did not feature prominently in this period, although it was 
infrequently mentioned. Reassurance focused heavily on Australia’s credibility as a 
security partner to regional countries with whom it shared a security relationship. This is 
consistent with the emergence of self-reliance and the end of forward defence as a 
planning and ordering principle of Australia’s defence policy. Validation was focused 
primarily on reiterating to the Australian public that Australia was capable of defending 
itself from armed attack. This was contrary to Australia’s entire history of defence 
thinking and it required substantial political reassurance to reinforce self-reliance as a 
realistic objective after forward defence collapsed. Validation also had to convince the 
Australian public that self-reliance was affordable as well as possible. Defence spending 
had to increase significantly to accommodate the new capability initiatives that had begun 
entering defence policy priorities as early as Menzies’ 1965 decision to acquire the F-111 
strike aircraft for the RAAF. Gorton in an interview acknowledged that the F-111 
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purchase was related to Indonesia but would not comment on whether it was still 
warranted. 
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Chapter 3  
1979-1986: Technological level and the core force concept 
The period 1979-1986 was marked by some of the fiercest debate about defence policy 
priorities and force structure decisions that Australia has ever experienced. During the 
1970s, much of Australia’s attention had been consumed by regional interests and the 
reformation of the Defence Organisation in the aftermath of the Tange reforms. The 
policy priority of self-reliance had dominated much of the defence discourse and public 
debate was centred primarily on how to structure the ADF to perform core tasks related to 
the defence of Australia. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a shock to the debate. 
Although the possibility of great power conflict disrupting international security had 
never slipped from the Defence Organisation’s priorities, it had not featured as 
prominently in debate as issues related to self-reliance. The sudden reorientation of 
discussion from primarily self-reliance and regional issues to include the importance of 
global security and the potential for great powers to invade smaller powers dramatically 
altered the policy debate and wider discourse. 
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This was particularly apparent in the representation of relative advantage in defence 
policy discourse. It provided ammunition to supporters of the concept of strategic denial 
as a means for Australia to defend itself. It also supported arguments that Australia 
needed a stronger force-in-being which could respond to short-warning conflicts without 
the delays involved in expansion. This introduced the idea of differentiating between 
short-warning and longer-warning contingencies and became a central force structure 
principle. It is important to note that this period does not contain any formal defence 
policy documents. It is between the 1975 and 1987 defence white papers and there were 
no publicly released policy information papers from within defence at the time. There 
were several important defence policy documents originating from other government 
sources, such as parliamentary inquiries, but these are not included in the data set. 
Therefore, the data this period are unique in the study to the extent that they are derived 
solely from Ministerial statements. 
 
3.1 More with less 
The late 1970s and early 1980s were a hotly contested period in Australian politics, 
particular in relation to defence issues. Although Labor and the Coalition had reached an 
implicit consensus on the broad strokes of Australia’s new approach to defence, they 
differentiated fundamental aspects of their policies more starkly than had been the case 
throughout the 1970s. In the area of strategic policy, the period is largely defined by the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Australia’s renewed concerns about the possibility of 
a major theatre war between West and East. Into the 1980s the looming retirement of 
HMAS Melbourne and the debate over a potential replacement was a vehicle through key 
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actors used rhetoric to publicise their policy initiatives for Australia’s defence. 424 
Meanwhile, wider policy discourse was tempered by the pragmatic limits of growth. 
Despite an optimistic outlook, Australia suffered from global economic trends which 
lowered the ceilings of its seemingly infinite expectations for continued expansion in the 
early 1980s. The decade became characterised largely by neo-liberal economic reform, 
with Hawke as the unifier who infused Labor’s policies with his own standards of social 
and political equity.425 The economic path Australia began in the 1980s was essentially 
bi-partisan and many of the reforms pushed by the Hawke government were criticised by 
the opposition for their modesty rather than their excess or extremism. 
 
The Afghanistan crisis 
The crisis in Afghanistan was a watershed moment for the Fraser Government. It brought 
the issue of international security back into Australia’s foreign and defence policy debates 
with renewed vigour. While Fraser had long-held personal reservations about the strength 
of America’s commitments to its allies, he saw the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the 
single greatest affront to international peace and security since the outbreak of World War 
Two.426 As a result, Fraser was prepared to set aside his misgivings about the Western 
alliance in order to present a united front against the spectre of communism.427 This 
created a wedge between Fraser and his Minster for Foreign Affairs, Andrew Peacock. By 
1980 Fraser and Peacock were at odds over the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and 
Australia’s continuing recognition of the Khmer Rouge. Peacock believed that Pol Pot’s 
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atrocities precluded the possibility of ongoing recognition from Australia. Fraser and his 
entire cabinet supported Peacock’s view that Pol Pot’s regime was abhorrent and 
unacceptable, but did not go so far as to withdraw Australia’s recognition of the regime. 
Fraser saw the invasion of Kampuchea as part of a broader Soviet attempt to influence the 
countries of ASEAN and prioritised pragmatism and solidarity with regional states over 
de facto support for the Vietnamese in Kampuchea.428 
 
While Fraser deferred to pragmatism in international issues, he prioritised his values in 
many domestic political spats. While Fraser’s co-authored memoirs paint him as a servant 
to his principles, those principles were understandably flexible in the case of resisting 
potential Soviet expansion by continuing to recognise brutal regimes in Southeast Asia. In 
matters closer to home, Fraser saw loyalty to his values as more important than loyalty to 
his friends or his party. This cost him dearly in the second half of his Prime Ministership, 
particularly in the aftermath of the Costigan Commission.429 The Commission followed 
organised crime deep into the support base of the Liberal Party and Fraser faced a 
contradiction between his loyalty to his values and his loyalty to his party. Fraser felt that 
his commitment to his principles resulted in a number of Ministerial resignations and 
reinforced perceptions that he was a detached and disloyal leader.430 Another perspective 
may be that the inconsistency in his absolutism when it came to principles was 
tantamount to hypocrisy. In any event, the Coalition entered the 1983 double-dissolution 
election battered and Bob Hawke, the newly elected Labor leader, contrasted the 
Coalition’s internal collapse with the slogan Bringing Australia Together. 
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The 1983 election campaign was criticised for being a personality race rather than a 
contest based on policy substance. The Australian Financial Review characterised the 
election as a barometer of the electorate’s judgment about the two would-be leaders and 
their suitability as potential heads of government.431 Some commentators believed that the 
personality-based campaigning was a deliberate move by both parties to side-step 
difficult policy questions. Although the campaign ultimately brought both parties face to 
face with some of the most intractable policy issues of the time, the campaigns did play 
on the individual qualities of Fraser and Hawke significantly. This approach was 
explicitly acknowledged by Graham Richardson, who had been a member of Hawke’s 
campaign committee in 1983. Richardson believed that Labor had promoted its leader 
more than its policies because the party saw the Hawke of 1983 as a perfect fit for what 
the Australia of 1983 wanted in a leader.432 Ultimately the image of a leader focused on 
national unity won over the electorate’s impressions of Fraser’s combative leadership 
style and the Government was defeated by a resurgent Labor Party at the polls. 433 Hawke 
had won the day, but had set high expectations for his government in the process. 
 
The rise of rationalism 
Once Labor took office in 1983 it began turning even further away from its traditional 
policy objectives than Hawke’s election campaign had signalled. Hawke and his Deputy, 
future Prime Minister Paul Keating, saw economic reform as a principal objective for 
their government. They immediately distanced the Labor Government of the 1980s from 
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both the ideology of the Whitlam Government and the orthodoxy of the Fraser 
Government. Instead Hawke and Keating painted themselves as pragmatist who believed 
that a new approach was not only desirable, but necessary. 434  Hawke’s turn toward 
economic rationalism began a sweeping reform of policies with significant social and 
political implications which ignited a series of debates and which cast a long shadow in 
Australian politics. Policies which began under Hawke and were continued under Keating 
challenged traditional views about Australia’s global and regional identity with a 
progressive vision of integrating the Australian economy with Asia to a much greater 
extent. The same policies also bridged some of the long-standing gaps between Labor and 
the Coalition in areas of economic policy, sometimes redrawing party lines in unlikely 
ways. 435 
 
Labor’s new focus on internationalism was coupled with a renewed intellectualism in the 
leadership and quickly distanced policy development from the party and its Whitlam-era 
support base in the wider Australian community. As early as 1984 some Party members 
felt alienated from the decision-making process, with Hawke’s own election campaign 
director lamenting his lack of knowledge about the Prime Minister’s major policy 
initiatives leading into the election.436 From the mid-1980s onwards Labor increased its 
focus on its more traditional areas of policy, introducing a suite of progressive social and 
environmental policies which were linked to the reform of the Australian economy. A 
range of income redistribution packages targeted low-income earners, anti-discrimination 
and equal opportunity legislation aimed to alter the composition of the workforce, and 
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superannuation pensions sought to safeguard Australia’s ageing population from 
economic dependency in their twilight years. Labor appeared to be swinging back 
towards its roots. Yet, it simultaneously pushed a complicated economic agenda which 
combined rationalism with trade liberalisation and a continued embrace of globalisation. 
Despite a seeming contradiction in policy directions, Labor sought to reconcile its past 
and future. An essential component of the Hawke Government’s plan for Australia’s 
transition to economic liberalism was social equity. Driving a reform agenda underwritten 
by equity was at once a precondition of support from Labor’s constituency, a tactic to 
justify market-based policy development, and a discrete aim of pursuing economic 
liberalism at all.437 
 
Another element of Labor’s reimagining of Australia’s global identity was a major shift 
in Defence policy. Hawke believed that, more than an expansion capacity, Australia 
needed a credible and relevant military capability which could provide for the defence of 
Australia against armed aggression.438 He opposed the Coalition’s proposal to acquire an 
aircraft carrier to replace HMAS Melbourne and believed that it was Labor’s task to 
rebuild the ‘basic military supplies’ which the coalition had allowed to dwindle over the 
preceding decade.439 In addition, Hawke sought to refine Australia’s strategic outlook by 
focusing it more on the defence of the Australian continent and offshore assets. He further 
wanted to substantially change the ADF’s force structure by equipping with the mix of 
capabilities which best suited Labor’s approach to prioritising strategic objectives. Hawke 
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appointed Kim Beazely as minster for Defence and commissioned Paul Dibb to report on 
the capabilities required to defend Australia as Labor envisaged. 
 
Hawke’s major challenge was to produce a defence policy which could be sold to the 
wider Labor Party but which also demonstrated that his government was not shying away 
from core defence issues. This meant closing the gap between the Coalition and Labor 
policies to ensure that Labor couldn’t be criticised as weak in matters of defence. It also 
meant making a case for a high-capability defence force at a time where some of Labor’s 
support base may have been attracted to New Zealand’s ‘path of de-facto non-
alignment.’440 On one hand Hawke limited the number of uranium mines in Australia, 
appeasing the far left. On the other hand, he renewed his government’s commitment to 
Western alliances, particularly ANZUS, under the banner of self-reliance within alliances. 
Hawke and Beazely presented a united front to both supporters and critics of the US 
alliance by focusing on the mutually beneficial elements of self-reliance and reinforcing 
the message that Australia’s credibility was bolstered by its capacity for unilateral action. 
 
Who do we think we are? 
In 1986 the Labor Government published the unclassified version of the Dibb Review and 
opened a debate with the community about the future of Australia’s defence. Although 
the review itself dealt primarily with matters of capability, it raised deeper questions of 
identity which stoked long-held concerns about security which were embedded in society. 
Dibb himself famously responded to some expansivist proposals regarding Australia’s 
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defence role by exclaiming ‘who do we think we are?’ This was no hyperbole. The 
question resonated deeply in the community and discussions of what could be done with 
material capabilities were often linked to discussions of what should be done and why 
Australia ought to be prepared to do it. In some ways the Dibb Review sparked a 
conversation about Australia’s place in the world which illuminated latent undercurrents 
of the xenophobia and insecurity which had been integral to the identity of earlier 
generations of Australians and had become entrenched in how many Australians 
understood their nation and themselves.441 
 
The Dibb Review and subsequent debate regarding the upcoming 1987 Defence White 
Paper presented Hawke with a unique opportunity to dovetail his defence and trade 
policies. Self-reliance provided a new lens for Australians to view and understand their 
near neighbours. Hawke believed that Australians had by and large interpreted Asia as a 
looming threat and that the time had come to see the region in terms of opportunities 
instead of dangers. 442 The Government leveraged the rhetoric of a stronger and more self-
reliant Australia to bolster its narrative of embracing Asia as an economic and political 
partner. Although Labor did not make significant progress in recasting Australia’s self-
image in the 1980s, it laid the ground for many of its later policy narratives by framing 
both defence and economic policies in terms of national characteristics which were 
transferrable to values and, by extension, to interpretations of national identity.443 The 
first step to unifying Labor’s vision was selling the Defence of Australia, still in its 
conceptual infancy, to the electorate. Much of this burden fell onto Beazley’s shoulders 
                                                 
441 Anthony Burke, Fear of Security: Australia's Invasion Anxiety  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008). 
442 Hawke, The Hawke Memoirs, 229. 
443 Fischer, Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices. 
Chapter 3 
1979-1986: Technological level and the core force concept 
 
 
 
 
172 
 
and he was both a blessing and a curse in the campaign to develop and defend Labor’s 
strategic policy vision. 
 
Although Beazley was generally well-liked as an individual in both major parties, he was 
a polarising Minster for Defence. Some believed that he was the finest minster that the 
Department had ever had. Beazely enjoyed a glowing record of major reform all the way 
from strategic interests and objectives down to long-term force structure planning, 
capability acquisition and military training and doctrine. He also struck a difficult balance 
between the Hawke Government’s views on defence self-reliance with the necessity of 
the US alliance and in the process forged strong relationships with many prominent 
American politicians. 444  Beazley was also seen as overzealous and militant. He was 
criticised for his fascination with expensive high-tech capabilities, particularly the Collins 
class submarines, and for reductions in the size of Australia’s ground forces. 445 Some 
commentators also objected to his readiness to use force in regional matters and 
characterised his approach to defence a new militarism. In balance, these criticisms were 
likely overstated. 446  Despite Beazley’s vehement rhetorical support for defence, the 
Department’s budget actually contracted during his tenure. In addition, the size of the 
ADF, primarily the Army, shrunk significantly under the Hawke and Keating 
governments.447 Beazley faced vigorous debates on many aspects of Labor’s strategic 
policy agenda. Selling a new Australian identity was a tall order under such 
circumstances and Beazley did not gain significant traction until he neared the end of his 
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tenure as Minister for Defence. Nevertheless, the Hawke Government planted the seed of 
a narrative of Australian identity which continued to evolve under successive Labor and 
Coalition governments. 
 
3.2 The force structure debate 
The defence policy background for the period 1979-1986 is defined largely by the force 
structure debate which had begun in the 1970s and continued until the late 1980s. This 
section examines the origins of the force structure debate, the emergence and controversy 
of the core force concept and the evolution of defence planning priorities. It examines the 
state of debate after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, through the parliamentary 
inquiries into threats to Australia and the ADF’s force structure and criticisms of the 
viability of multipath expansion to an unknown terminal force.448 It concludes with then-
Minister for Defence Kim Beazley’s decision to commission Paul Dibb to conduct a 
review of force structure planning for the ADF and the release of Dibb’s findings in his 
review of Australia's defence capabilities report in 1986.449 
 
The force posture debate 
The late 1970s and early 1980s were a period of significant defence debate in Australia. 
The implications of self-reliance had not yet been teased out and a cohesive 
implementation policy was needed.  Public support for self-reliance was not immediately 
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forthcoming and many citizens believed that Australia lacked the strategic weight to fend 
for itself. 450  Important questions emerged that defence policy could not yet answer, 
particularly in the realm of force structure planning, operational concepts and doctrine, 
the scope of the interests that Australia was willing to pursue with armed force and the 
priorities that would determine appropriate capabilities to develop in order to meet the 
types of threats that Australia sought to defend against in the future. This reinforced the 
fundamental nature of the shift in policy away from Forward Defence and toward self-
reliance.451 The ADF now faced an operational and doctrinal transition from its historical 
preparations for land war in Asia or further afield and toward the defence of the 
Australian mainland and its expansive air and maritime surrounds.452 Meanwhile, the 
Department of Defence was still adjusting to the Tange reforms and faced the daunting 
task of translating new strategic guidance into actionable policy. 
 
Then-Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser characterised the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as 
the worst international crisis in 35 years. His rationale for this claim was that the 
economic implications of Soviet control over Afghanistan and the potential to dominate 
or invade Iran and the Persian Gulf region. He elaborated: 
There have been a number of crises, especially in the Cold War period - Berlin, Korea, 
Cuba. Now all of those were important in a regional context… But there is an additional 
element that was not present in the Berlin matter, North Korea or Cuba. And that is, if the 
Soviets take the step further we were talking about, if they do a turn into Iran and start to 
gain an entrance or a control over some part of Middle East oil production then they have 
an addition, the capacity to vastly damage or even to destroy the economies of advanced 
industrial countries. And that is why I believe you have not only the strategic 
circumstances, you have an economic element that was not present on earlier occasions. 
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And that is why I think it is more dangerous and more important than those earlier 
occurrences.
453
 
 
Fraser later added further concerns: 
It is not just that our strategic perceptions have altered, but that the strategic environment 
in which we live has also changed dramatically. The security, thought to be conferred by 
detente, was shattered by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan… and it certainly has clear 
implications for our attitude to national and regional defence. These fundamental changes 
in Australia's national circumstances require a number of re-assessments and 
responses.
454
 
 
 
The 1976 defence white paper had grand designs for the new role of the ADF and 
promises of healthy investment in new capabilities and infrastructure from the Fraser 
government. What it lacked was a clear idea of how it would translate its new resources 
into strategic outcomes.455 A first step toward rectifying this was a range of inquiries, 
both public and private, into Australia’s strategic circumstances. The 1981 Joint 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence inquiry report on threats to Australia’s 
security found four basic types of threats: global war, invasion of Australia, intermediate 
threats to Australian interests and low level contingencies.456 The report concluded that 
even though the likelihood of any major threat was very low the ADF needed to retain 
high technology capabilities with long lead times in order to hedge against the rapid 
development of offensive capabilities by a regional power and to ‘act as a deterrent to 
hostile action.’457 A caveat to this conclusion is that being able to meet a challenge is not 
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necessarily the same thing as deterring it.458 Deterrence must not only apply to attacks of 
many varieties, but also to threats of attack.459 
 
One outcome of the program of inquiries and reports was a renewed focus on the concept 
of defence warning time. While the concept would not be clearly articulated in its full 
form until the late 1980s, many of the precursory concepts had already been outlined by 
the early 1980s. A key aspect of warning time which emerged was the differentiation 
between short-warning conflicts and long warning time conflicts and the necessity for a 
force-in-being able to deter or defeat short-warning escalation. The terminology of short-
warning conflicts was largely overtaken by the more familiar but conceptually ambiguous 
terminology of ‘credible contingencies.’460 The only major difference being that short-
warning conflicts largely considered Australia’s Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) as 
contingencies the force-in-being should be capable of defeating, whereas credible 
contingencies were often limited to attacks against Australia or offshore assets and 
harassing operations in the northern approaches. However, this may have been a 
reflection of the wider debate about whether or not to retain an aircraft carrier capability 
once HMAS Melbourne was retired.461 
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The core force concept 
An important carryover from the Forward Defence era was the concept of a force-in-
being or core force that would provide an expansion base for a rapid increase in the size 
of the ADF in response to an emerging threat.462 Ostensibly this would provide a wide 
ranging deterrent at an acceptable cost. One difficulty in maintaining a core force was 
ensuring that it could provide an acceptable base for expansion. A senate inquiry into the 
Australian Army tabled in 1974 identified three points which it found underpinned the 
concept of an expansion base. The first was that there is a critical minimum-sized Army, 
below which ‘the nation ceases to have a useful asset.’ The second was that Australian 
forces should be organised, trained and equipped primarily as a base for expansion in the 
event of a contingency. Thirdly, that parliament and government must be prepared to 
respond to any deterioration in Australia’s ‘advantageous strategic and technological 
position.’463 Despite its focus on the Army, the inquiry’s points of concern were largely 
applicable to the wider ADF and Parliament was apprehensive about elements of the core 
force concept because if a threat did arise, the logic would be to rapidly change the 
composition of the ADF to meet that threat. The implication of this expansion path being 
that Australia could develop an inappropriate force if a different contingency required the 
deployment of ADF assets. 464 
 
The expansion path problem underpinned significant debate regarding the ways in which 
the core force concept could be applied in Australia’s defence planning. Critics, such as 
Langtry and Ball, argued that ‘the core force concept suffer[ed] from a number of quite 
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debilitating inadequacies.’ 465  One of which was the significant gap between likely 
warning times and lead times for expansion. Then-Minister for Defence Jim Killen 
countered that Defence would maintain a range of capabilities broad enough to allow the 
Commonwealth Government options for expanding the core force in numerous directions 
in response to emerging threats. In Killen’s view, the Government would have the ability 
to being increasing the force-in-being in response to changes to the strategic environment 
in advance of full blown expansion towards a specific terminal force. 466  This would 
further enable Australia to shape the strategic circumstances in which hostilities could 
arise. Killen’s view echoed earlier statements by then-Defence minister Lance Barnard 
that 
Our approach is therefore one of response to developing circumstances from which we 
assess pressures or an actual threat could later emerge and mature. By such response we 
would aim progressively to influence the circumstances which might lead to ultimate 
threat, to deter such threat should it nevertheless take shape, and to be ready in time to 
deal with it should our policy fail to avert it. Clearly, with this approach Australia needs 
to maintain reliable strategic associations with a number of countries, so as both to 
enlarge our influence over strategic developments and to provide for co-operation in any 
future contingency.
467
 
 
The main policy challenge identified through this debate was that the core force concept 
was essentially reactive, requiring defence planners to expand and contract various force 
elements in response to unfolding strategic circumstances. 468 This is problematic due to 
the potential for a shortfall between warning time and lead time.469 It is also impossible 
for Defence to determine the optimal configuration of a fully mobilised ADF. Because the 
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fully mobilised ‘terminal force’470 is reactionary, it could take on any number of forms. A 
core force must therefore be able to support expansion into any number of significantly 
different force structures, which presents enormous practical challenges to expansion.471 
This necessitates extensive multi-path force expansion planning and a wide range of high 
technology capabilities to facilitate multi-path expansion.472 The result is a diffusion of 
resources across a broad range of units and equipment, which waters down the overall 
potency of the ADF and limits economies of scale in any one area.473 
 
One possible solution to this problem was a ‘split force’ which combined a small number 
of high technology platforms with a larger number of low-cost systems of moderate 
performance.474 In 1982 the higher defence machinery review found that the concepts of 
versatility and adaptability used in force structure planning were appropriate as a basis for 
defence planning.475 The review noted organisational concerns regarding the ambiguities 
between the roles of the Force Structure Committee and the Force Development and 
Analysis Division476 and the lack of input from the Force Development Branch in shaping 
strategic guidance.477 This was problematic because the Australian Strategic Analysis and 
Defence Policy Objectives (ASADPO) document did not ‘provide sufficient guidance, 
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particularly for the purpose of determining relative priorities for the development of 
Defence Force capabilities.’ 478   The 1984 Parliament inquiry report the Australian 
Defence Force: its structure and capabilities found that strategic guidance from 
government was inadequate and that Australia lacked appropriate organisational 
machinery for translating national security objectives into strategic concepts and force 
structure.479  
 
Planning priorities 
Part of the problem was an incoherent policy process and part was conceptual. At the time 
Australia incorporated elements of three different approaches to defence planning.480 The 
first was the contingency probability approach, which emphasised shaping the ADF to 
meet likely threats. This approach was considered to be undesirable because it 
necessitated a force structure that was oriented to performing low level operations and did 
not require capabilities to deal with improbable high intensity contingencies. The second 
was the terminal force approach, which was an evolution of the core force approach 
advocated in the 1970s. Although the term core force had been replaced in policy 
documents with the term force-in-being, the concepts had the same foundations. The 
terminal force approach was criticised as an open-ended commitment to high technology 
capabilities that would become prohibitively expensive to maintain. The third was the 
deterrent approach, which focused possessing demonstrable military capabilities 
optimised for medium and high intensity combat. The deterrent approach conceded that a 
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gap between lead and warning times was likely, but sought to mitigate the associated risk 
by pre-empting it with capability expenditure.481 
 
In response to criticism of the government’s investment in the ANZUS alliance, then-
Minister for Defence Ian Sinclair shifted emphasis in his strategic calculus away from 
global level threats and towards regional contingencies in which Australia would expect 
to operate more independently and in which a technological basis for expansion was 
integral.482 Amidst the changing focus of ongoing force structure and defence policy 
debates, Sinclair made frequent reference to material capabilities being acquired by 
government, 483  although these were not regularly linked to specific strategic policy 
outcomes or requirements. After the 1983 change of government, incoming Prime 
Minister Bob Hawke quickly signalled his government’s intentions to maintain 
Australia’s commitments to its great power and regional security alliances and to reform 
defence policy to provide for a force structure which effectively utilised military 
technology and afforded the ADF a qualitative advantage in Southeast Asia.484 
 
Soon after, then Minster for Defence Gordon Scholes articulated a comprehensive 
approach to defence policy which would become a significant aspect of strategic guidance 
for policy formation. Scholes used the term ‘graduated readiness’ 485  to describe his 
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thinking on how best to manage modernisation and budget constraints. Political needs 
such as managing public expectations regarding defence expenditure and reassuring allies 
that a new government would maintain committed to long-standing relationships had a 
strong correlation with new expressions of technological advantage in the mid-1980s. 
 
Successive commitments to long-term acquisition plans were undermined by a lack of 
funding for major capital projects that saw ADF capability lag behind the force structure 
decisions identified in the 1976 defence white paper and flagged for procurement by 1981. 
This shortfall was compounded by a proclivity within Defence to purchase relatively 
expensive high technology replacements for retiring equipment and capabilities.486 By 
late 1984 Defence had become dysfunctional and mired in intra-organisational 
disagreements over definitional and conceptual issues that presented an obstacle to 
meaningful policy development.487 Then Defence minister, Kim Beazley appointed Paul 
Dibb to conduct a review of Australia’s defence capabilities. The primary terms of 
reference for the report were to  
...undertake a review of the content, priorities and rationale of defence forward planning 
in the light of the strategic and financial planning guidance endorsed by the Government; 
to advise on present and future force capabilities and on the present and future balance 
between resource elements such as manpower, activities, operating stocks, facilities and 
equipment—where appropriate that advice should indicate priorities for changes to 
particular defence force elements within various time-frames…488 
 
The emphasis on capabilities represented a popular concern that the post 1976 white 
paper defence debate had focused largely on abstract strategic concepts and not on how 
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the ADF could be structured to effectively operate as in the self-reliant defence of 
Australia. 
 
The Dibb Review set out to address that concern quickly becoming the scaffolding for the 
first defence white paper in over a decade and casting a long shadow in its influence on 
defence policy through the 1990s and 2000s. Together, Beazley and Dibb transformed the 
earlier vision of defence self-reliance presented in the 1976 defence white paper into 
robust strategic guidance that linked Australia’s defence priorities to a concrete force 
planning process.489 The 1987 white paper, the Defence of Australia, followed soon after 
and was instrumental in enabling progress in Australian defence and force structure 
policies and generated wide debate over how Australia might utilise its resources to 
pursue its newly articulated objectives. However, the some aspects of the defence debate 
of the early 1980s remained unresolved. The tension between Australia’s global interests 
and its regional strategic circumstances had become more apparent in the aftermath of the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. At the same time serious debate about the announced 
replacement of HMAS Melbourne with another aircraft carrier, HMS Invincible, 
intersected force structure planning debates and questions about the scope of Australia’s 
strategic interests.490 
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3.3 Policy context 
The policy context for relative advantage did not change significantly during this period. 
Capability remained an important consideration, while technology was more closely 
linked with communications and the development of self-reliant capabilities. The primary 
referent remained great powers, which is almost certainly due to concern about Soviet 
adventurism and increased uncertainty in Australia regarding great power conflict, 
particularly in the Indian Ocean Region. Nevertheless, the scope of Australia’s defence 
policy began to take a decidedly regional focus, with greater interest in international 
peacekeeping missions being offset by direct focus on Southeast Asia in determining 
Australia’s defence policy priorities. 
 
Key concepts 
In the period 1979-1986 The primary concept articulated in defence policy discourse was 
technology. These included discussion of specific platforms and technologies. For 
example, in 1979 Killen noted that 
There has been a revolution in fighter aircraft technology. Designs have been radically 
changed. Engines are much more powerful. New concepts have been adopted. Flybywire 
control systems, new non-metallic structural materials, integrated avionics and weapons 
systems controlled by on-board digital computers- these are but a few of the more 
significant advances.
491
 
 
Discussion also ranged from statements on technology generally, such as Killen’s remark 
that ‘the pace of technology is unrelenting,’492 to comments regarding the necessity for 
the ADF to maintain cutting edge capabilities. For example, Killen commented that ‘the 
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Defence Force must keep up with modern technological developments.’ 493  In 1980, 
Killen also made a clear statement that the capability benchmark for the ADF was relative 
advantage over the region, announcing that ‘the first test is the strength of the force vis-a-
vis the countries that are within striking distance of Australia.’494 
 
Then-Prime Minister Fraser said in 1981 that 
Our efforts to secure the nation's defence, through a well-developed defence infrastructure, 
necessarily place a premium on technological capacity, well-trained manpower, and an 
officer corps which is sensitive to the kinds of co-ordinated tactical responses which a 
modern defence capacity requires.
495
 
 
Gordon Scholes was concerned that the implications of a high technology defence force 
included increased demand in the skill levels of ADF personnel and a cost-benefit trade 
off of certain capabilities over others. In 1983, Scholes stated that 
Technological developments have changed perceptions of the relative value of some 
weapons. Precision guided munitions have begun to demonstrate accuracy and reliability 
that was previously only a prospect. Electronic warfare technology is rendering some 
weapons less effective and opening up new needs. Wide area surveillance systems are 
making it possible to detect ships, submarines and aircraft hundreds and even thousands 
of kilometres away. Reliable, secure communications are necessary over greater ranges, if 
these developments are to be effectively countered or exploited… Despite some 
predictions, these complex new technologies seen demand more, and more skilled, 
Service manpower. Increasingly, it is becoming clear that if these new and more costly 
capabilities are to be acquired we must give up some of the things that change has 
rendered relatively less important in the strategic environment of Australia today.496 
 
Scholes also linked skilled manpower to the capacity of the ADF to act as a successful 
deterrent and, in extremis, to defend the country against hostile military operations. 
With regard to defence, the major problem that any country has now, and a country of 
Australia’s size has that problem in a greater proportion is the rapid development of 
technology, the capabilities of which have to be required if the equipment which needs to 
be acquired, and to a significant extent the skills which are necessary in order to make a 
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modern defence force a workable, viable and reliable deterrent and security force for the 
country in question.
497
 
 
Beazley focused on technology in general terms, noting that ‘modern defence equipment 
frequently incorporates leading edge technology’498 and that ‘there is a requirement for a 
high level of technological capability in our defence infrastructure.’499 However, Beazley 
also offered the important caveat that 
It is a prime example of that most basic of traps - assuming that higher technology is, by 
definition, always the answer. What we require is not higher technology per se but 
appropriate technology. This may well include higher technology, but not as a 
precondition.
500
 
 
Referent actors 
During the period 1979-1986 much more of the defence discourse was centred on 
Australia’s regional security interests. However, the main referent mentioned in the data 
set remained great powers. 501  This is largely attributable to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and the Australian government’s reaction to what it saw as a precedent of a 
superpower dominating a small power with very little effort from the international 
community to keep the conflict in check. There is also a significant emphasis on regional 
actors in the data set and some concepts, which later became defence policy staples, 
emerged for the first time. 
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Fraser, speaking about the then-planned acquisition of HMS Invincible from the Royal 
Navy said that it would ‘provide a very substantial increase in Australia's national defence 
capabilities, and will greatly enhance our ability to-deter aggression in our own region in 
the decades ahead.’502 
 
Speaking of the F/A-18 Aircraft, Sinclair claimed that ‘this 'state of the art’ aircraft will 
maintain the RAAF’s position as the most advanced air force in the region.’503 Similarly, 
Hawke proclaimed that 
The F/A-18s are perhaps the most impressive and tangible expression of this policy to 
date. They will make a major contribution to our ability to present ourselves as a 
formidable and independent defence presence in our region.
504
 
 
In both instances, the F/A-18 was linked directly to affording the RAAF a formidable 
position in relation to regional militaries. 
 
Beazley made the same claim, but was more extensive in scope, noting that 
…we have access to the latest military technology and hardware. The availability of US 
military technology means, effectively, that our Defence Force will remain a qualitative 
jump ahead in regional terms for the foreseeable future.
505
 
 
Speaking further about the region, Beazley continued to link the validity of ADF 
capability to regional benchmarks: 
…these forces constitute by far the strongest long range strike capability in the region. 
They provide us with the ability to operate against a full range of targets, not only in our 
area of direct military interest, but well beyond. The capabilities we need for defence in 
depth are determined, among other things, by our assessments of the capabilities we may 
face… The Government has carefully analysed the defence capabilities within our 
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region…. Two important assessments emerge. The first is that no regional power has the 
capability to mount a major attack on Australia…. The second is that the capability to 
mount smaller scale-but still serious-military operations against us already exists in our 
region.
506
 
 
 
Beazley also linked Australia’s desire for a leading edge in the region to capabilities-
based defence planning.507 
…we need these capabilities now, we need them in the force-in-being. Again I am not 
suggesting that any willingness or intention to threaten Australia in this way exists in the 
region. But, as I have said, proper defence planning must be based on contingencies 
which reflect a realistic assessment of prevailing and developing regional capabilities. 
Inherent in the defence paper and in the government’s implementation of defence self-
reliance is the linking of practical defence policy with our allies, and our role in the region 
as a military power.
508
 
 
Policy scope 
By the early 1980s the scope of Australia’s strategic interests and objectives had begun to 
narrow. Although regional interests featured most prominently as a proportion of coding 
frequency, defending Australia from armed attack became a close rival. Again, although 
there were significant references to global actors, global level interests did not feature 
significantly in statements regarding the scope of Australia’s strategic interests and 
objectives.509 
 
Despite looming concerns about Soviet aggression, Australia’s global interests began to 
diversify. Australia now focused on long-held but often deprioritised interests in global 
security which served to reinforce international norms. A commitment to these norms and 
                                                 
506 "1987 Defence Policy Information Paper," House of Representatives Hansard (1987), 4. 
507 Young, "Capabilities-Based Defense Planning: The Australian Experience."; Dibb, "The Conceptual 
Basis of Australia's Defence Planning and Force Structure Development." 
508 Beazley, "1987 Defence Policy Information Paper," 7. 
509 See Appendix C, Table 18 
Chapter 3 
1979-1986: Technological level and the core force concept 
 
 
 
 
189 
 
a history of contributing to their legitimacy was thought to be beneficial in projecting 
Australia’s image of itself as a self-reliant middle power. Speaking of the UN operation in 
Namibia, Fraser said: 
We have a real capacity to contribute to the success of this United Nations initiative. We 
believe that this is above all a time when our sense of responsibility in international 
affairs and our commitment to the settlement of disputes by peaceful means needs to be 
firmly underlined. This is a time not for withdrawal but for participation, for the 
acceptance of a commitment which is within our capacity.
510
 
 
 
However, traditional security issues still underpinned Australia’s heightened interest in 
selective participation in international peacekeeping operations. Speaking about the 
proposed peacekeeping mission to the Sinai in 1981, then-Prime Minister Fraser said that 
The starting point is that Australia has a clear and strong national interest in the progress 
of peace in the Middle East. It is first and foremost a matter of deciding what it is in our 
own national interest to do, and then acting accordingly. Without question, the continued 
progress towards peace in the Middle East is of enormous significance to Australia. An 
outbreak of conflict would have repercussions not only for the region but for the peace of 
the world which would affect us profoundly and in manifold ways. It would affect our 
allies and friends in ways which could not but impinge greatly on our international 
relationships and with risks for the strategic balance of great moment to our national 
security. Australia's interest is in seeing what is probably the single most serious threat to 
world peace removed. Further warfare in the Middle East could trigger off a much wider 
war. Australia has a legitimate interest in preventing this. This point is so evidently true 
that I believe it does not require elaboration here.
511
 
 
The last sentence in the quote above is particularly instructive. Fraser states that 
Australia’s national interest in contributing to action taken to prevent wars which could 
trigger wider international conflict is self-evident. 
Sound defence relationships with our near neighbours to the north, Indonesia and Papua-
New Guinea, are fundamental to Australia’s security. These two countries are very 
different in their national experience, their defence needs and their perceptions of ways in 
which Australia might best work with them for the presentation of regional stability.  
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Nevertheless, the Government bases its defence policy on the recognition that geography 
determines that the security of each of the three is of abiding interest to the others.
512
 
 
Direct references to the region as scope for Australia’s strategic interests were less 
common, although they did occur. Hawke made a clear point of identifying regional 
interests in a 1983 speech when he said that v  
South East Asia is strategically important to Australia. Australia shares with the ASEAN 
countries a strong sense of the need to maintain regional peace and stability. Australia is 
deeply concerned by any developments that might either threaten regional security or put 
at risk the territorial integrity and stability of regional countries.
513
 
 
3.4 Strategic concepts 
Australia’s strategic concepts changed quite noticeably during this period. Self-reliance, 
denial and contingencies became more significant force posture concepts. This is 
consistent with other policy considerations and the emphasis on self-reliance throughout 
all facets of defence policy discourse during the period 1979-1986. Rationale for 
technological advantage still emphasised industry concerns, but references to cutting edge 
technology became prominent as well, suggesting that the idea of an inherent need for 
state of the art technology and capabilities was gaining traction in the defence policy 
community. 
 
Type of advantage 
By the early 1980s the type of advantage being advocated in the data set was largely 
related to the use of emerging information and communication technologies to allow 
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improved coordination between ADF force elements. Material advantage in individual 
weapon platforms was also emphasised, often in conjunction with the need for the 
industrial base to sustain them.514 
 
In the late 1970s Killen had focused mostly on expansion and warning time, stating that 
We must sustain a defence force containing men with the right skills, possessing the right 
weapons, that could train and develop an expanded force as and when a major threat to 
Australia begins to emerge.
515 
 
Throughout the 1980s, Beazley continued many of the same points about warning time 
and expansion. For example, in the lead up to the development of the Defence of 
Australia white paper, Beazley noted that 
The second point concerns our capacity for expansion. As a developed western country 
with the world’s most powerful nation as a strong ally, we clearly have a substantial 
capacity in relative terms for timely military development.
516
 
 
Beazley further stated that 
The future holds very challenging prospects for the Army Reserve. With a role of real 
responsibility in defence of the north, a major part in maintaining expansion capabilities, 
and continued emphasis on integration and affiliation of reserve and regular units to 
enable the development of skills and knowledge.
517
 
 
However, Beazley also focused on the material component of a technological edge with 
the observation that 
Provided our strategy is right, contemporary military technology means that we can 
defend our approaches. That technology can render our approaches transparent. 
Technology means also that we now have the mobility to use that information to defend 
ourselves.
518
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This echoed Killen’s earlier sentiment that 
In the interest of rational defence debate, we must resist a somewhat old fashioned 
concept of measuring the country's military capability in terms of the number of men in 
our Army, or the number of men we could contribute to overseas expeditionary forces in 
a major conflict in a distant theatre.
519
 
 
Fraser led in references to coordination, making observations such as 
Modern warfare requires both high technologies and rapid communications so as to 
ensure that these capabilities are co-ordinated effectively… The Defence Force needs 
advanced command and control facilities which can support the movement of troops, 
aircraft and ships.
520
 
 
Fraser also issues comments which would later be echoed in the ADF’s later joint 
operating concept and the creation of Joint Operations Command (JOC). He noted that 
In the past, single-service contingents have operated, more or less, as self-contained 
tactical forces. But advances in technology, and radical changes in operational situations 
and methods have led to a blurring of the lines which formally separated the individual 
services.
521
 
 
 
Force posture 
Unsurprisingly, in the 1980s much of the political debate was focused on defence self-
reliance as a key principle for Australia force posture. Self-reliance was by far the most 
frequently coded force posture concept, followed by strategic denial and contingencies.522 
 
In combination, self-reliance, strategic denial and contingencies account for the vast 
majority of all coding instances for force posture. These priorities all relate to maintaining 
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a force-in-being able act independently, deny Australia’s air and maritime approaches to 
an adversary and deter or defeat limited attacks against Australia and it offshore assets. 
Consequently, the data show that the period 1979-1986 hosted a strikingly different 
debate about how Australia should approach the ADF’s force posture and prioritise long-
term force structure planning.  At the same time, discussion of core force and 
expeditionary priorities in force posture planning were extraordinarily rare. Even when 
they were discussed, it was often in the context of using existing capabilities to expand or 
conduct expeditionary operations rather than as an endorsement of those capabilities as 
force structure priorities. 
 
Fraser demonstrated a broad view of Australia’s force posture, including international 
peacekeeping in the spectrum of operations he believed the ADF should contribute to 
when the government felt it was appropriate to do so. In reference to the proposed UN 
peacekeeping operation in Namibia, Fraser said 
We have a real capacity to contribute to the success of this United Nations initiative. We 
believe that this is above all a time when our sense of responsibility in international 
affairs and our commitment to the settlement of disputes by peaceful means needs to be 
firmly underlined. This is a time not for withdrawal but for participation, for the 
acceptance of a commitment which is within our capacity. If we are not prepared to 
participate in an initiative sponsored, amongst others, by the United States and Great 
Britain, adopted by the United Nations and accepted by the conflicting parties, how can 
we expect others to fulfil their obligations to act responsibly and cooperatively in efforts 
to settle disputes and restore stability in areas of conflict?
523
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Fraser also claimed that ‘a balanced defence force is one in which the whole range of 
contingencies which might threaten our security can be met in a co-ordinated and 
integrated way.’524 Killen reinforced this view, noting that the ADF’s force structure 
…must address all credible contingencies- including the contingency that in some 
calamitous situation we might again find, as was once our experience, territory to 
Australia's north occupied by a country with hostile intent towards us. Australia's force 
must exploit the advantages of the sea and air spaces which would separate us from the 
bases of such an enemy. We cannot assume that all threats could necessarily be disposed 
of at a distance. I do suggest nevertheless that we would be well advised to reflect a little 
more carefully than some commentators do upon our present and future capabilities.
525
 
 
Yet by far the most common discussion of Australia’s force posture was with reference to 
self-reliance. Given that this concept was percolating in policy discussion and would be 
promulgated through official channels by the mid-1980s and enshrined in the 1987 white 
paper, it is unsurprising that Beazley often mentioned self-reliance and discussed it in a 
range of contexts. For example, Beazley said that 
Another advantage Australia derives from our relationship with the US is that we have 
access to technology, equipment and intelligence that would otherwise be unavailable to 
us. Consequently, Australia is able to maintain a level of defence capability that enables 
us to realistically aim for defence self-reliance, and at a cost that is acceptable to peace 
time governments facing periods of economic stringency.
526
 
 
Beazely also referred to strategic denial while discussing self-reliance, noting that 
Our extensive sea and air approaches do offer considerable strategic advantages, 
particularly against the possibility of major attack. At the same time, those advantages are 
only available while we have the ability, firstly, to know what is going on in the maritime 
environment and, secondly, to be able to control activities there, or at least to deny an 
adversary freedom to exploit them against us.
527
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Rationale for advantage 
During the 1980s the rationale for pursuing an advantage was broadly similar to the 1970s 
in that it focused primarily on industry concerns.528 The 1979-1986 period involved some 
quite different reasons for prioritising industry which differentiate it from the 1970s.  
Rationales offered for technological advantage began with self-reliance and simple 
capability statements. For example, Fraser asserted that 
…Australia's defence policy must be one of self-reliance. For a country with a small 
population, a large land mass, an even larger territorial sea, extensive lines of 
international communication and a developed industrial base - self-reliance means a 
defence capability based on high technology rather than simple numbers.
529
 
 
Moreover, Fraser argued that ‘modern warfare requires both high technologies and rapid 
communications so as to ensure that these capabilities are co-ordinated effectively.’530 
Sinclair similarly focused on force coordination and communications technology, stating 
that 
Assessing our Defence task, we have to look at both the offensive and defensive 
requirements of a modern defence force inevitably facing far more sophisticated weapon 
systems in the future than has been the case in the past. Modernising the Forces 
increasingly is a matter of ensuring that software as well as hardware is up to date with 
tomorrow’s Technology.531 
 
For Fraser, the purpose of utilising technology was largely related to mitigating 
Australia’s strategic limitations. 
Australia has got to have [its] own independent defence capacity and by the standards of 
many countries we spend a modest amount on Defence. It’s a little less than 3 percent of 
everything we produce although present projections will build it up to that and it’s a small 
force, small in numbers, and that’s one of the reasons why you need modern, highly 
sophisticated and harder hitting equipment - whether it’s for the Airforce, the Army or the 
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Navy and I suppose in a sense you make up for lack of numbers by making sure that your 
own people are very well equipped indeed.
532
 
 
For Killen, the main emphasis was that technological advantage was relative to regional 
states. In 1979 he declared that ‘like every country Australia must sustain its military 
standing in its geographical neighbourhood through which attacks upon its territory could 
be launched.’533 Killen claimed that Australia’s level of advantage was appropriate to its 
regional circumstances. 
We, in the meantime, possess maritime capabilities which, by standards relevant to our 
immediate strategic requirements, are substantial, and will remain so. Let me say 
something about them, and also about our strike capabilities, reminding the House at the 
same time of my earlier comment about our needing to sustain a force that would deter 
interference with Australia's sovereignty and protect our supply lines in adjacent maritime 
areas… I put it to the house that our maritime capabilities in our region do not lag behind 
the second tier of maritime nations, and are not in danger of slipping behind them.
534
 
 
 
Beazley mirrored this approach in 1986 when he set regional militaries as a direct 
benchmark for assessing the ADF’s force structure 
If we take as our force structure yardstick the minimum requirement of Australian self-
defence in the context of regional capabilities, we have a quantifiable measure for 
reacting to changes in our region.
535
 
 
By far the most significant change in rationale related to industry, with the vast majority 
of references to advantage referencing industrial capacity generally or the Australian 
defence industry directly. Fraser spoke of industry in general terms 
During this period there has been a good deal of technological change and much talk 
about it.  Some people say it is best to put up the shutters against technological change 
because it tends to reduce the number of jobs. That again is a defeatist attitude and it is 
not an option I believe that is open to us because our industries depend on being 
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competitive, they depend on being able to do well or better than the same industries in 
other countries. We are not going to be able to do that with outmoded technology which 
can either produce a product that is not so good, or if they can produce one that is good 
they might produce it at considerably higher cost. So new technology is inevitable, we 
need to embrace it and use it to our advantage.
536
 
 
 
Meanwhile Killen, for good reason, focused more directly on defence issues. For example, 
in 1979 he said that 
We must also plan for the parallel advances that will have to be made in Australian 
industry. The new technologies of the fighter will have to be learnt and practised in our 
industry so that local production and servicing capabilities will be available of the kind 
that I have indicated.
537
 
 
 
The kinds of industry concerns that were used to rationalise a high technology edge were 
different because they were related more to self-reliance and supporting the ADF than to 
maintaining an industrial base for future expansion. In 1980 Killen stated that 
Extensive opportunities will open up in defence industry - vitally important for increasing 
our self-reliance - in design, development, production and continuing support of a wide 
range of new equipment. Technological skills will be upgraded. We will continue to 
emphasise the development of this essential component of our capability.538 
 
In 1981 he added that 
The tactical fighter force project is a major national enterprise, it will involve not only the 
RAAF, and my department, but a host of contractors and sub-contractors in Australia’s 
defence-related industry. It will provide us with a central element of the forces needed to 
defend our nation’s security. It will develop our technological and industrial capacity in 
an area critical to our defences but also important on a wider national basis.
539
 
 
Sinclair, too, made specific reference to the F/A-18 Hornet project, noting that 
For the future there is the decision to purchase the F/A-18 Hornet for the tactical fighter 
force. This 'state of the art’ aircraft will maintain the RAAF’s position as the most 
advanced air force in the region, being selected to serve its fighter requirements into the 
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twenty-first century. This acquisition will also inject important technological knowledge 
into Australian industry, representing an investment in increased defence self reliance.
540
 
 
3.5 Strategic signalling 
During the period 1979-1986 Australia’s strategic signals contained a strong focus on 
deterrence. Deterrence was communicated in two key ways: by showcasing ADF 
capabilities and professionalism to external audiences, and by promoting the material 
advantage that ADF capabilities had over regional states. Reassurance was based 
primarily on Australia’s ability to contribute to alliance relationships than on credibility 
as a security partner, which was a break from the focus on credibility during the 1970s 
and primarily attributable to concern about the Soviet Union. Validation focused on 
promoting the ADF’s ability to defeat attacks against Australia and to justify increased 
defence spending on certain capabilities. 
 
Deterrence 
In the early 1980s deterrence was mixed between a focus on dissuading major powers 
from viewing Australia as a viable target and deterring regional states.541 For example, 
Fraser identified the Soviet Union as a target of deliberate deterrent signals: ‘…we must 
maintain absolute clarity and certainty in our signals to the Soviet Union, in order that our 
interests and the limits of our tolerance are not misread by Moscow.’542  Meanwhile, 
Killen made reference to deterrence signalling in generic terms, stating that 
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We must sustain a defence force which supports our diplomacy so that both in 
combination effectively deter interference with Australia's sovereignty by the military 
forces of a foreign power.
543
 
 
In 1982 Sinclair combined the capabilities of the force-in-being with Australia 
technological potential for expansion to issue deterrence signals to both short-term and 
long-term potential threats 
Australia is able, with its present and planned military capabilities, to make low or 
intermediate-level attacks against it costly and hazardous. Furthermore, we are well 
equipped to expand these capabilities in the face of an emerging threat because of our 
alliance relationships; our economic circumstances and potential for growth; our 
industrial, transport and communications expansion base; and the whole Australian 
community’s level of education and skill, including our capacity to absorb new civil and 
military technology.
544
 
 
Hawke was focused primarily on the visibility of the force-in-being, noting that ‘…there 
is Australia’s defence effort itself. Here we aspire to a capability that is visibly defensive 
and sufficiently potent to be a credible deterrent.’545 Beazley, too, clearly reinforced the 
deterrent value of the ADF and announces its commitment to operations: 
Many commentators have suggested that the strategy proposed by Paul Dibb is too 
defensive. They say that Dibb has advocated a reactive posture which commits Australia 
to sitting and waiting for an attack, rather than going out to meet it. This is linked with a 
claim that Dibb’s capability recommendations would, if implemented, undermine the 
deterrent presented by the ADF to a potential attacker. Much of this comment is based on 
a misunderstanding of the 1000 nautical mile limit placed by Dibb on Australia’s area of 
primary military interest. This has been assumed by some commentators to be a kind of 
operational limit beyond which Australia would never deploy forces. That is quite wrong: 
as Dibb makes clear, the area defined as within 1000 nautical miles of Australia’s 
coastline is an area within which Australia’s forces must be able to prevail. It is, in short, 
a minimum rather than a maximum boundary for military operations… From the 
misunderstanding about Dibb’s 1000 nautical mile limit flow several more fundamental 
misunderstandings of this Government’s defence posture. One is that the posture is purely 
defensive and commits Australia to waiting for an attack while surrendering the initiative 
to an enemy. There is no such commitment. The Australian Defence Force is, and will 
remain, capable of offensive and pre-emptive operations, including land strike.
546
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However, he also placed significant caveats on the value of deterrence as a force structure 
priority in itself, noting the failure of British capability to deter Argentina during the 
Falklands war. 
A related misunderstanding concerns the issue of deterrence. No one doubts that deterring 
wars is better than winning them, but it is a mistake to imagine that this is a recipe for 
developing a force structure. In particular. The requirements of deterrence do not 
necessarily dictate long range offensive strike capabilities. A potential aggressor could 
easily calculate that political limitations would prevent Australia striking home bases in 
response to low level harassments… Clearly when deciding on the capabilities needed to 
meet the most credible threats to Australia, ie low level contingencies, we cannot use the 
possession of major offensive strike forces acquired for deterrent potential as the force 
structure determinant. As the superpowers discovered over twenty years ago, 
comprehensive and effective deterrence requires that credible responses be available to 
the entire range of threats, and that means a range of capabilities must be available to 
provide those responses.
547 
 
Reassurance 
Despite substantial changes to the government’s concept of the ADF and its role in 
defending Australia and contributing to wider regional security circumstances, Ministerial 
statements continued to showcase Australia as a credible ally. However, credibility was 
linked to the quality of potential ADF contributions to regional contingencies and 
international multilateral operations. During the period 1979-1986 Ministerial statements 
placed more emphasis on supporting regional countries with the ADF through direct 
assistance, training and logistical support and defence cooperation initiatives. However, 
the data do not include any instances of reassurance in the context of humanitarian or 
logistical assistance in response to a natural disaster or humanitarian crisis.548 
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Killen spoke of operational contingencies and reassured Australia’s security partners that 
the ADF had adequate resources to contribute to regional security. 
We need a defence force with capabilities affording the Government of the day the option 
of giving defence help to regional friends with whom we have common security interests, 
should they wish this- whether this be the south-west Pacific, Papua New Guinea, or other 
countries to our immediate north. Subject to our giving priority to capabilities needed for 
operations in our own environment, our defence force should also provide the 
Government of the day with the practical option of contributing to Pacific defence in 
accordance with the ANZUS Treaty.
549
 
 
Fraser emphasised cooperation on matters of regional security, noting that 
We cannot enhance our security, however, without due regard to the security of our 
friends and allies. Defence is not simply a national endeavour. It is a co-operative effort, 
in a regional sense as well.
550
 
 
Sinclair, speaking about the defence cooperation program, stated that 
This programme with its two way benefits is emerging as an increasingly significant part 
of our national defence effort, encompassing as it does twelve countries in the ASEAN 
and South West Pacific area. The knowledge, skills, and resources of the Australian 
Defence Force and our defence related industries, have helped significantly in increasing 
the capability of each of these nations to resist external aggression.
551
 
 
Beazley made the less direct claim that ‘a self-reliant Defence Force will be capable of 
providing physical support to an ally should the Government of the day deem this 
appropriate.’552 He also linked defence self-reliance to an increased capacity to contribute 
to or support regional security: 
The fact is that our new defence posture makes us a better ally. We will be a better 
[W]estern alliance partner in the South Pacific and South-East Asia with a more effective 
force structure.553 
 
Validation 
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Rattled by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the shock to the stability of the 
international system that it represented, the Australian government responded by 
reasserting its capacity to defend Australia from credible contingencies.554 This coincided 
with a lengthy discussion regarding force projection as Australia was investigating a 
replacement for HMAS Melbourne and oscillated between positions, announcing the 
purchase of HMS Invincible from Great Britain 555  and then ultimately foregoing a 
replacement carrier when HMAS Melbourne was decommissioned. 
 
Fraser considered defence a fundamental responsibility, announcing that ‘Australia's 
defences are strong and relevant to today. The Government is fulfilling its fundamental 
responsibility - to keep this nation secure.’556 Hawke reiterated this sentiment with a 
pronouncement of his government’s national security priorities, stating that ‘providing for 
national defence is the most fundamental of all government responsibilities’557 Fraser also 
used the term responsibility to characterise his view of defence, proffering the view that 
‘Australia's defences are strong and relevant to today. The Government is fulfilling its 
fundamental responsibility-to keep this nation secure.’ 558  Fraser also emphasised the 
strength of the ADF in lauding its ability to defend the nation, stating that ‘the strength 
and capability, of the Australian Defence Force is greater than it has ever been in-
peacetime.’559 Beazley similarly characterised defence as a duty of the government to the 
public, claiming that 
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The Australian people expect that Australia should be able to defend itself. The 
Australian government accepts its duty to provide Australia with defence forces able to 
meet that expectation.
560
 
 
But this duty came at significant expense to the taxpayer and in the early 1980s, 
Ministerial statements frequently emphasised the need for greater investment in defence 
expenditure, often citing neglect from previous governments 561  as a rationale for 
increased funding to maintain the ADF. Killen argued for increased defence expenditure 
to sustain growth of ADF capabilities to desired levels in accordance with the 1976 white 
paper’s guidance, noting that 
The 1980-81 Budget introduces a commitment to sustained development which will lift 
the Defence Force and the national defence infrastructure to a higher level of capability, 
preparedness and self- reliance. We will continue to develop the basic capabilities we 
need. These include surveillance, reconnaissance, patrolling and strike capabilities, 
mobile and versatile land forces, air defence and strategic and tactical air support.
562
 
 
Killen also pointed to other countries’ force structures to justify the level of expenditure 
he believed to be appropriate for the ADF: 
It is not difficult to flip through Jane's Fighting Ships to find second or third tier navies 
that possess more units than ours: fast, inshore, missile-armed patrol boats, for example, 
tailored to the operational requirements of the inland waters of the Baltic and the 
Mediterranean, or the enclosed waters of the South East Asian archipelago. One can distil 
plenty of parliamentary questions out of researches such as these. It is quite another 
matter to distil a credible, transoceanic strike force that could overcome our own sea-
borne capabilities on, in and over the seas around our own country, defeat our land-based 
aircraft, blockade us and shepherd an invading force to our shores, and go on supplying 
and resupplying it.563 
 
Fraser added to this, stating that 
We have got quite effective defence forces and we shouldn't forget that. We've got some 
very good and very advanced equipments in the three services, and over the last there 
years we've been trying to get a larger share of the, defence vote, which itself has been 
increasing, into the purchase of more modern equipment which is very important for a 
defence force which inevitably because of the number of people in Australia, will remain 
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small in size. Now Mr. Killen in this last week made a statement in the Parliament which 
indicated that we've already made decisions that involve a greater rate of increase in 
defence spending than we had in mind at the time of the last Budget.
564
 
 
Soon after, Hawke took a more conciliatory tone, claiming that 
The Government is taking advantage of our current favourable security outlook to 
concentrate on investments that will consolidate and enhance our defence capability over 
the longer term – particularly investments in major equipment and facilities.565 
 
Chapter conclusions 
The period 1979-1986 was an important transition point between the emergence of self-
reliance and the maturation of relative advantage which occurred in the Dibb review and 
1987 defence white paper. During this interim period, the force structure debate changed 
significantly and the ADF’s force posture came to be viewed as a means for responding to 
‘credible’ threats, those which could occur without sufficient warning to expand the ADF, 
and those which were estimated to require enough preparation that Australia would be 
able to detect and respond to the challenge as it arose. Consequently, Ministerial 
statements from this period emphasise many of the same concepts but in quite different 
ways. For example, industry was still promoted as an important rationale for 
technological advantage, but it was seen as a means to sustain the ADF and maintain high 
technology platforms rather than as a technological base to expand from in the event of 
major aggression against Australia or its interests. 
 
The policy context for relative advantage did not change much in this period. The primary 
referent remained great powers, which is almost certainly attributable to the Soviet 
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invasion of Afghanistan and increased uncertainty in Australia regarding great power 
conflict. Nevertheless, the scope of Australia’s defence policy began to take a decidedly 
regional focus. Australia’s strategic concepts changed more noticeably during this period. 
Self-reliance, denial and contingencies became far and away the most significant force 
posture concepts employed. This is highly consistent with other policy considerations and 
the emphasis on self-reliance throughout all facets of defence policy discourse during the 
period 1979-1986. Rationale for technological advantage still stressed industry, but 
cutting edge became quite prominent as well. This suggests that the idea of an inherent 
need for state of the art technology and capabilities was becoming more popular and 
possibly less contentious. 
 
Strategic signalling contained a strong focus on deterrence. Deterrence was primarily 
promoted through maximising the credibility of the ADF as a professional military force 
employing high technology weapons and systems and by promoting Australia’s material 
advantage over regional states. Reassurance was based primarily on the quality of 
Australia’s potential contributions to collective action rather than on demonstrating 
Australia’s ability to make a significant contribution. This indicates a sharp break with the 
1970s, during which demonstrating Australia’s credibility as a strategic actor was 
paramount. Validation focused on assuaging fears that decreased force projection 
combined with regional military modernisation would lead to a deficient ADF. It also 
offered justification to the Australian public and to Parliament to garner support for 
increased defence spending on certain capabilities. 
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Chapter 4  
1987-1996: Technological edge in the Defence of Australia era 
The late 1980s and early 1990s are an era of Australian defence policy most directly 
associated with the concept of a technological edge. Beginning in the 1987 defence white 
paper, the policy imperative to maintain a clear technological advantage over regional 
militaries featured prominently in defence discourse. By the early 1990s the idea had 
become engrained in defence discourse but was rivalled by exogenous pressures to 
complement the government’s new diplomatic and economic approaches to Asia, which 
were collaborative and favoured engagement and were not entirely conducive to directly 
espousing military advantage in the region. Consequently, a lot of the discourse began to 
frame Southeast Asian military capabilities in collaborative terms, noting the kinds of 
capabilities that were being developed in the region as modernisation programs with 
favourable outcomes for Australia’s security environment. Nevertheless, Southeast Asia 
remained the clear benchmark for Australia’s technological edge. 
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4.1 A larger world 
During the early 1990s the gap started to close between Labor and Coalition approaches 
to strategic policy. Labor’s proposal for the Defence of Australia as a guiding principle 
for strategic and force structure planning was initially contested by the Coalition. 
However, Robert Ray’s enthusiasm for technology and enhanced ADF capability 
resounded within future coalition leaders and closed some of the distance between Labor 
and Coalition positions on defence policy. The transition from Hawke to Keating and 
Labor’s victory in its ‘unwinnable’ election heralded the contemporary era of personality 
politics.566 While previous elections had focused much more on issues of policy substance, 
the early 1990s saw the introduction of minimalist policy campaigns and a more 
concerted focus on individual leadership and credibility issues which would come to 
dominate Howard’s election campaign in 1996. Meanwhile, Keating’s approach to policy 
began to represent his own vision of Australia’s future as a part of Asia rather than as a 
misplaced Western country. He saw the larger post-Cold War world as a significant 
opportunity for Australia to remake itself in its own region and break from its past.567 
Whether this was a by-product or driver of the broader trend in federal politics isn’t clear. 
However, Keating’s personal investment in the combination of furthering the economic 
reforms which had begun in the 1980s and further linking Australia’s prosperity to Asia 
was a core political issue throughout the 1990s. 
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The way forward 
As the Cold War ended Australia saw the US as a necessary balance to potential regional 
power politics and vigorously supported a continued American strategic interest in the 
Asia-Pacific. The importance of the US role as regional balancer was enshrined in the 
major strokes of Australia’s defence policy, but it was combined with a more 
controversial political idea: that Australia ought to aspire to develop the military 
capability to provide for its own defence.568The Defence of Australia positioned the 
Labor government’s international outlook for Australia between a traditionalist focus on 
building defence capability and strengthening Western alliances and a revisionist focus on 
embracing regional states as partners in Australia’s future prosperity. Defence self-
reliance also saw the alliance as a mutually reinforcing relationship in which access to US 
technology and intelligence would underpin Australia’s capacity to defend itself. Despite 
the significant political attention paid to emerging issues in Australian policy debates, 
many enduring challenges were addressed in the final years of the Hawke Government. 
Australia’s relationship with the US in the post-Cold War era was particularly important. 
 
In many ways, the foundations of the contemporary Australia-US alliance can be traced 
back to the Hawke Government. In this regard Keating and Howard, both of whom later 
laid claim to improving relations with America, ‘stood on Hawke’s shoulders.’ 569 Old 
and new priorities dovetailed under Hawke, with the Defence of Australia presented as a 
policy which met the needs of the both the electorate and alliance partners. Beazley was 
tasked with selling self-reliance to Australians as a credible defence policy and to the 
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Americans as a useful contribution to ANZUS.570 Labor’s image of US support as a vital 
component of self-reliance reversed the logic of great power partnership which had 
dominated Australia’s defence thinking since federation.  
 
The instrumental view of the alliance did not supplant the more traditional view of great 
power allies as a credible deterrent against potential attack. Rather, Beazely’s aim was to 
reimagine the alliance as a mutually beneficial relationship in which Australia drew 
benefit from US support and became both a more capable individual actor and a more 
useful ally in the process. 571 It was a nuanced message and Beazley struggled to explain it 
to the electorate and convincingly defend it from criticism. One of the biggest challenges 
that Hawke and Beazley faced was convincing the public that Australia was capable of 
defending itself from armed attack without great power intervention. Australia’s long held 
view of itself precluded the notion of self-reliance and the nation’s self-image had to be 
re-written to accommodate the new policy message. Perhaps complicating the adoption of 
a new vision of Australia was Keating’s matching philosophy of embracing regionalism 
to ensure Australia’s prosperity and security in the 1990s. In combination, these ideas 
were well ahead of public opinion and held implications which the electorate was not yet 
comfortable with. 572 
 
Finding the limits 
As Australia began to realise some of Labor’s pragmatic foreign and defence policy goals, 
Keating believed that the time had come to challenge Hawke for leadership of the Party. 
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Shifting from his hardnosed approach to economic reform to a more open-ended vision of 
prosperity, Keating attempted to revitalise ‘the big picture politics of ideas’ in Australia’s 
mainstream political discourse.573 The battle between Hawke and Keating for leadership 
of Labor Party was a political centrepiece for the turn of the decade, but the underlying 
political debate reflected renewed interest in Australia’s future amongst the electorate. 
Although Labor had begun the discussion about Australia’s place in the post-Cold War 
period, it did not have a monopoly on innovation or ambition. The Opposition engaged in 
the debate about Australia’s future, but, especially in Howard’s case, saw a more 
moderate approach.574 
 
Keating became Prime Minister as the global political landscape was shifting to 
accommodate the end of the Cold War. Australians were re-evaluating their place in the 
world and Keating seemed to be locked on a vision of the future in which Australia’s 
prosperity was boundless. Labor’s 1993 election campaign leaned on the allure of 
modernism, technology and possibility to convey Keating’s optimism to the public.575  
Keating went so far as to invoke the 1890s as an analogy for Australia’s outlook in the 
early 1990s. He used emotive terms when he pronounced that Australians needed to be 
‘bold, determined and faithful to [their] beliefs and aspirations’ 576 in order to realise their 
potential. He further stated that 
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As the 1890s were, so will this decade become a watershed. I believe we will emerge a 
robust social democracy, a player of substance in the world, integrated with our region 
and prosperous in a way that we have never been before: prosperous not only in material 
comforts but also in ideas and innovations, in our capacity to make things and sell them to 
the world, in opportunity, prosperous in our faith: our faith in ourselves and the life we 
have created here.
577
 
 
Keating’s use of analogy was supported by his skill as a public speaker. Regardless of the 
content of his messages, Keating was often able to communicate his ideas clearly to the 
public. His use of visual, emotive and memorable phrases was unparalleled by his 
contemporaries and he often used this skill to good effect. 578 
 
Too far gone? 
Keating was often perceived as a Prime Minster who led from the front. He was often 
unwilling to compromise in his pursuit of his vision of policy as it ought to be rather than 
as it was. This yielded significant political results and Keating enjoyed a number of 
foreign policy successes which served Australia’s regional interests and also ‘popularised 
the idea of a grand Australian strategy.’ 579  Nevertheless, domestic politics had been 
embittered by the issue of economic reforms and Keating entered the 1993 election 
campaign as an embattled incumbent with little hope for success. The 1993 election 
turned out to be a turning point for Australian politics because it signalled the electorate’s 
opposition to another round of economic reforms. This broke from recent tides in Federal 
politics in which the electorate had mostly supported a generally optimistic view of 
economic growth and sweeping reform policies. The writing was on the wall for future 
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governments to read. They would need to justify economic reform with an explanation of 
how proposed reforms would deliver tangible benefits to society. 580 
Despite some setbacks along the way, Keating had retained his leadership and had 
continued to push the limits of Australia’s willingness to accept globalisation, reduced 
protectionism and further regional integration in both economic and political terms. 
Keating has made substantial progress towards realising his vision for Australia’s future. 
However, it had become apparent to many observers that this vision was too often 
egocentric.581 The community was divided along unfamiliar lines and mainstream voters 
were becoming disenfranchised with Labor. The Coalition used the slogan for all of us in 
their 1996 election campaign to simultaneously broaden the political middle-ground 
across the electorate and attract the wider mainstream with an appeal to solidarity. This is 
essentially the same narrative that Hawke used in his successful campaign against Fraser 
in 1983 used under different circumstances. While Hawke’s message promoted national 
unity as an alternative to the fractious Coalition Government of the early 1980s, 
Howard’s message promoted a party for everyone as an alternative to a Labor 
Government which had become focused on peripheral groups and neglected the 
mainstream. The coalition campaign effectively couched a derisive implication about 
Labor within a positive statement of self-promotion by comparison. This was a deliberate 
attempt to drive a wedge deep into Labor’s heartland and fracture the staples of its 
support base. The campaign appealed to swing voters and Labor supporters alike, 
dividing traditional Labor voters along major policy lines.582 
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4.2 The Defence of Australia era 
Between 1973 and 1987 there was a conceptual transformation in Australian defence 
policy in which defence self-reliance, the defence of Australia, and in particular its 
maritime approaches, became key determinants for strategic planning and force structure 
development. 583  These concepts were realised in the 1987 defence white paper and 
matured throughout successive policy documents through to the 1994 white paper. The 
period 1987 through to 1996 was characterised by DOA and the extensive debates it 
generated.584 The conceptual progression of key themes in Australian defence thinking 
occurred in stages, from the release of the 1987 white paper through the various policy 
documents and major international events of the 1990s, to the change of government in 
1996. This is one of the most dynamic periods of conceptual debate in Australia’s defence 
policy history. 
 
The Dibb review and the DOA doctrine  
By late 1984 Defence had become dysfunctional and mired in intra-organisational 
disagreements over definitional and conceptual issues that presented an obstacle to 
meaningful policy development.585 Then Defence minister, Kim Beazley appointed Paul 
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Dibb to conduct a review of Australia’s defence capabilities in 1985 and the seminal 
report was delivered in 1986.586 The next defence white paper was released in 1987 and 
was substantially founded on the approach to defence planning outlined in the Dibb report. 
During the transition from the old policy approach to the new, Beazley reiterated the 
phrase defence in depth to stress the importance afforded to demonstrating Australia’s 
material capacity to defend itself with a high-technology defence force.587 References to 
military technology where subsequently linked to assertions that Australia’s capacity for 
self-reliance was credible and desirable.588 Beazley framed DOA as a catalyst for change 
in the politics of defence. Changing ideational norms in the debate were, in Beazley’s 
view, necessary to accommodate the new concepts used in planning and structuring the 
ADF and major platform acquisitions. 589  Without contradicting the constellation of 
concepts that underpinned DOA, Beazley also made direct reference to the need to 
reassure allies of Australia’s commitment to its security relationships and indicated that a 
high-tech ADF provided material benefits to those relationships.590 
 
In 1989 the government released a new defence policy document, Australia’s strategic 
planning in the 1990s, which set strategic level guidance for force acquisition priories to 
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Defence and explained and validated capital expenditure to the public.591 The strategic 
planning document noted the changing security dynamics in Southeast Asia, and the 
world, and linked force structure decisions to military capabilities which it stated were 
essential in securing Australia’s national interests. As the 1980s drew to a close, Hawke 
also questioned the implications of strategic changes in the region in the aftermath of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and asserted that Australia’s high-technology military would 
become an integral component of regional stability and security in the 1990s. For 
example, Hawke noted that: 
The size of our economy, and our technical expertise, means that Australia will continue 
to maintain significant military capabilities, especially maritime capabilities, which will 
allow us to make a valuable contribution to the military dimension of regional security.
592
 
 
At this point, the requirement for Australia to sustain a clear technological lead over its 
region went largely unchallenged. Ministerial statements signalled a willingness to 
continue to spend on high-technology systems and platforms in order to ensure that 
Australia continued to be seen as a credible ally, that the ADF was recognised as a well-
equipped and formidable force, and that the public was reassured that defence 
expenditure was purposeful. However, the role that technology played in delivering 
Australia’s edge had already begun to change. 
 
As early as the 1991 force structure review,593  Australia began referring to military 
technology in terms of coordination. The review made note of the new roles played by 
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information technologies in enabling the military to operate more effectively.594 Minster 
for Defence, Robert Ray noted that Australians had come to believe that Australia could 
defend itself in accordance with the central principles of DOA.595 This perception allowed 
political actors to reduce their focus on credibility and place more emphasis on material 
capability, which had come to the forefront of many defence debates since DOA was 
released. Technology emerged as a discussion point in its own right. The 1993 strategic 
review was the first document to expressly link military technology with 
interoperability,596 noting that 
The overall development of the ADF will need to have a particular emphasis on the key 
principles of joint operations, the selective application of advanced technology, the 
promotion of competence and professionalism, and the application of a rigorous approach 
to preparedness.
597
 
 
Ray noted interoperability requirements as a driver for high-technology military platforms 
when referring to relative advantage, but sometimes situated it within a broader 
commitment to alliances, including but not limited to ANZUS.598 This coincided with 
Keating’s push for greater engagement with Asia and may have reflected political needs 
within government to ensure that public statements were signalling positive intentions 
vis-à-vis other policy priority areas. 
 
Throughout the early 1990s it became clear that DOA did not account for the extensive 
transition of the strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific region from the relatively benign 
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Asian security environment of the previous 20 years of the Cold War to the much more 
dynamic post-Cold War period. Two significant indicators that the doctrinal approach to 
defence embedded in DOA needed revision were tensions over North Korea’s nuclear 
program in 1994 and the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996. A third challenge was the 
increasing likelihood that Australia might deploy forces to maintain stability in the 
regional neighbourhood. 599  Political actors realised that the thinking which had 
underpinned the 1987 and 1994 defence white papers600 required adjustment and set about 
commissioning a new policy document which could incorporate systemic changes to the 
security situation in Asia and new concepts about harnessing information technologies 
with strategic guidance which altered but did not abandon central facets of existing 
defence policy which drew on key themes from DOA. 
 
DOA after the Cold War 
At the end of the Cold War the likelihood of great power conflict affecting Australia had 
diminished greatly. This underwrote a renewed confidence in Australia’s ability to 
provide for its own defence and for it play a more active role in regional security and 
stability. New emphasis on regional engagement permeated many aspect of Australia’s 
foreign and security policies and then-defence minister Robert Ray was under significant 
political pressure to ensure that defence rhetoric mirrored foreign policy statements 
outlining Australia’s political and economic interests in the Asia-Pacific. In the wake of 
the Cold War, Australian commentators began to question the utility of defence concepts 
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developed in another era for serving Australia’s interests in its new security 
circumstances.601 Critics pointed to a lack of political instrumentality in the Defence of 
Australia concept. They contended that by focusing on geo-strategic planning, DOA 
promoted an abstract, decontextualised strategic discourse and that it surrendered too 
much initiative to a potential adversary.602 Soon after taking over as Foreign Minister in 
1989, Gareth Evans said that Australia’s self-reliant defence policy had ‘once and for all 
liberated Australian foreign policy.’603 
 
The emphasis on self-reliance also made a subtle but important difference to the way 
Australia viewed the US alliance. Self-reliance helped to alleviate the stigma of 
dependency somewhat, because the alliance was seen to serve Australia’s strategic 
interests. Evans elaborated that 
… it is no longer necessary for Australian foreign policy to begin with the assumption 
that its first task is to ensure the defence of Australia by attracting the protective attention 
of great and powerful friends… the evolution in our defence and strategic thinking has 
put into sharp relief the reality that Australia's interests are multidimensional, and that to 
promote these interests we need policies that are equally multidimensional. 
604
 
 
The sense of confidence which DOA inspired was relatively short lived. Upon taking 
office, Howard reaffirmed Australia’s wider regional concerns and that ‘Korea and 
Taiwan remain[ed] sources of tension and possibly major confrontation.’605 
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Critics also pointed to the limited scope of DOA as an insufficient basis for force 
development.606 While others emphasised the need for a broader range of capabilities to 
meet the kinds of contingencies and challenges the ADF was likely to face in the regional 
security environment of the post-Cold War period. 607  A further criticism focused 
specifically on the use of concepts such as defence warning time as a basis for force 
structure planning and development.608 The defence warning time concept was based on 
Australia’s ability to successfully estimate the likelihood of hostility and a timeframe for 
military operations to arise. According to Australia's strategic planning in the 1990s this 
ability rested on two key factors: 
The first is the period required for a general deterioration in relationships that would 
precede any use of military force against Australia. This timescale is difficult to define. In 
present circumstances, a rapid deterioration is unlikely. In other circumstances, relations 
could deteriorate within months rather than years. But in any circumstances, our own 
actions will always be a significant factor determining events. The first hostile actions 
against Australia might be non-military, for instance attacks on our Embassy; aggressive 
assertion of fishing rights; seizure of Australian assets; restriction of our sea and air 
transit rights; or attacks against Australian citizens.
609
 
 
The first factor depends on the ability to identify and respond to threats appropriately, 
which is highly contested.610 It further relies on the assumption that Australia would be 
able to stage a graduated response to an attack, which critics argue is not guaranteed and 
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undermines the flexibility of the ADF to respond to dynamic operational 
circumstances.611 
The second factor in warning is the detection of improvements to regional capabilities 
which would be necessary for the use of military force at higher levels against Australia. 
Current studies in this area conclude that a very substantial force would be necessary for 
any kind of major military assault against Australia. The capabilities to support and 
sustain an assault across the sea-air gap in the face of Australian countermeasures do not 
now exist. Australia would, of course, respond to such developments by expansion of our 
own military capabilities. So long as our own capability development maintained our 
relative advantages to counter effectively any power projection forces within the region, 
then major direct assault from any regional country would continue to remain 
improbable.
612
 
 
The second factor similarly hinges on Australia’s capacity to monitor threat levels, to 
interpret events correctly and then respond to them appropriately. It further requires 
guaranteed access to equipment and material during a period of rapid force expansion. 
Criss and Schubert argue that this is a moot point as the degree of assured access required 
can be neither proven nor disproven. 613  The uncertainty of supply during a crisis 
undermines Australia’s suggested capacity to expand at will in response to events.  
 
From DOA to defending Australia  
In the early 1990s Australian defence discourse invested substantially in the popular 
rhetoric of emerging commercial and military technologies which were thought to have 
the ability to revolutionise the conduct of warfare.614 Popular commentary emphasised 
Precision Guided Munitions (PGM), Information and Communications Technologies 
(ICT) and various military platforms which were intended to enhance battlefield 
                                                 
611 Criss and Schubert, "The Leading Edge: Air Power in Australia's Unique Environment," 67-68. 
612 Department of Defence, Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s, paras. 4.20-4.21. 
613 Criss and Schubert, "The Leading Edge: Air Power in Australia's Unique Environment," 67-68. 
614  Benbow, The Magic Bullet? Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs.; Sloan, Military 
Transformation and Modern Warfare: A Reference Handbook. 
Chapter 4 
1987-1996: Technological edge in the Defence of Australia era 
 
 
 
 
222 
 
coordination, serve as enablers for information-based operations and which would act as 
force multipliers for existing ADF capabilities.615 Meanwhile, technology played a much 
larger role in the defence policy guidance offered by Ray during his tenure as Minster for 
defence 1990-1996. Ray personally demonstrated a clear acceptance of the principle of 
relative advantage, but also saw new challenges to add to the long recognised limitations 
to technological edge. He noted that 
Military technology poses new challenges. Over the longer term we will need to be more 
selective about those military capabilities in which we must maintain our technological 
advantage.
616
 
 
This entailed much more engagement with industry and several reports and commissions 
were published in the early 1990s examining rationales for further investment in industry 
and in technology for two inter-related reasons: the capacity for self-reliance and the 
maintenance of a cutting-edge defence force. In his 1992 review of the Australian defence 
industry, Roger Price noted that  
The cost-effective use of technology to meet defence needs is one of the building blocks 
of Australia’s policy of defence self-reliance. The technology required is often at or ahead 
of the leading edge for civil requirements. This requires specialist scientific expertise to 
discriminate between alternative technology options, to modify and to support equipment, 
and in some circumstances to develop indigenous capabilities.
617
 
 
 
Amidst the defence debate about technology, strategic potential and the kinds of 
operations the ADF needed to be able to perform to defend Australia from armed attack, a 
second conversation began in the media and academic literature about the scope of 
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Australia’s interests after DOA. Commentators debated the differences between concepts 
of strategic denial and sea control and whether or not the ADF needed to the ability to 
stage uncontested operations in Australia’s approaches to adequately defend the 
continent.618  Another key issue in the debate was whether the ADF could genuinely 
maintain operational preparedness and could acquire sufficient stockpiles of material to 
sustain combat operations from Australian resources. The Joint Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade held the view that 
Judgments on force structure and preparedness relate to the best affordable mix to 
generate desired military capabilities… The investment level to provide the preparedness 
of the mix is related to the sustainability and stockholding issues which have yet to be 
resolved.619 
   
This dour assessment casted some doubt on the likelihood of Australia’s capacity to 
realise self-reliance in the defence of the continent or offshore territories. Some critics, 
notably Graeme Cheeseman, had similar apprehensions regarding the ADF’s capacity to 
sustain, let alone expand, the military workforce which would be needed in self-reliant 
operations in defence of Australia.620 
 
At the same time, a narrower debate took place within Defence. While it did not critique 
its guiding concepts to the same extent as some external actors, the Department did have 
to come to grips with some major difficulties arising from the rapidly changing post-Cold 
War strategic environment. Technology and economy proved to be significant emerging 
challenges in Defending Australia which directly identified economic growth in the Asia-
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Pacific region as an important strategic trend.621 This underpinned Defending Australia’s 
focus on what it termed strategic potential, the capacity to develop and support military 
forces, which was linked directly to ‘economic strength and technological depth.’622 
Defence was prepared to meet the trends it observed, but realised that it would need new 
conceptual approaches to it strategic policy formation to do so. Defending Australia noted 
that 
…defence planning will need to accommodate these changes. Until now, we have been 
able to sustain a technological edge over the full range of capabilities that could be 
brought to bear against us. Over the longer term that advantage will not be maintained as 
economic growth and technological development increase the strategic potential of 
countries throughout our region.623 
 
Part of Defence’s response to the challenge was to broaden its strategic horizons beyond 
the near region to include the wider Asia-Pacific region. Great power competition, 
broader regional security and expeditionary operations became more important issues 
throughout the earlier 1990s and culminated in the view that 
Planning for the defence of Australia takes full account of our broader strategic interests. 
Australia has important interests beyond the defence of our own territory, and the 
Australian Defence Force will be called upon in the future, as it has been in the past, to 
undertake activities and operations elsewhere in our region, and in other parts of the 
world, in cooperation with neighbours, allies and international institutions, particularly 
the United Nations.624 
 
 
4.3 Policy context 
The policy context for key concepts changed significantly during the period 1987-1996. 
This begun with a shift in focus towards the region as the referent for advantage and was 
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cemented with overt benchmarks of relative advantage set against regional militaries. 
Technology became central to defence debates and the 1987 white paper introduced the 
term technological edge into the popular defence vernacular. The scope of Australia’s 
policy also focused much more on regional interests than on DOA or global interests. 
 
Key concepts 
Technology was a significant concern in the period 1987-1997 and was the primary 
concept used. For example, the 1987 defence white paper mentioned technology with 
specific reference to military capabilities or equipment on 32 separate occasions. It also 
specifically declared that it was essential that Australia maintain a technological edge in 
the region.’625 By the 1994 defence white paper, the Department of Defence had become 
equally blunt in its phrasing of long held strategic ideas. For example, it noted that 
‘Australia relies for its defence on advanced technology.’ 626  It also asserted that 
Australia’s ‘dependence on a small, technology-based, mobile and integrated force 
requires us to keep abreast and in some cases to lead developments in some areas of 
defence technology.’627 Although this technological focus leaned strongly on defence 
industry policy, it further announced that Australia ‘must keep abreast of continuing 
advances in defence-relevant technology so that we will be able to defend Australia into 
the future.’628 This clearly links earlier statements about the reliance of the ADF on 
technology to Australia’s capacity to defend itself in the future. 
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Political rhetoric in the late 1980s and early 1990s followed a similar theme. Beazley was 
heavily invested in his rearticulation of defence self-reliance and stated that 
What makes self-reliance possible in these circumstances is not only the capability and 
intentions of our neighbours, but also the possibility of a technological fix. We have 
available to us, or are acquiring, or could acquire, a range of weapons systems, 
surveillance systems, and range extenders for weapons systems which are capable of 
dealing with those problems if resources are properly marshalled.
629
 
 
Meanwhile Hawke drew on examples of specific capabilities to illustrate the ADF’s 
ability to employ high technology force elements and to signal its force posture. For 
example, Hawke announced that 
RAAF Base Tindal is the permanent base for a squadron of F/A-18 aircraft Fighter Force 
- a major component of Australia's Tactical Fighter Force and the most powerful 
operational unit in our far North. Tindal provides tangible proof of the technological 
strength and the strategic orientation on which Australia's defence planning will be based 
into the 21st century.
630
 
 
 
In the aftermath of Australia’s contribution to the Gulf War, the Keating government saw 
the potential for regional militaries to rapidly modernise their military capabilities and 
acquire high technology systems which would be comparable or close to comparable to 
Australia’s level of technology. Keating offered this as an additional rationale for 
maintaining technological superiority, noting that 
The Gulf War demonstrated the potency of high technology weapons. The technology, 
expertise and data once available only to the superpowers are now readily accessible to a 
wide range of countries.  Next-to-cutting edge technology is available to those willing to 
pay, and there are many willing suppliers. Such modernisation can strengthen security 
and stability, but it can also increase the intensity of any conflict.
631
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When the Howard government was formed in late 1996, one of Ian McLachlan’s earliest 
statements as the incoming Minster for Defence was to note Australia’s high technology 
capabilities. However McLachlan shifted emphasis from the weapons and platforms that 
the ADF used to the C4ISR systems that the ADF used to coordinate and support 
operations. McLachlan further linked the ongoing effectiveness of the ADF’s high 
technology capabilities to the efficiency of command and control, stating that  
In order to maintain and increase the forces' very high level of capability, in order to arm 
them with the most effective technology and in order to develop the most streamlined 
command and control procedures, we need to look at how Defence is structured and how 
efficiently it is managed.
632
 
 
Advantage was a close second in significance throughout the period, but featured much 
more prominently in the 1990s than it had in the 1980s or at any point prior. During his 
tenure as Minister for Defence, Ray had a strong penchant for discussing advantage in 
both technological and relative terms. He often used phrases such as ‘relative 
technological capability’ 633  in Ministerial statements and publicly signalled that 
‘Australia maintains an edge in technologies of strategic importance to us.’ 634  Ray 
occasionally offered caveats, but they were generally linked to a need for more specificity 
in the technological edge that Australia pursued rather than a reduction of it. For example, 
Ray noted that Australia ‘must be selective in our use of technology. This means that we 
must be specific about where a margin of technological superiority critically needs to 
be.’635 Ray also noted that a common point in the defence debate of the early 1990s was 
                                                 
632 Ian M. McLachlan, "Ministerial Statement: Defence Policy," House of Representative Hansard (1996), 
5431. 
633 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, para. 4.25. 
634 Ray, "Address to the Rsl Victorian Branch " 15. 
635 Department of Defence, Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s, para. 4.25. 
Chapter 4 
1987-1996: Technological edge in the Defence of Australia era 
 
 
 
 
228 
 
‘to what extent we need to continue the philosophy of keeping the technological edge and 
what areas we should concentrate on in this particular regard.’636 
 
Similarly, Ray emphasised relative advantage even when discussing other policy issues. 
One significant example is from a Ministerial statement about defence cooperation rather 
than military capability in which Ray made comment on ‘the enormous disparity in size 
and capability of our defence force relative to those in the Pacific Island countries.’637 
This illustrates Ray’s approach to thinking of defence capability in relative terms that is 
also evident in force development and force posture statements. 
 
Referent actors 
Documents and statements from the DOA period overwhelming emphasise the Asia-
Pacific region as the referent of Australia’s level of military technology and capability.638 
There is a large amount of discussion about regional military capabilities and much of it 
conveys the same essential message, that the degree of modernisation and relative 
improvement in regional militaries has a significant impact on Australia’s ability to 
maintain its leading edge and on the strategic stability of the Asia-Pacific region. 
In line with changing strategic perceptions, the basis for regional force structuring has 
altered. The earlier emphasis on ground forces oriented to internal security has been 
replaced by a focus on modern maritime and air forces to support new economic and 
security interests. New prosperity will mean that real growth in defence spending is likely 
to continue, allowing the introduction of high-technology weapon systems.639 
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More often than not the comparisons were made in favourable terms, for example noting 
the level of military modernisation and high technology capabilities being pursued or 
operated by regional militaries as a benefit to regional and thereby Australia’s security. 
For example, the 1993 Strategic Review noted that ‘…the development of more capable 
conventional military forces will improve the strategic stability of the region.’640 But it 
was nevertheless clear that regional militaries were the benchmark for ADF capability 
levels. Statements and policy documents also directly linked regional military advances to 
the need for a technological edge and emphasised Australia’s relative advantage over the 
region as a cornerstone of Australia’s defence posture.641 The 1989 strategic planning 
paper directly identified regional military modernisation as a point of interest for 
Australia, stating that 
The clearest response of regional countries to changes in their strategic environment is 
their acquisition of modern military technologies and the development of their force 
structures. Relatively advanced technologies are increasingly available, and are being 
marketed aggressively throughout the region. Regional countries are increasingly able to 
absorb and support such equipment.
642
 
 
The 1987 white paper discussed this at length,  
…economic growth and expanding military capabilities throughout Asia mean that the 
nature and scale of forces that could be brought to bear against Australia, and to which the 
Australian Defence Force needs to be able to respond, will increase steadily over the next 
fifteen years… As regional force structures develop we will need to enhance our 
capabilities if we are to maintain the relative effectiveness of our Force. If we fail to make 
appropriate enhancements to the force structure, our capacity to defend Australia will be 
eroded… As sophisticated military equipment becomes more widely available and the 
capacity of many countries to acquire and operate military systems increases, the level of 
capability in the region and the potential demands of short-warning conflict will also 
increase. Our most important challenge over the next fifteen years will be to adapt our 
own forces to be able to meet these greater demands… Australia would expand its 
military capability to maintain a relative advantage.
643
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The 1989 strategic planning paper directly compared strategic potential within the region, 
focusing on Australia’s ‘economic and military power relative to our neighbours’ and 
‘available regional capabilities; the ways in which such capabilities might be used; and 
the purposes for which such capabilities might be used.’ 644 The paper was optimistic 
about Australia’s relative advantage, commenting that ‘current and prospective regional 
inventories do not have the capability to mount and sustain major landings against the 
capabilities of the ADF.’ 645 It was confident that the ‘inability of any regional country to 
mount a substantial threat against Australia’ would not be significantly challenged in the 
short term and that ‘Australia would, of course, respond to such developments by 
expansion of our own military capabilities.’646 
 
The timing of these judgments was crucial and after the collapse of the Soviet Union the 
Department of Defence articulated a much bleaker outlook. 
The 1993 Strategic Review presented a less optimistic assessment about Australia’s 
advantage over its regional neighbours when it noted that 
…the growth of regional economies and technological skills, and the enhancement of 
military capability, will reduce the technological and capability edge that has traditionally 
been an important element in Australia's defence posture.
647
 
 
The Strategic Review still argued that Australia’s technological advantage would still 
provide the ADF with an edge in the neighbourhood, asserting that ‘Australia's use of 
advanced technology will continue to be a key element in our overall defence approach, 
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not least for maintaining our regional standing.’ 648  However, it also saw that these 
capabilities were becoming more crucial as a minimum rather than a boon when it 
concluded that 
… it is precisely Australia's skills in acquiring and adapting high technology for national 
defence, and in achieving the highest professional military standards, that are attractive to 
regional countries contemplating their own defence planning problems. These capabilities 
and skills give Australia its regional defence standing. We need to maintain this standing 
if we are to engage effectively with the region.
649
 
 
Policy scope 
After 1991, Australia dramatically changed its policy focus from the global security 
environment to the Asia-Pacific region. 650  Although it still used the terminology of 
defence of Australia, the discourse largely emphasised regional security in Asia, keeping 
it in line with other policy documents at the time, particularly then-foreign minister 
Gareth Evans’ foreign policy statement on Australia’s regional security. 651 Defending 
Australia from armed attack remained the main priority and force structuring principle of 
the Defence Organisation, but major policy documents tried to link three recurring 
scoping statements together: the security of Australia and its interests, regional security 
and global security. This was particularly true of Southeast Asia and the defence of the 
Australian continent. Global security objectives underwent significant change and were 
more closely aligned with participation in multilateral forums, the contribution of troops 
to UN peacekeeping operations and the presentation of Australia as an active global 
citizen. 
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In the first half of this period global actors were mainly considered important to the extent 
that they contributed to or detracted from regional security and were no longer framed as 
a standard for ADF technology or capabilities. For example, Australia’s alliance with the 
US was framed in regional terms and the 1993 strategic review stated that ‘we now see 
our alliance relationship with the United States primarily in the context of our shared 
commitment to security in the Asia-Pacific region.’652 Policy interests of global scope 
were rarely related directly to the military capabilities of great powers and interoperability 
with the US and NATO was framed in terms of defence industry interests and 
participation in international relief than in terms of defending Australia or participating in 
expeditionary or coalition military operations. Great powers were de-emphasised in the 
second half of this period, largely due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
dramatically changed international strategic landscape. 
 
Rather than maintaining interoperable capabilities regardless of cost, the government 
sought to secure Australia’s position in the region and used its alliances with great powers, 
particularly the US, to leverage that position. Hawke also linked technological 
advancement to the ability to prioritise contingencies closer to home while enabling the 
ADF to conduct operations to secure regional and global interests: 
…our policy is to build a defence force to defend Australia, because that is the ADF's 
principal role. But that does not mean that we believe the ADF has no other role. There 
still lingers in our defence debate the echoes of the old debate between forward defence 
and fortress Australia. But that dichotomy has been left far behind by the development of 
defence technology, and of the ADF itself.  It might once have been the case that 
Australian defence policy had to make a stark choice between defending Australia and 
playing a role in Australia's wider region. That is no longer the case. The capabilities 
which the Australian Defence Force has developed and is acquiring for the defence of 
Australia also provide powerful capabilities to play a role in our region of broad strategic 
interest and beyond.
653
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Developments in Southeast Asia were seen as fundamental determinants of Australia’s 
perception of its strategic environment. In particular, regional military modernisation was 
linked directly to capability advantage. For example, Defence policy cited regional 
military capabilities as an indicator of credible threats to Australia’s security. The kinds 
of threats deemed to be credible were then set as a benchmark for relative advantage in 
ADF force structure planning. 
 
The 1994 defence white paper went so far as to link Australia’s future security to the 
security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region.654  It linked Australia’s security to 
regional circumstances, when it maintained that ‘we have always recognised that 
Australia cannot be secure in an insecure region, and we have worked hard over many 
decades to support security in the region.’655 The white paper went to note that Australia 
intended to invest in regional security and that ‘Australia's engagement with countries in 
Asia and the Pacific as a partner in shaping the strategic affairs of the region will thus 
become an increasingly important element in ensuring our security.’656 This was a new 
take on DOA and was a significant precursor for the later concept of concentric circles, 
introduced in the 2000 defence white paper. 
 
4.4 Strategic concepts 
Through the early 1990s the strategic concepts used in defence policy changed to reflect 
more focus on certain aspects of technology, in particular the emergence of advanced ICT 
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and the international fascination with the RMA. Self-reliance and contingencies became 
key force posture determinants in accordance with the strategic guidance of the 1987 
defence white paper. 
 
Type of advantage 
Between 1987 and 1996, defence policy documents often used the term technological 
edge to describe the need for military advantage relative to Southeast Asia. This was 
primarily in reference to material capabilities, but specific material advantage was not 
specifically discussed to the same extent as new technologies which would allow the 
ADF an advantage in coordinating its force elements and improving situational awareness. 
Similarly, focus on expansion, primarily in the context of defence warning time, was 
significant.657 
 
The 1987 defence white paper frequently used terms such as ‘state of the art’ and ‘most 
advanced’ to describe the types of capabilities which Australia would require to defend its 
territory and interests. DOA doctrine in general emphasised the need for technologically 
superior platforms for the ADF and for the use of high technology equipment to mitigate 
Australia’s strategic constraints. Some examples are the introduction of the specific 
terminology of ‘technological edge’ 658  to the popular defence vernacular, the policy 
objective to maintain an actual and demonstrable technological advantage over regional 
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militaries and the use of technology to mitigate relative deficiencies in the ADF’s size, 
capabilities or resources.659 
 
DOA further considered Australia’s technological and industrial base as a form of relative 
advantage, particularly over regional countries that were developing, but lacked the high 
technology infrastructure that Australia possessed and the requisite skills and training 
mechanisms to successfully utilise an industrial base for the purpose of military 
expansion. 
An expansion base is required at a lower priority to maintain the essential skills and 
capabilities needed for more substantial conflict, together with sufficient units on which 
to base timely expansion. Elements for lesser contingencies also form a large part of the 
expansion base. The command, training and logistic framework to support the 
development, operation and maintenance of the total force is also required.
660
 
 
The 1994 defence white paper added the concept of flexibility to the familiar expansion 
base principle, stating that 
Adaptability is also a characteristic of our wider national defence effort. It requires a 
flexible defence capability base which we can enhance or expand; a national industrial, 
scientific and technological base which allows us to redirect and expand our defence 
effort in a timely way.
661
 
 
Defending Australia further argued that adaptability was linked to broader economic and 
technological trends in Australia. It claimed that ‘strategic potential - the capacity to 
develop and support military forces - depends directly on economic strength and 
technological depth.’662 The white paper declared that Australia’s advantages in strategic 
potential and material capability were diminishing and that Defence would need to 
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exercise more prudent judgment in its whole-of-force trade-offs to ensure the best mix of 
high technology capabilities. It held that 
Until now, we have been able to sustain a technological edge over the full range of 
capabilities that could be brought to bear against us. Over the longer term that advantage 
will not be maintained as economic growth and technological development increase the 
strategic potential of countries throughout our region. We will therefore become more 
selective about identifying those areas in which we need to maintain a decisive lead, and 
give priority to them.
663
 
 
Ray disagreed with his white paper to some extent and asserted that the ADF’s 
technological edge was substantial and was sufficient to mitigate Australia’s smaller 
population. 
What you do need though is a technological advantage and that’s what we’ve sought to 
have in our own forces. It came back very clearly to me, visiting our neighbours in the 
five power defence [agreement] just how more sophisticated at the moment our aircraft 
are and our naval assets are compared to our neighbours. They have a large population 
(inaudible) we have to make up the edge by having the most technologically advanced 
weapons platform that we can afford.
664
 
 
Part of the rationale for maintaining a technological advantage was to employ advanced 
ISR to monitor Australia’s approaches and coordinate effective responses to incursion or 
low-warning contingencies. Another factor in the rational was the use of emerging ICT, 
decision support systems and precise weaponry to enhance coordination between the 
services and between force elements during combat operations. Ray announced that 
To optimise our force structure, the development of the ADF will give a particular 
emphasis to the key principles of joint operations, the promotion of competence and 
professionalism, the selective application of advanced technology and a rigorous 
approach to preparedness.
665
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Ray also included the human element of coordination advantage, noting that ‘Defence is 
made up of more than its equipment and technology assets, vital as these are. Of central 
importance are its people, military and civilian alike.’666 
 
Force posture 
Between 1987 and 1996 Australia’s force posture strongly emphasised two concepts 
which were central to DOA: detecting and defeating low-level contingencies against 
northern Australia or Australia’s off-shore territories and using self-reliance as the main 
guiding principle for ADF force structure planning.667  For example, while discussing 
DOA, Hawke plainly stated his government’s emphasis on self-reliance 
For the first time, as a result of the Government's 1987 Defence White Paper, Australia's 
defence policy now places full and proper emphasis on the development and maintenance 
of a self-reliant defence capability.
668
 
 
Keating continued this line of rationale: 
At the core of Australian defence policy is self-reliance, by which we mean the capability 
to defend ourselves against any credible attack on Australia without relying on the combat 
forces of other countries. The White Paper's defence equipment decisions are all directed 
towards strengthening that self-reliant capability.
669
 
 
Ray further articulated the government’s later views of self-reliance: 
Self-reliance, in essence, means such structure and capabilities must give priority to the 
needs of national defence. We have an obligation to the Australian people, to our allies 
and to our region, to be capable of looking after ourselves… Thus self-reliance for 
Australia means developing the ability to defend ourselves, whilst also supporting 
collective security and the United Nations, and developing effective and practical co-
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operation with regional neighbours to promote the strategic interests we have in 
common.
670
 
 
Ray also linked self-reliance to specific capabilities and aspects of the force structure 
being pursued in the early 1990s when he stated that 
Our strategy for the defence of Australia remains one of defence-in depth. This strategy, 
and our force structure planning, give priority to presenting any adversary with a 
comprehensive array of military capabilities capable of independent defensive and 
offensive operations… Emphasis, therefore, is given to clearly-focused intelligence and 
surveillance operations, to strong maritime and air defence capabilities, and to highly 
mobile and capable land forces which can deal with hostilities quickly on our own terms. 
The capabilities for these roles determine the ADF’s overall force structure.671 
 
This approach required a potent force-in-being which would be able to deal with credible 
contingencies of attacks against Australia. The 1987 white paper noted this when it stated 
that 
In developing a defence force capable of maintaining a self-reliant defence posture, 
priority is given to those capabilities which are needed for the defence of Australia and its 
direct interests. This requires a force-in-being to defeat any challenge to our sovereignty 
and specific capabilities designed to respond effectively to attacks within our area of 
direct military interest.
672
 
 
Ray added that a contingency-oriented force posture required moving a substantial 
portion of the ADF to the North of the country where it could be readily used in the 
defence of the Australian continent and the air and maritime gap. He also mentioned the 
level of readiness that defence deemed appropriate in maintaining a force-in-being able to 
meet credible threats. 
Defence self-reliance leads very swiftly to the idea of the move to the north. The fact that 
there is no identifiable military threat facing Australia has considerable bearing on the 
particular shape that the Australian Defence Force takes in implementing our Defence 
policy. Given the absence of threat, it is obvious that there is no sense in maintaining, at 
full readiness, a disproportionately large military force.
673
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This reflects the rationale within Defence for differentiation between short-warning 
attacks, which it deemed to be of little existential threat due to the lack of technological 
sophistication of offensive military capabilities in the region, and longer-warning attacks, 
which were deemed to pose a greater threat, but which would also entail longer warning 
times due to the military build ups which would be needed to prosecute a substantial 
attack against Australia. In accordance with this logic, statements were often framed in 
terms which strongly resembled earlier notion of expansion. For example, Ray stated that 
We have had a traditional technological edge within our region, which has allowed us to 
have a small standing force. We seek to have a minimal platform which will retain our 
competencies across a wide range of areas which can be expanded if a high level 
contingency threat emerges.
674
 
 
 
Another theme throughout the period was increasing emphasis on stabilisation operations. 
DOA was clear that any ADF contributions to stabilisation or humanitarian operations 
would be drawn from the force-in-being and would not be a force structure development 
priority in its own right. 
Development of the Defence Force for national security provides the Government with 
the capability for such contributions. It is not necessary to develop forces especially for 
peacekeeping. Like contributions to allied efforts, such contributions can be mounted 
from the force-in-being.
675
 
 
Beazley used cautious terms to emphasise self-reliance. For example, he said that 
It is obvious that our approach has not been to prepare the Australian Defence Force to 
act as part of an allied force in a distant theatre, but to meet the strategic requirements for 
the defence of Australia in the most cost-effective manner.
676
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After the end of the Cold War, the 1993 Strategic Review was more open to participating 
in peace and stabilisation operations, stating that 
…with the end of the Cold War, new opportunities have opened for the international 
community to play a more active role in peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Defence 
involvement in such activities is an increasingly prominent aspect of our defence 
approach.
677
 
 
Ray used the example of the ADF’s contribution to the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda 
to highlight Australia’s interest in being more engaged in multilateral operations 
This new contribution by the Australian Defence Force in Rwanda reinforces Australia’s 
commitment to international humanitarian relief operations and to UN peace operations in 
general.
678
 
 
Rationale for advantage 
Support to the defence industry remained the primary context for rationalising a high 
technology ADF. However, emphasis on both state of the art technology and on a 
technological level relative to other militaries was much more substantial than it had been 
in previous decades. There was comparatively little emphasis on the use of high 
technology weapons and systems to mitigate Australia’s strategic constraints, which 
suggests that confidence in the ADF’s capacity to defend Australia, to operate 
sophisticated weapons and to present a formidable deterrent was higher in the 1990s than 
it had been in previous periods and probably than at any other time in Australia’s 
history.679 
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Policy documents frequently used the term technological edge and highlighted the need 
for effective ADF force elements. For example, Defending Australia stated that 
As regional force structures develop we will need to enhance our capabilities if we are to 
maintain the relative effectiveness of our Force. If we fail to make appropriate 
enhancements to the force structure, our capacity to defend Australia will be eroded.680 
 
The technological advantage referred to was often characterised in absolute terms. Policy 
actors often used phrasing which indicated cutting edge or state of the art technology and 
sometimes likened the ADF to other advanced militaries. For example, while speaking of 
the RAN deployment to the Persian Gulf in 1990, Hawke made reference to both the 
cutting edge weapons and sensors employed by the RAN and the fact that the ships being 
deployed were technologically equal to the US capability they would be working 
alongside. 
Our ships are well-suited to the role we are asking them to fulfil. they are the most 
modern ships in our fleet, equipped with state-of-the-art weapons and sensor systems, and 
manned by crews that are as good as any in the world. The same type of ships are serving 
with the US Navy in the gulf region at the moment, on similar tasks to those our ships 
will perform.
681
 
 
Hawke also used phrases like ‘most modern and capable’ to describe ADF capabilities. 
For example, speaking of Australia’s submarines, he said that 
Self-reliance means the capacity to defend yourself, if ever that is necessary. And in this 
sense, these vessels are the most modern and capable conventionally-powered submarines 
in the world. Based on the west coast of Australia they will substantially increase our 
capacity to defend our shores.
682
 
 
 
 
                                                 
680 Department of Defence, Defending Australia, para. 14.6. 
681 Robert J. L. Hawke, "Speech by the Prime Minister," Parliamentary Resolution on the Gulf Crisis 
(1990), 6. 
682 "Speech," ed. Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (1991), 2. 
Chapter 4 
1987-1996: Technological edge in the Defence of Australia era 
 
 
 
 
242 
 
Policy documents also linked high technology capabilities to preparedness, noting that 
The overall development of the ADF will need to have a particular emphasis on the key 
principles of joint operations, the selective application of advanced technology, the 
promotion of competence and professionalism, and the application of a rigorous approach 
to preparedness.
683
 
 
The level of preparedness that was realistically achievable was a matter of contention, 
though. The 1989 strategic planning paper warned that 
…we must be selective in our use of technology. This means that we must be specific 
about where a margin of technological superiority critically needs to be…. [T]echnologies 
relevant to the maintenance of our technological edge are likely to be both more 
expensive and more capable. For this reason, we may have to acquire combat systems in 
reduced numbers. [H]igher operating costs are generally associated with the high 
acquisition costs of advanced-technology equipment.
684
 
 
Nonetheless, Ray emphasised that Australia’s high technology approach to defence 
planning was no longer seen as a choice, but as a necessity when he announced that 
regional states ‘have a large population (inaudible) we have to make up the edge by 
having the most technologically advanced weapons platform that we can afford.’685 
 
This period also focused extensively on industry, linking it to Australia’s capacity to 
achieve a self-reliant force structure and posture. DOA noted that ‘we would be assisted 
by the relative advantage that is latent in our military and industrial base’686 which would 
‘provide a suitable basis for timely expansion to meet higher levels of threat if our 
strategic circumstances deteriorate over the longer term.’ 687  Hawke also linked self-
reliance to defence industry capacity: 
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But defence self-reliance means much more than this. Any country which aspires to 
defence self-reliance must be capable not only of operating the necessary defence 
equipment on which its security depends but also of constructing and maintaining it.
 688
 
 
Defending Australia announced that industry would become increasingly involved in long 
term force structure planning. 
Increasingly, in areas of rapid technological advance such as complex command and 
control systems, Defence will seek ways to involve industry more in identifying 
capability solutions.
689
 
 
Keating added that major capability acquisitions would benefit industry. In reference to 
the Collins submarine project, he commented that 
The submarine project went much further than a decision we made to replace the ageing 
Oberon class submarines: it is the first part of a determination to re-establish Australia's 
shipbuilding industry.
690
 
 
Similarly, when speaking about the ANZAC frigates developed for the RAN and RNZN, 
Keating also emphasised the importance of maintaining a technological advantage to 
sustain industry for the purposes of self-reliance: 
…we will focus on our regional strengths, our industrial capabilities, our capacity for 
research and development, for design not simply of ships but of combat systems and 
weapon systems… We are building a naval ship building capacity like this here in 
Australasia and, of course, in Australia's case we also have a submarine program, we will 
soon have the Mine Hunter Program and the hydrographic ship.
691
 
 
Keating went even further to state that collaboration between Australia and New Zealand 
on the Anzac frigates was beneficial for both countries defence industries and for ADF 
and NZDF force postures 
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The fact that we work together collaboratively on a single class of ship, like this, that 
bears the name the proud name of Anzac, the history of which and the culture of which 
we share says something I think about the modern relationship in peace and how we can 
develop ourselves, develop a defence capability here. How we can see technological spin-
offs in both of our countries. How, by improving and building on our defence material 
capability, we can, at the same time, support other industries and while giving ourselves a 
stronger defence posture.692 
 
4.5 Strategic signalling 
Strategic signalling demonstrated incremental changes throughout the period 1987-1996. 
Deterrence became more closely linked with strategic denial and strike capabilities as 
those capabilities became more central to policy objectives and as their supporting 
concepts were realised in policy guidance. Reassurance linked increased ADF capabilities 
for self-reliance to increased capacity to assist regional security partners. It also 
emphasised potentially distant contributions to multilateral operations using capabilities 
determined by a self-reliant force posture. Validation grappled with the need to justify the 
change in force structure planning priorities from a balanced force comprised primarily of 
expeditionary capabilities to a force structure ostensibly characterised by strategic denial 
in the defence of Australia’s air and maritime approaches. 
 
Deterrence 
A significant shift in Australia’s approach to signalling deterrence was the introduction of 
strategic denial as a principal means for establishing credible defence self-reliance.693 The 
emphasis on strategic geography and capabilities able to deny Australia’s air and 
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maritime approaches to a potential adversary imbued Australian defence discourse with a 
new sense of confidence in its ability to deter and defeat armed attacks against its territory 
and interests. 
 
The DOA period strongly emphasised technologically advanced capabilities which would 
enable the ADF to detect and engage hostile forces operating in or near Australia’s 
northern approaches. The material focus of relative advantage was founded on individual 
weapon platforms, such as strategic strike with advanced aircraft, the use of advanced 
PGM, maritime interdiction and harassment of surface combatants and sea lift with 
submarines. It also extended to technical capabilities which would allow the ADF to 
achieve information dominance over potential adversaries, including the Jindalee 
Operational Radar Network (JORN), secure communications and establishing the Joint 
Operations Command. 
 
DOA clearly signals that Australia’s force posture will demonstrate the ADF’s capacity to 
deny its approaches to a would-be adversary: 
This Government believes that Australia must be able to provide its own defence in 
circumstances, presently quite unlikely but still credible as a future possibility, of a threat 
posed to Australia by a nation operating within our own region. Such developments 
would place great demands on our defence capacity. Our force structure planning will 
ensure that we have, and can be seen to have, the capacity to respond effective to them.
694
 
 
The terminology is instructive here because the white paper doesn’t just state that 
Australia should have the desired capability, but stresses that it must be seen to have them. 
This is recurrent theme in DOA, with phrases such as ‘any potential adversaries know 
that they will be faced with a comprehensive array of military capabilities, both defensive 
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and offensive’ 695  and ‘our military capabilities and competence must command 
respect.’ 696  The 1989 strategic planning paper followed this trend, commenting that 
Australia ‘must ensure that the adversary is left under no misapprehension about our 
ability to interdict and employ strike against selected military targets.’697 
 
Hawke added that Australia’s relationships had a deterrent effect, noting that 
…our alliance arrangements and our firm friendships with countries in the region provide 
the framework within which we can not only deter aggression against Australia but also 
promote the security of our region and, ultimately, of the globe.
698
 
 
The 1994 defence white paper suggested that in addition to ‘maintaining essential military 
capabilities’ the ADF’s purpose was to help ‘deter aggression against Australia’699 It 
further commented that 
Depth in defence requires responsive national mechanisms; effective command and 
control of a cohesive Australian Defence Force; carefully targeted intelligence and 
surveillance operations; and highly capable, responsive and mobile forces that can deal 
with threats quickly and decisively. To make the most effective use of each of our 
operating environments - sea, land and air - the Australian Defence Force is structured in 
such a way that anyone wishing to apply military force against us would need to contend 
with the coordinated and efficient action of all our forces under joint operational 
command.
700
 
 
Meanwhile, Keating specifically differentiated between the deterrence effect of 
capabilities and force employment: 
I think credible defence does more than material purchases or procurement or weapons 
procurement in their own right. It is a total thing which is operational forces, combat 
readiness, capacity logistics as well as equipment. These are very sophisticated issues 
which require sophisticated judgements and most defence ministries and armed services 
try and make those judgements all the time.
701
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Reassurance 
In the Defence of Australia period, policy documents discussed credibility, support to 
regional partners and crisis response fairly evenly. However, Ministerial statements 
discussed credibility to a much more significant extent than other forms of reassurance.702 
 
Policy documents and Ministerial statements both sought to link Australia’s approach to 
self-reliance, which potentially entailed significant increases to defence capabilities, to 
positive security outcomes. In particular, documents and statements linked self-reliance to 
increases in the ADF’s ability to support regional allies and both regional and global 
security. The kind of assistance advertised to regional security partners included the full 
gamut of response and support options and repeated firm signals of Australia’s 
commitment to use the ADF to assist it allies. For example, Hawke signalled that 
In planning for defence self-reliance, the Government's defence policy has focused on the 
need to develop and maintain a credible force able to mount operations in Australia's area 
of direct military interest.703 
 
Credibility as an ally was emphasised substantially in this period to offset what may 
otherwise have been perceived as isolationism in the announcement of DOA. Hawke and 
Beazley went to great lengths to reassure Australia’s allies that self-reliance would give 
the ADF the kinds of capabilities it needed to contribute to wider regional and global 
military operations if the Australian government deemed it necessary. They linked DOA-
oriented capabilities to Australia’s ability to participate in coalition operations, to meet 
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burden-sharing obligations and to promote regional stability by being independently 
secure from destabilising forces. For example, Keating stated that 
The quality of our defence partnership and the value of the contribution we each make to 
wider regional stability and United Nations peacekeeping depends on our maintaining 
credible defence capabilities.
704
 
 
When pressed on the applicability of DOA capabilities for expeditionary operations, 
Ministers frequently asserted that the kinds of capabilities useful to defending the 
Australian continent and denying the air and maritime gap were conducive to operations 
further afield even though they weren’t optimised for expeditionary operations. For 
example, Ray echoed Beazley’s earlier pronouncements when he said that 
…by developing sound relationships with neighbouring countries we can help foster a 
more secure regional environment, benefitting both the region and ourselves. Over and 
above this; we have as part of our foreign policy, a policy of ‘constructive commitment’ 
to the South Pacific region, which includes constructive commitment in the areas of 
defence and security no less than in other areas.
705
 
 
This paralleled comments in DOA that 
This Government believes that an Australian defence force able to deal effectively with 
the most credible challenges to the nation's sovereignty is the best contribution we can 
make to the continued stability of our region. Meeting our requirements for the defence of 
Australia will provide the Government with practical options for use of elements of the 
Defence Force in tasks beyond our area of direct military interest in support of regional 
friends and allies.
706
 
 
Ray summed this up, stating that ‘our capability to defend our own territory is central to 
our standing in the region and to the role we can play as a partner in regional security.’707 
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Successive policy documents emphasised that contributions to regional security, although 
second to self-reliance, were an important consideration in Australia’s force structure 
planning. For example, DOA stated that 
The current substantial capacity of Australian forces to contribute to security in the South-
West Pacific will be further enhanced by the Government's decision to increase our air 
and naval deployments to the region and to provide practical assistance in such fields as 
maritime surveillance and patrol and hydrography. In the event of a regional conflict, the 
forces we are developing for our own defence would have direct utility in the South-West 
Pacific.
708
 
 
Similarly, the 1993 Strategic Review stated that 
For Australia to maintain its security and its regional defence standing in the 1990s, we 
will need to continue to give our first priority to capabilities for national defence. This 
approach meets the responsibility of Government to provide for national security. It will 
also provide a secure and confident basis on which to engage in regional defence 
cooperation. It is precisely our strengths in planning for national defence - in acquiring, 
adapting and supporting modern defence equipment and developing the professional 
skills of a modern defence force - that are attractive to regional countries. It is these 
strengths that will provide the basis for industry and logistic cooperation, and, overtime, 
for the levels of interoperability that will be required for true regional defence 
cooperation.
709
 
 
Ray added that this capacity held significant international prestige when he noted that ‘the 
professionalism and capabilities of the Australian Defence Force mean Australia is 
among the first countries to be called on to assist in international security and 
humanitarian crises.’710 He further linked this to Australia’s capacity to contribute to 
regional security: 
This is not to neglect alliance and regional associations and cooperation with regional 
neighbours. They remain essential elements of Australia’s overall defence approach. As 
the Gulf War showed, from a self-reliant defence force structured for the defence of this 
nation, Australia can make a contribution to operations further afield in support of friends 
and allies, and activities sanctioned by the United Nations. Today’s decisions will ensure 
that Australia continues to have the capacity to contribute to wider global and regional 
security.
711
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Keating focused more on Indonesia, claiming that ‘if we are to turn into reality our policy 
of seeking defence in and with Asia, instead of against Asia, Indonesia is the most 
important place it will have to be done.’712 To reinforce this sentiment, Keating publicly 
announced his intention for his first international visit to send a clear signal that one of his 
government’s priorities would be its relationship with Indonesia. 
I have come to Indonesia, on this my first overseas visit as Prime Minister, because 
Indonesia is in the first rank of Australia's priorities.  As our close neighbour, as the 
fourth most populous country in the world, as a rapidly growing economy in the most 
rapidly growing part of the world, as a key player in this region where our future lies, 
Indonesia commands Australia's attention. Very different we may be, but we have found, 
I think, that the destinies of our two countries are joined. I should like this visit to signal 
that.
713
 
 
Keating also took conciliatory steps towards other regional states, particularly when he 
re-established defence ties with Fiji in 1992. 
I think it is now appropriate to resume defence cooperation with Fiji. Initially that 
renewed defence cooperation will concentrate on maritime surveillance and training, and 
will include a resumption of operational Royal Australian Navy visits to Fiji, resumption 
of aerial maritime surveillance patrols in and through Fiji's exclusive economic zone, and 
also offering Fiji training places in the joint services military college in Canberra for the 
training of Fiji military force personnel.
714
 
 
Validation 
One interesting trend in the validation node in the 1987 defence white paper was that the 
government’s decade or so of investment in convincing the public that defence self-
reliance was possible had begun to pay off. As a result, validation was more concerned 
with the ADF’s capabilities and more targeted toward justifying increased expenditure. 
Appeals to morale often referenced the ADF’s military proficiency and the utility of high 
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technology weapons and systems used to increase Australia’s strategic weight. There was 
generally less emphasis on the ADF’s credibility as a fighting force at all. Validation 
stressed self-reliance as a force structure principle, but was less concerned with justifying 
in principle the ability of or need for an ADF which could defend Australia.715 
 
Beazley frequently characterised self-reliance in the context of alliances, making a clear 
point about Australia’s capacity and intentions to defend itself to all audiences, but at the 
same time recognising the practical limits to Australia’s defence self-reliance. 
Throughout the late 1980s and into the early 1990s, validation was largely focused on 
cementing self-reliance and the geographical boundaries of Australia’s primary force 
structure concerns in the Defence of Australia doctrine. DOA changed defence policy 
priorities which would determine force structure decisions and signalled different 
intentions which further altered Australia’s force posture. 
The Australian people expect that Australia shall be able to defend itself. The Australian 
Government accepts its duty to provide Australia with defence forces able to meet that 
expectation.
716
 
 
However, DOA envisaged only slight expenditure growth and did not make a vigorous 
case for increased spending to supply its proposed force structure. 
The Government's defence planning will continue to provide for modest annual real 
increases in operating costs, recognising that it generally costs more to operate modern 
and more capable equipment than it did to operate older designs of equipment.
717
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In the 1990s, Defence took a different approach. Defending Australia made statements 
linking defence self-reliance to Australia’s sense of confidence and to national identity: 
We are rightly proud of our Defence Force, which by its ideals and achievements over 
nearly a century has done so much to define our national identity. Our defence self-
reliance underpins our national self-confidence. Maintaining the capabilities to defend 
ourselves is important in the way we see ourselves as a nation.718 
 
Keating similarly employed the concept of confidence in relation to defence capabilities. 
Speaking in reference to the Collins project, he commented that 
The Collins class submarines increase our confidence in our ability to defend ourselves, 
and illustrate how, through joint cooperation ventures Australian industry can contribute 
to the security needs of our neighbours, and help increase regional security and 
stability.
719
 
 
Defending Australia also used more emotive terms, such a pride, to inspire public opinion 
and confidence on Australia’s maturity as a nation able to stand tall in the international 
system as a result of defence self-reliance: 
The foundation of the Government's defence policy is self-reliance, which requires that 
Australia maintain the military capabilities to defend our country without depending on 
help from other countries' combat forces. This approach to defence reflects our view of 
ourselves. Self-reliance in defence is essential to the Government's broader conception of 
Australia as a nation, proud of our continent and our achievements, and committed to 
preserving them.
720
 
 
Another example is the combination of respect, confidence and security in a single phrase: 
Our ability to defend ourselves and contribute to regional security does much to ensure 
that we are respected and helps us engage in the region by giving confidence that we can 
manage uncertainty and assure our security.
721
 
 
Meanwhile, Ray focused more on security concerns, stating that ‘the first responsibility of 
Government is to ensure the sovereignty of Australia by providing adequate security 
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protection.’ 722  Ray added that Australia’s security was improved by Australia’s 
geography and a strategy of strategic denial: 
Strategically, the sea provides us with a considerable measure of security. A hostile force 
would have to cross a large area of open ocean to attack us. The sea-air gap across 
northern Australia forms the basis of our defence planning for the defence of Australia. 
As a result we have extensive maritime capabilities, and sizeable maritime forces.
723
 
 
Chapter conclusions 
The late 1980s and early 1990s are an era of Australian defence policy most directly 
associated with the concept of a technological edge. Beginning in the 1987 defence white 
paper, the policy imperative to maintain a clear technological advantage over regional 
militaries featured prominently in defence discourse. By the early 1990s the idea had 
become engrained in defence discourse but was rivalled by exogenous pressures to 
complement the government’s new diplomatic and economic approaches to Asia, which 
were collaborative and favoured engagement and were not entirely conducive to directly 
espousing military advantage in the region. Consequently, a lot of the discourse began to 
frame Southeast Asian military capabilities in collaborative terms, noting the kinds of 
capabilities that were being developed in the region as modernisation programs with 
favourable outcomes for Australia’s security environment. 
 
The policy context for key concepts changed dramatically during this period, beginning 
with a substantial shift towards the region as the referent for relative advantage. Policy 
documents frequently linked regional capabilities to Australia’s need for an edge and 
overtly set regional capability levels as a benchmark for Australia’s technological edge. 
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The scope of Australia’s strategic interests also focused much more on regional than 
global or, at times, even DOA interests. 
 
The strategic concepts used in defence policy changed to reflect more focus on certain 
aspects of technology. The acquisition of advanced C4ISR technologies and the third 
stage of the JORN project were particularly relevant in demonstrating the ADF’s 
increasingly high technology capabilities and incorporating emerging NCW capabilities 
into doctrine for greater coordination. Self-reliance and contingencies became far and 
away the most important force posture determinants, but references to regional 
stabilisation operations were also prominent. Between them, these concepts constituted 
the bulk of force posture coding and reflected a growing concern with the self-reliant 
defence of Australia against armed attack and an increased willingness to use the ADF to 
support regional assistance and international peacekeeping. This was consistent with 
international peacekeeping supply and demand trends in the immediate post-Cold War era, 
with many nations becoming more comfortable with supplying peacekeepers to UN 
missions than before. 
 
Australia’s strategic signals underwent mostly incremental changes. For example, 
deterrence became strongly linked with strategic denial and strike capabilities as those 
capabilities matured and were more central to policy objectives. Reassurance overtly 
linked increased ADF capabilities for self-reliance to increased capacity to assist regional 
security partners. There was also significant emphasis on using and contributing to 
alliances while maintaining a self-reliant force posture. Validation responded to a 
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perceived need to justify the change in force structure planning priorities from a focus on 
expeditionary capability planning and to a DOA styled force structure. 
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Chapter 5  
1997-2009: Capability edge in the twenty-first century 
In 1997 the Howard government released its first major defence policy document. 
Australia’s strategic policy became the cornerstone for a wide-ranging reform to the way 
Australia viewed itself in terms of defence. Although many key concepts, such as self-
reliance and a focus on regional security, would remain the same, some aspects of 
Australia’s policy approach would change significantly. This was largely due to a new 
image of Australia in the world, one of a highly capable ADF able to contribute to 
expeditionary operations, able to deter and defeat attacks against Australia by using high 
technology weapons, ICT and by enhanced coordination of force elements and NCW. The 
2000 defence white paper introduced the idea of concentric circles to Australia’s 
prioritisation of its strategic interests, which is still prominent today. Concentric circles 
built on previous concepts of distance and priority, but also substantially reformed 
Australia’s priorities in accordance with its new self-image. The defence updates through 
the 2000s set aside many of the key judgments made in the 2000 white paper, until 2009 
realigned defence policy with the fundamental approach to strategic policy which began 
in 1997. 
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5.1 Concerned but not alarmed 
Australia’s political landscape throughout the 2000s was significantly influenced by 
security politics. Colloquially termed the ‘counterterrorism decade,’ the post-9/11 period 
drew a lot of public interest to defence and national security policy and eased the political 
friction which may otherwise have accompanied sweeping reforms to Australia’s security 
apparatuses.  Strategic policy didn’t change significantly from the policy declarations 
made prior to 9/11, but operational practice demonstrated changing attitudes towards the 
purpose of the Defence Organisation and challenged some underlying priorities for force 
structure planning. Major political debates often intertwined domestic and international 
issues in the 2000s, replacing issues like the GST and the 1997 gun buyback program 
with regional security interventions, asylum seekers and Australia’s contribution to the 
international war on terror. 
 
Under the lens 
Howard had formed the first coalition government in 13 years on the basis of his appeal 
to mainstream Australians. He had a targeted broad common denominator, primarily 
dissatisfaction with Labor’s big picture focus on issues such as republicanism, increased 
engagement with Asia and reconciliation; issues which the Coalition painted as peripheral 
in comparison to core political business of ensuring prosperity, managing the economy 
and providing essential services.724 Howard’s middle road appeased environmentalists 
and blue collar workers alike, separating Labor from some of its traditional bases of 
                                                 
724 Judith Brett, "The New Liberalism,"  The Howard Years, ed. Robert Manne (Melbourne: Black Inc. 
Agenda, 2004), 79-81. 
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support. As a result, the coalition formed government in a strong position in 1996. 
Despite their broad-based agenda, the Coalition began delivering policy outcomes quickly, 
even in the face of unexpected crises such as the Port Arthur Massacre and East Timor. 
Howard kept his front bench calm and effective in the face of adversity as the emerging 
24 hour news cycle placed more pressure on individual ministers. One of Howard’s 
distinctive leadership traits was the political autonomy which he afforded to his Ministers. 
His rationale was that the public expected rapid answers from its Ministers on policy 
issues within their portfolios. This reasoning was borne out by the demand for political 
input from the evolving news media which compelled the government to change the way 
it conducted its affairs.725 
 
As the end of the century neared, the Coalition began formulating its own Defence white 
paper. Foreign and defence policy had attracted significant public interest during the East 
Timor intervention and the dismissal of Department of Defence Secretary, Paul Barratt, in 
1999,726 making a comprehensive statement on  Australian defence an important signal to 
both the electorate and Australia’s security partners. Howard sought to cement existing 
ties with Western powers, particularly the US, while pursuing a more modest agenda of 
political and economic partnership with Asia. This translated significantly into Howard’s 
approach to defence policy, which retained many of the key strategic concepts of the 
Defence of Australia doctrine, but envisioned the ADF as a broader instrument of 
Australia’s strategic policy and planned a force structure more explicitly capable of 
                                                 
725 Paul Kelly, "Re-Thinking Australian Governance: The Howard Legacy," Australian Journal of Public 
Administration 65, no. 1 (2006): 11. 
726 Len Pullin and Ali Haidar, "Dismissing a Departmental Secretary: An Overt Exercise of Power in Public 
Employment," Department of Management Working Paper Series, Working Paper 32/04 
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coalition operations further away from the Australian continent.727 Although this policy 
would be validated in principle by numerous policy updates throughout the 2000s, it was 
quickly altered in practice. Within a year of the government’s defence policy stipulating a 
concentric approach to matters of defence, the first of Australia’s contributions to the war 
on terror began reshaping the ADF at an operational level. Howard continued to support 
the idea of defence self-reliance through strategic denial, but he also emphasised 
Australia’s need to participate in international coalition operations to meet what he saw as 
common threats to Western civilisation.728 
 
A war on terror 
Howard was in America as the events of 9/11 unfolded and many believe that his 
personal experience of the attacks underwrote his commitment to the US response.729 Just 
weeks after the attacks Australian troops were deployed to Afghanistan and they were 
later deployed repeatedly to Iraq and Afghanistan throughout the rest of the decade and, 
in the case of Afghanistan, beyond. Howard publicly expressed his concern for 
Australia’s national security after 9/11 and this impetus fuelled his desire to contribute to 
an international coalition to fight terrorism abroad. The Bali Bombings further drove 
Howard’s message home, reminding Australians that they too could be targeted by 
terrorists and that even some prominent holiday locations, close to home and long 
considered safe, were now dangerous places. 
 
                                                 
727  Rod Lyon, "Australia's Strategic Fundamentals," (Special Report No 6: Australian Strategic Policy 
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728 Matt McDonald and Matt Merefield, "How Was Howard's War Possible? Winning the War of Position 
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The 2000s proved to be a turbulent decade for international politics and Australian 
domestic politics often reflected the sense anxiety that boiled beneath the surface of many 
Western nations. Domestic political discourses were heavily influenced by a sense of 
insecurity and alarmism which Marr has characterised as political panic.730 This panic 
made it easy for politicians to position themselves as guardians of Australian values and 
of national security, playing on entrenched alarmism to secure their positions, and to 
frame the public agenda by justifying and reinforcing the fears their policies were 
intended to allay. 731  This incentivised rhetorical brinksmanship, particularly at the 
leadership level, and was a major point of contention between the Coalition and Labor in 
the 2004 election. In the lead-up to the election, Beazley, then leader of the opposition, 
and Howard entered into a contest of one-upmanship in which each tried to sound 
stronger than the other on security issues, particularly on counterterrorism measures.732 
 
Kevin ‘07  
In the aftermath of Labor’s 2004 election defeat, the party struggled with a policy 
platform which would dethrone the longstanding Howard Coalition reign. In late 2006, 
Rudd challenged Beazley for leadership and became leader of the opposition. Over the 
next year he won popular support across a range of political issues, presenting the new 
face of Labor as more in touch with the digital age and more balanced on progressive and 
social issues. Rudd’s campaign was reminiscent of Howard’s 1996 campaign. He claimed 
that the coalition had lost touch with mainstream Australia and that the new Labor Party, 
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under his leadership, could better serve the country’s needs. Important issues to voters 
were industrial relations law, particularly reforms to the government’s unpopular 
WorkChoices legislation, as well as health policy and the economy.  However, Rudd also 
promised to dramatically change the nature of Australia’s involvement in two key areas 
of international cooperation: the Iraq War and the Kyoto Protocol. These proved to be 
areas of interest for many Australians and Rudd’s promises to withdraw Australian troops 
from Iraq was met with support from a significant cross-section of the community. 
 
Despite the Coalition’s objectively strong track record on economic management, 
Howard’s credibility was damaged by rhetorical entrapment when he admitted breaking 
an election promise to ensure that interest rates remained low. When coupled with 
increasing anti-war attitudes and suspicion regarding the government’s national security 
powers and the substance of quickly passed changes to anti-terrorism legislation, 
Howard’s image was damaged and he lost his own seat at the 2007 election. Rudd 
emerged victorious and immediately began enacting his personal project for Australia’s 
future. One of Rudd’s main areas of reform was defence policy. He quickly made good 
on his promise to withdraw the ADF from the unpopular war in Iraq, although he 
increased Australia’s contribution to Afghanistan soon afterward, and announced that his 
government would produce a new defence white paper to reflect Labor’s views of the 
Asia-Pacific region in the twenty first century. 
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5.2 The twenty-first century and a changing security environment 
The first decade of the twenty-first century was a particularly turbulent period for 
Australian defence policy. International events, such as the crisis in East Timor and 9/11, 
rocked the stability of the strategic environment that Australia had characterised as 
essentially benign for much of the preceding two decades. Although creeping tensions in 
North Asia had been a major point of concern in the 1990s, the strategic shocks of the 
2000s and Australia’s simultaneous involvement in regional stabilisation operations in 
Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands and in combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq 
eclipsed policy-makers’ expectations of contingencies. Meanwhile, technological 
advancements and regional military modernisation programs exerted pressure on Defence 
to change the way it conceptualised relative advantage, to maintain capability 
development to achieve some degree of mitigation against the slowly closing qualitative 
gap between the ADF and regional militaries and to exploit advanced ICT infrastructure 
and highly trained personnel to the maximum advantage. 
 
Australia’s strategic policy 
After the change of government in 1996, policymakers resolved to generate a new policy 
guidance document for Australia’s defence planning. The Howard government identified 
three ways in which DOA needed revision. First, by widening the scope of Australia’s 
regional interests from Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific to the broader Asia-
Pacific region in order to include substantial developments in North Asia which affected 
the security environment elsewhere; second, by overtly acknowledging the potential for 
great power tension in the region due to China’s rise; and third, by raising the profile of 
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peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in Australia’s strategic priorities. 733  This 
widening of Australia’s security outlook coincided with a change in focus for the way 
technology was conceptualised in defence policy and statements. In 1997 the Howard 
government released Australia’s Strategic Policy, a policy statement which sought to 
reshape broad concepts used in the Australian defence policy discourse in subtle but 
important ways. 
 
One of these was to broaden the scope of Australia’s strategic interests from the ‘region 
of primary strategic interest’ of the DOA paper and referred to in policy documents 
during the early 1990s. McLachlan envisaged a more forward posture for the ADF and 
strategic interests which included the wider Asia-Pacific region. 734  Another was to 
deliberately drop the phrase ‘Defence of Australia’ from policy documents and 
statements.735 Paul Dibb argues that despite the change of name, many of his core ideas 
from the DOA ‘orthodoxy’ were present in Australian defence policy in and after the 
change of terminology.736 This suggests that the change of name had less to do with 
breaking from policy, indeed incremental changes are the norm, but to frame the debate in 
new terms which the new government could exercise ownership and authority over. The 
seminal phrase was laden with too much conceptual baggage from the previous 
government and was replaced with terminology which the coalition could frame in their 
own design and use to exert more control over the defence discourse. McLachlan clearly 
noted his intention that the document would boost public confidence in the government’s 
approach to defence in the foreword of the report. 
                                                 
733 White, "Four Decades of the Defence of Australia," 180. 
734 McLachlan, Australia's Strategic Dilemmas: Options for the Future.; ASP pp9-10 
735 White, "Four Decades of the Defence of Australia," 179. 
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I hope this document gives all Australians a sound understanding of those challenges. But 
more importantly, I am confident it also provides reassurance that the Government is 
putting in place a strategic approach to ensure those challenges are met.737 
 
Part of this reframing of key policy concepts was to introduce the term defeating armed 
attacks against Australia into the defence lexicon and part was to widen the ADF’s remit 
to include defending regional interests and support global interests. 738  Australia’s 
Strategic Policy also used these interests to create a hierarchy of capability development 
priorities which would be the basis for force structure planning in future policy. 
 
The government now had a conceptual toolkit of its own design to use in framing defence 
policy, engaging in policy debate and promoting policy action to the Australian public. 
However, the policy vision that had been formed in Australia’s Strategic Policy was 
incomplete. 
The paper did not attempt a rigorous financial analysis of capability options and long-
term funding needs. All it did was sound an important warning that while current funds if 
carefully managed could sustain current forces in the short term, long-term cost pressures 
were going to force some tough choices.
739
 
 
The 2000 defence white paper, Our Future Defence Force 740  was the Howard 
government’s second major defence policy document and distilled many of the ideas 
which had taken hold within defence since their introduction in Australia’s strategic 
policy. The 2000 defence white paper was written amidst the backdrop of the beginnings 
of INTERFET and was focused on adapting DOA to the changing strategic environment 
of the mid and late 1990s. The emergence of regional security tensions, the rapid rise of 
China’s influence in North Asia and the proliferation of UN peacekeeping operations all 
                                                 
737 Department of Defence, Australia's Strategic Policy, iv. 
738 ASP p.29 
739 White, "Four Decades of the Defence of Australia," 181. 
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served to complicate Australia’s earlier approach to DOA.741 The 2000 defence white 
paper took the initial ideas of DOA and added to them the implicit strategic interests from 
further afield, overtly deprioritising them relative to defending Australia based on 
geographical proximity, but including forward operations as an important consideration. 
 
Soon after the release of Our Future Defence Force, the world was shocked by the events 
of 9/11 and the strategic logic of concentric circles was largely overridden by the gravity 
of Australia’s international concerns. Howard invoked ANZUS for the first time in the 
treaty’s history,742 the ADF deployed to support coalition operations in Afghanistan and 
later to Iraq and Australia saw for the first time the practical implications of preparing 
primarily for territorial defence and strategic denial. Then-Minister for Defence, Senator 
Robert Hill famously remarked that ‘[i]t probably never made sense to conceptualise our 
security interests as a series of diminishing concentric circles around our coastline, but it 
certainly does not do so now.’743 Hill went further to say that 
…our strategic environment remains unsettled. It is always the case and thus the 
Government committed itself to conduct an annual update of the Strategic Review - 
which underpinned the White Paper. We have commenced work on the first of these 
reviews, which is due to be completed before the end of the year. It will assess the impact 
of 11 September on our strategic environment, consider the nature and scope of any 
changes necessary in strategic guidance and review the balance of priorities in the ADF's 
roles and tasks. This will involve re-examining the validity of our key planning principles, 
the priorities and challenges that face our international defence relationships, and how 
well our defence capabilities equip Defence to undertake the major tasks set by 
Government.
744
 
 
                                                 
741 Ross Babbage, "Australian Defence Strategies,"  Security and Defence: Pacific and Global Persepctives, 
ed. Desmond Ball and Cathy Downes (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1990).; McLachlan, Australia's 
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The paper Hill referred became the first of three ‘updates’ to the 2000 white paper 
released in 2003, 2005 and 2007. 745 The three defence updates through the 2000s were 
criticised for being reactionary and inconsistent. In places they reversed the logic of 
concentric circles and instead focused on prioritising ADF capabilities that were 
ostensibly optimised to both defend Australia and participate in overseas contingency 
operations. However, some declared capability priorities appeared to be selected for the 
latter and emphasised interoperability and coalition operations as a driver of capability 
development.746 This highlighted the disparities between the ADF envisaged in policy and 
the ADF that existed in reality.747 Despite popular criticism, the approach taken in the 
defence updates did not necessarily detract from Australia’s capacity to defend itself from 
armed attack. There were no reductions to existing DOA-styled capabilities and force 
structure enhancements served to make the ADF a more formidable fighting force than it 
had been prior to INTERFET. 
 
Nonetheless, defence policy rhetoric often linked expeditionary capabilities and a 
willingness to participate in coalition operations to Australia’s strategic interest in global 
security. Thus, the approach taken during the second half of the Howard government’s 
tenure was largely focused on contributing to international security by promoting stability 
through Western norms and military preponderance. This fracture between core 
                                                 
745 Department of Defence, Australia's National Security, Defence Update (Canberra: Defence Publishing 
Service, 2003); Australia's National Security: Defence Update 2005  (Canberra: Defence 
Publishing Service, 2005); Australia's National Security, Defence Update (Canberra: Defence 
Publishing Service, 2007). 
746  John Winston Howard, "Keynote Address:  Australia's Security Agenda," ASPI Global Forces 
Conference (2006).; Robert Hill, "Future Strategic Challenges in the Region: Keynote Address," 
Australian National University's Strategic Studies Program Dinner (2002).; "Australia to Join 
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objectives in policy documents and policy instruments employed by actors generated 
serious debate about whether Australia’s reimagining of defence self-reliance had been a 
delusion from the outset.748 Separately, observers also debated whether long term force 
structure planning for the ADF should reflect post-9/11 operational needs or should 
remain enshrined around the very unlikely tasks of defencing Australia from armed 
attack.749 Various commentators discussed potential strategies and force structures for the 
future ADF,750 while relatively few were able to translate a laundry list of operational 
needs into a coherent force structure plan.751 This reflected the popular aphorism that the 
obstacle for Australian defence policy is not in designing strategy, but in adequately 
providing the means to implement a strategy.752 
 
Concentric circles and capability development  
Throughout the early 1990s Australia had begun to style itself as a more significant 
regional actor than it had considered itself in previous periods. In the early 1990s the 
Labor government had vigorously sought partnership and engagement with Asia.753 This 
theme was continued in a different form in then-Minster for Foreign Affairs, Alexander 
                                                 
748 Robyn Lim and A.D. McLellan, "Self-Reliance as Panacea: Muddling Strategic Thinking in Australia," 
Agenda 3, no. 3 (1996).; Brown, Australia's Security: Issues for the New Century. 
749 Dupont, "Transformation or Stagnation? Rethinking Australia's Defence; "Our Forces Must First Be 
Functional; White, "Australian Defence Policy and the Possibility of War; "A Focused Force." 
750 For example, Beyond the Defence of Australia: Finding a New Balance in Australian Strategic Policy  
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Downer’s infamous ‘Should Australia Think Big or Small in Foreign Policy?’ speech in 
2006, which emphasised Australia’s economy, GDP per capita, advanced industrial base 
and natural resources as reasons to think of Australia as a prominent international actor 
rather than a small regional power. 754  Aspects of this idea proliferated with the 
introduction of terms such as ‘activist middle power’ and ‘punching above your weight’ 
to Australia’s foreign and defence policy discourses. In the mid-2000s there was a lively 
debate about the role of middle powers in the international system and the ways in which 
middle powers could pursue global interests through multilateral forums and coalition 
action.755 
 
This approach gelled nicely with the way policy actors viewed Australia and its interests 
in the 2000s. It also mirrored significant changes in the scope of Australia’s strategic 
interests and the types of capabilities that defence policy envisioned as integral to the 
ADF of the twenty first century. Concentric circles attempted to reconcile Australia’s 
competing local and global security concerns with the need for an ADF that could be self-
reliant, interoperable with key allies and still able to conduct unilateral stabilisation 
operations, lead local coalition and concurrently contribute to expeditionary coalition 
operations further afield. Part of the solution was an increased focus on emerging 
technologies which, amidst popular fascination with RMA technologies in Western 
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militaries, 756  appealed to national mythology of Australians as qualitatively superior 
warriors.757 The 2000 defence white paper introduced the term ‘capability edge’ into the 
popular defence vernacular and announced that ‘Australia’s defence planning should aim 
to provide our forces with a clear margin of superiority against any credible adversary.’758  
Under the heading capability edge, the 2000 white paper said 
Maintaining a capability edge will not be easy. In future we will no longer be able to rely, 
as we have in the past, on an assumption that either our technology or our trained people 
will be decisively better than those of other regional forces. Our focus, even more than at 
present, will be on the advantages we can achieve by combining well-trained people with 
the effective use of technology - what we have called the ‘knowledge edge’. Our 
capability edge will also come from the innovative ways in which we develop our 
doctrine, organisation and logistics.
759
 
 
Force structure planning began to incorporate many of the ideals of a network enabled 
force that was designed to achieve Rapid Dominance,760 the official name for the more 
colloquial ‘shock and awe’ concept, and decisive victory through overwhelming 
firepower and concentration of fires. The best example of this is NCW,761 an approach to 
warfare that emphasises rapid exchange of information between self-synchronising units 
at the tactical and operational levels in order to develop comprehensive shared situational 
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awareness and disaggregate decision-making to the lowest possible tactical levels.762Part 
of the solution was based on increasing interoperability and part of it was investment in 
NEC to increase the situational awareness, information dominance and concentration of 
fires of the ADF.763 This signalled a new concept of capability advantage, one which 
privileged advanced C4ISR technologies, enhanced coordination and information 
dissemination between force elements and NCW in addition to material advantage.764This 
also promoted the role of mitigation, because the ADF could increase its strategic weight 
without running into the hard limits of Australia’s population size, industrial capacity for 
quantity of major platforms or the economic constraints on acquisition, maintenance and 
sustainment. 
 
In the late 1990s, technology became central to Australia’s ‘knowledge edge’765  and 
enabled the ADF to coordinate its force elements to a much greater degree than had 
previously been possible. Information and communications technologies were viewed as 
the ultimate kind of relative advantage in the contemporary strategic environment. The 
1997 Australia’s strategic policy document placed the knowledge edge at the top of the 
government’s list of defence capability priorities, stating that 
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Our highest capability development priority therefore is ‘the knowledge edge,’ that is, the 
effective exploitation of information technologies to allow us to use our relatively small 
force to maximum effectiveness.
766
 
 
Material capabilities now took a back seat to the capacity for coordination that might 
allow a small nation to increase its strategic weight. This reflected a powerful notion of 
technocracy which had swept through Western defence establishments. 767  The 
government signalled to both external and internal audiences that Network Enabled 
Capability would deliver significant gains in the ADF’s capacity to win conflicts and that 
it was, for the Australian public, a worthwhile and necessary investment. 
Australia’s traditional assumption that our forces will have an automatic technological 
edge over others in the region is no longer plausible. Henceforth we will have to work 
hard in our increasingly competitive environment—to make sure that our forces have the 
technology, people, education and skills to win.
768
 
 
The knowledge edge 
In 1997 McLachlan noted that the government no longer prioritised the universal 
purchase of high-technology equipment, stating that 
In the past Australia benefited from being the most developed economy in our region, 
holding the most advanced military equipment and weapons. In some defence areas, that 
is no longer the case. To stay confident in our ability to defend Australia, we must be 
more efficient and smarter in using resources.
769
 
 
What McLachlan and Defence declared to be a smarter and more efficient use of 
Australia’s resources related strongly to the knowledge edge and to RMA technologies 
which would allow the ADF to exploit its knowledge edge through coordination of force 
elements and concentration of fires. Australia’s Strategic Policy stated that 
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The so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) or the information revolution— 
much of which is being driven by commercial developments in the civil sector—is 
changing the nature of warfare all over the world. But for Australia it has particular 
significance. Not only will new technology provide military personnel with an expansive 
breadth and depth of information about the battlefield, but sophisticated strike weapons 
will give advanced forces the capability to destroy targets with an unparalleled degree of 
precision and effectiveness. Our ability to use and manage information technology will be 
one of the areas where we can maintain and aspire to continuing excellence. Advances in 
technology will put a premium on the skills of our people. We will give a high priority to 
investments to ensure that our military forces gain the greatest advantage from 
developments in this field.
770
 
 
The rationale for this significant shift in approach to conceptualising relative advantage 
was linked to changing Australian perceptions of power relativities, particularly those in 
Asia. 771  This theme would soon re-emerge in policy statements and influenced the 
creation of a new defence white paper in 2000. 
 
Although its focus was on capability advantage, the 2000 defence white paper uniquely 
separated information technology that related to the knowledge edge from other 
capabilities and treated it as a discrete capability area. It stated that 
Information capabilities have been highlighted in a separate capability grouping to ensure 
that they receive proper attention and prominence, but in reality information systems will 
be profoundly important in the development of all our capabilities. For Australia, 
effective exploitation of information capabilities will be critical to maintaining our 
edge.
772
 
 
The transition from capability to information as a point of reference for relative advantage 
occurred without much debate or fanfare. It appears to have been caught up in the 
introduction of a range of new terminology associated with the RMA and accepted as 
intrinsically useful by the policy community that used it. In 2003 Drobik made a specific 
note that the terminology used for relative advantage ‘evolved from the technology edge 
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to the information edge with little rigour in defining the concepts or usage.’773 However, 
this did not inspire any re-examination of the defence discourse or the construction and 
use of terms within it. 
 
The RMA remained the central justifying principle in the renewed defence debate of the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. This three several distinct effects: a long timeframe for 
defence capability discussions, an implicit acceptance of the knowledge edge as a guiding 
concept in defence policy and a closer partnership with the American defence industry. 
Evans argues that 
Australia's response to the RMA had three main characteristics. First, Australian planners 
tended to use a 2025 time frame for assessing the value of RMA technologies. Second, 
most official Australian strategists tended to view information networking - the essence of 
the Knowledge Edge philosophy, involving the rapid dissemination of real-time 
surveillance and targeting data - as the most realistic outcome likely to emerge from 
RMA technologies over the next two decades. Third, while accepting the necessity for 
American assistance, Australian policy-makers were careful to avoid the more grandiose 
ideas of American RMA advocates.
774
 
 
By the late 2000s the concept of the RMA had taken hold in the Australian public and 
was widely accepted as a necessary and desirable force structure priority for the ADF.775 
In many ways the knowledge edge and capability advantage had become benchmarks for 
ADF performance in popular opinion.776 
 
In the lead up to the 2009 Defence white paper, Force 2030: Defending Australia in the 
Asia-Pacific century, Defence undertook wide community consultation. This consultation 
process found that a majority of respondents supported the maintenance of a capability 
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edge for the ADF in three areas: technology, information and training. The community 
consultation program also reported broad support for further investment in high-
technology force enablers, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets 
and electronic warfare systems.777 The subsequent defence white paper used the phrase 
strategic capability advantage to illustrate the new government’s conception of relative 
advantage.778  The 2009 white paper overtly prioritised investment in the exploitation and 
application of ‘new advanced technologies’779 in order to mitigate some of Australia’s 
strategic limitations.780 It linked capability advantage to specific knowledge edge related 
technologies and asserted that 
Superiority in combat and other forms of military operations will hinge on continual 
advances in military technology, especially in areas such as EW, precision targeting, 
stealth and signature management, battlespace awareness, command and control and 
information networking.
781
 
 
It also, quite controversially, linked Australia’s strategic concerns to China’s rise, sending 
strong signals to the international community about Australia’s ongoing commitment to 
international security. By this point, Australia’s declared intentions related more to 
acquiring communication technologies to enhance coordination between force elements 
rather than strictly the material advantage of specific platforms. 
 
5.3 Policy context 
The period 1996-2009, more than any other in this study, involved substantial crossover 
between fundamental concepts used in Australian defence policy. Capability was largely 
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infused with a technological element, making the two difficult to differentiate at times. 
Some actors used them in different ways, while others combined them increasingly 
during their tenures in Ministerial roles. The main referent of Australia’s relative 
advantage remained regional states. However, during the tumultuous period of the 
defence updates global interests were often emphasised in policy and in Ministerial 
statements. The scope of Australia’s defence policy was heavily influenced by 
McLachlan’s approach to framing Australia’s defence interests and his preference for a 
more forward looking defence posture. It is not clear from the data whether or not this 
conceptual crossover was a result of McLachlan’s preferences or was a reflection of 
institutional approaches to framing defence from within the bureaucracy. However, it 
appears to have been very influential in defining the concept for future Ministers and 
governments. 
 
Key concepts 
The period 1997-2009 saw a significant conceptual spill over of technology into 
capability. Although Our Future Defence Force actively sought to distance the two 
concepts, popular usage made it difficult at times to distinguish technology from 
capability. 
 
Howard emphasised the relationship between capability and effectiveness. In his 
formulation, technology was a means to an end, but capability was about what the ADF 
could do, not the tools it had at its disposal. Howard often noted his commitment to 
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‘maintaining the Australian Defence Force's capabilities and improving its 
effectiveness.’782 Howard also asserted that 
The Government does set a very high priority on maintaining a strong defence capability. 
We do need as a nation to spend more money on defence. The white paper will indicate 
the degree of additional financial commitment that Australia will make to the defence of 
this country and the security of the neighbourhood in which we live. It is the first priority 
of government and it is always the first responsibility of any government to ensure that 
the defence forces are not only appropriate to deal with the great unlikelihood of a direct 
assault upon Australia but also to make a contribution to greater stability and a more 
secure strategic environment in the area in which we live.
783
 
 
In contrast to Howard, Moore took a material view, when he argued that ‘the Government 
takes the challenge of rebuilding Defence capability… seriously.’784 Hill favoured the 
most advanced technology that Australia could source and claimed that Australia could 
and should ‘enhance [its] security through the acquisition of other cutting-edge 
capabilities.’785 
 
The 2000 white paper used a much broader notion of capability, which combined 
Howard’s vision with Moore and Hill’s more material views when it stated that 
 
Capability is much more than just a piece of equipment. It includes everything that 
contributes to the ADF’s ability to achieve a particular result at a particular time. That 
means it encompasses personnel and their training, support and maintenance, logistics, 
intelligence, doctrine, and many other contributing elements.
786
 
 
Force 2030 introduced a new category of capability, joint enablers, which it defined as: 
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Defence-wide 'baseline' enabling capabilities, such as command and control, 
communications, logistics, transport and movement capabilities, repair and maintenance 
elements, and health support, are required for all forms of operations from warﬁghting to 
humanitarian relief and disaster assistance.
787
 
 
This was the result of an increasing conceptual integration of capability and technology 
which had been building throughout the 1990s. One clear example is where Australia’s 
Strategic Policy linked ICT to increased capability: 
In modern warfare, the business of winning will increasingly begin by knowing as much 
as possible about an adversary and their intentions. Our highest capability development 
priority therefore is ‘the knowledge edge’, that is, the effective exploitation of 
information technologies to allow us to use our relatively small force to maximum 
effectiveness.
788
 
 
McLachlan also emphasised the benefits of technology for ADF capabilities, noting that 
In the past Australia benefited from being the most developed economy in our region, 
holding the most advanced military equipment and weapons. In some defence areas, that 
is no longer the case. To stay confident in our ability to defend Australia, we must be 
more efficient and smarter in using resources. Developments in technology are working to 
our advantage. They are giving a greater capacity to watch our maritime approaches and 
offer high precision in the way we apply force in those approaches.
789
 
 
Our Future Defence Force went one step further, asserting that ‘Australia’s future 
defence capability will require access to advanced technology,’790 It added that 
Developments in information technology, and the rapid changes they are bringing to the 
nature of warfare, will enhance the operational effectiveness of armed forces over the 
coming decade. Intelligence, surveillance, communications, command and control 
capabilities, and the whole spectrum of information warfare, will expand significantly.
791
 
 
The 2005 defence update discussed the same trend, but in terms of maintaining 
Australia’s edge over other militaries with access to similar technologies. It commented 
that 
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The technology revolution has led to a diffusion of technology, particularly in the areas of 
information and communications. Maintaining technological superiority is increasingly 
difficult and expensive. The proliferation of military technologies, including to non-state 
groups, is particularly relevant for Australia which has relied on maintaining a 
technological edge in its defence capabilities.
792
 
 
Referent actors 
The period 1997-2009 is remarkably diverse in its referents, primarily due to the 
combination strong regional focus of the late 1990s and the substantial post-9/11 
interregnum during which global interests are discussed much more frequently than at any 
other point in the era of defence self-reliance apart from the months following Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.793 
 
Indonesia played a significant role in Australia’s strategic calculus. Australia’s Strategic 
Policy referred explicitly to Indonesia in several places, noting the ‘unique place 
Indonesia has in shaping [Australia’s] strategic environment.’794 It also stated that 
Indonesia has unique strategic significance for Australia. It is of course by far the largest 
country among our nearer neighbours. Its large archipelago covers much of Australia’s 
strategic approaches, while its large population and regional standing have made it 
decisively influential in Southeast Asia’s strategic and political environment… 
Indonesia’s gross national product will likely overtake Australia’s in that same period, as 
will its defence budget. That will mark a turning point in the nature of Australia’s 
relations with a region in which we have until now been the predominant economic and 
strategic power. As a result of this growth, Indonesia’s strategic weight and political 
influence is likely to increase significantly in the years ahead.
795
 
 
Australia’s Strategic Policy also took a broader view of the Asia-Pacific region and 
signalled that Australia now had ambitions further afield than earlier policies had 
envisioned. 
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The development of wider high-technology defence capabilities throughout the Asia–
Pacific region is one of the most important trends in our strategic environment. 
Australia’s traditional assumption that our forces will have an automatic technological 
edge over others in the region is no longer plausible. Henceforth we will have to work 
hard in our increasingly competitive environment—to make sure that our forces have the 
technology, people, education and skills to win. For Australian defence planning, there 
seems no alternative to meeting the challenge of rising regional capabilities. Australia’s 
forces at present are among the most capable in our region. Our present level of 
capabilities can be measured against two key benchmarks: we have the capability to deny 
our air and sea approaches to any credible regional force; and we maintain a strong 
regional presence as a maritime power. The Government’s aim is to ensure that the ADF 
continues to meet these overall benchmarks in the year ahead. In regard to individual 
platforms and weapon systems, we need a set of benchmarks to inform decisions about 
the level of capability required. By identifying how others are approaching these tasks, 
and how well they are doing them, we will set benchmarks against which to measure our 
own performance. These benchmarks will be based on the military capabilities likely to 
exist in the region over the next fifteen years—as a reasonable guide to the types of 
military capabilities we should be able to counter.
796
 
 
The 2000 defence white paper focused less on Indonesia and more on the wider Asia-
Pacific region. It noted that 
A key factor in the evolution of Australia’s strategic environment is the development of 
military capabilities in the Asia Pacific region. This will influence the relationships 
between countries in the region, and it is a critical issue to consider in deciding 
Australia’s own future capability needs.797 
 
Rudd went one step further, focusing much more on the Asia-Pacific than on the nearer 
region, which had been central to earlier formulations of Australia’s strategic ambitions. 
In 2008, Rudd commented that 
This 21st Century is the century of the Asia Pacific. We see the rise of huge new powers 
in our own region. Economically strong, but on the back of economic growth comes also 
greater investment in military expenditure. And as a result of that we have therefore, huge 
increases in military spending here in our own region, our own neighbourhood, our own 
backyard. So Australia's response to that under the Government that I lead is that 
Australia must be prepared. And therefore it is important that we are in a position in the 
future to deal with any future challenges which might arise, both through our defence 
preparedness but also through our wider national security policy and foreign policy 
actions also to try and ensure that we have a peaceful and stable environment through this 
century. One of the challenges we face is the fact that there is not just this increase in 
military expenditure across this region, but also that presents therefore challenges in terms 
of Australia's ability long term to defend its own sea-lines of communication.
798
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Rudd was also concerned about regional military modernisation, noting that 
As nations grow and become more affluent, they also update their military forces. We see 
this in our own region. We see a substantial arms build-up over time. We need to be 
aware of the changes taking place. And we must make sure that we have the right mix of 
capabilities to deal with any contingencies that might arise in the future. The growth in 
Asian and US military expenditures has dominated recent increases in global military 
spending. And, as a general observation, the modernisation of Asian military forces is 
being characterised by significant improvements in air combat capability, and naval 
forces - including greater numbers and more advanced submarines. We are also 
witnessing a gradually increasing ability to use military assets more powerfully through 
more advanced communications, joint command and intelligence systems. As we look at 
our own Australian defence needs for the decades ahead, we need to ensure we are at the 
forefront of military technology development and acquisition. Our armed forces must be 
equipped to deal with the emerging security environment. For that, we need to further 
develop key capabilities.
799
 
 
The 2009 defence white paper echoed these sentiments, with comments that 
Military modernisation, particularly in the Asia-Paciﬁc region, and the proliferation of 
advanced military technologies will mean that Australia's ability to maintain a capability 
advantage will come under increasing challenge. We will have to work harder to ensure 
that we maintain a capability advantage in the areas that matter most.
800
 
 
Overall, the Asia-Pacific region was specifically identified as a referent of Australia’s 
relative advantage in every policy document produced throughout the period. The 2009 
defence white paper even went so far as to note that not only the present but ‘the future 
operating environment of the ADF will be shaped in very large measure by changes in 
military technology and its employment, especially in the Asia-Paciﬁc region.’801 
 
Policy scope 
Despite increasing interest in global affairs after 9/11, Australia’s policy scope remained 
focused on the region. Interestingly, the defence of Australia did not warrant much 
discussion despite being the ostensive main priority of defence policy. Policy documents 
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briefly declared that defeating attacks against Australia and its interests were the most 
important priority for defence and then went on to discuss, often at greater length, 
regional and global circumstances and interests. Perhaps more telling, though, is the 
frequency with which regional issues were discussed throughout the entire period and, to 
a lesser extent, the frequency with which global interests were mentioned in the middle of 
the period, between 2001 and 2005.802 
 
Part of this was likely due to McLachlan’s interest in framing defence in more forward 
terms from the outset of the Howard government’s articulation of its approach to defence 
policy. McLachlan made a concerted effort to position Australia’s defence interests in a 
more regional, and particularly a more forward focused, context. This is apparent in 
Australia’s Strategic Policy, which states that  
Australia’s principal strategic interests are today concentrated on the Asia–Pacific region... 
While we have important interests—including strategic interests—at the global level, the 
focus of our strategic attention is now more than ever on the Asia–Pacific region.803 
 
The paper took this as consistent with its assertion that 
The fundamental strategic outcome the Government seeks is to prevent armed attack or 
coercion against Australia. Our core strategic interests relate to those factors in our 
strategic environment which would increase the likelihood that Australia might come 
under direct attack, or erode our capability to resist such an attack.
804
 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Australia defined its region of primary strategic interest as 
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. At that time, strategic events in Asia beyond that 
closer region affected our security only through their consequences for the global balance, 
rather than more directly. That is no longer true. Today, our strategic interests are directly 
engaged throughout the wider Asia–Pacific region, because events beyond our nearer 
neighbourhood could have direct effects within it.
805
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In some ways these claims are internally consistent in the document. A conceptual link is 
made between defending Australia and the regional strategic environment. However, it is 
also apparent elsewhere in the document, such as in the passage above, that the Asia-
Pacific region is where policy is focused, even if it is ostensibly for the purpose of 
defending Australia. 
 
Howard also framed Australian defence policy in forward looking terms, but was more 
restrained in his views. 
Beyond our immediate neighbourhood, Australia has important interests in helping to 
support the stability of Southeast Asia, the wider Asia-Pacific, and the global security 
framework. The Government is realistic about the scale of contribution Australia can 
make to the security of the wider region and beyond.
806
 
 
This trend is continued in the 2000 defence white paper with the introduction of the 
concentric circles approach: 
We have given highest priority to the interests and objectives closest to Australia... in 
general, the closer a crisis or problem to Australia, the more important it would probably 
be to our security and the more likely we would be able to help to do something about 
it.
807
 
 
Our Future Defence Force formally anchored Australia’s strategic interests close to home 
with consideration but not deference to regional and global interests. 
At its most basic, Australia’s strategic policy aims to prevent or defeat any armed attack 
on Australia. This is the bedrock of our security, and the most fundamental responsibility 
of government… Australia is an outward looking country. We are engaged in many 
different ways - economic, cultural and personal - with the region around us and the 
world beyond. We are a major trading nation, with our prosperity dependent on our 
engagement with other countries.
808
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But like its predecessor, Our Future Defence Force stated that defending Australia was 
the most important strategic priority for Defence and then focused significant attention on 
regional strategic issues than on continental or territorial interests. One interesting feature 
of Our Future Defence Force is the contrast between the concentric prioritisations of 
interests and the reverse prioritisation of security relationships. Our Future Defence 
Force focuses mostly on the US alliance, then on major powers in the region, particularly 
in North Asia, and finally on allies in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The priority 
afforded to Australia’s allies is the inverse of the weight of strategic priority encapsulated 
by the concentric circles approach to considering Australia’s strategic interests. 
 
After 9/11 Defence took a decidedly different view about its priorities. The 2003 defence 
update broke from Our Future Defence Force, stating that  
Australia’s strategic environment is different from what it was when the 2000 Defence 
White Paper was released… Compared to 2000, the significance of the global strategic 
and security environment for Australia’s defence and security has become much more 
evident... the prospect of a conventional military attack on Australian territory has 
diminished… The implication is that for the near term there is less likely to be a need for 
ADF operations in defence of Australia.
809
 
 
This sentiment was continued through the 2005 and 2007 updates. It was not until after a 
change of government that Force 2030 reversed the trend of increasingly global creep in 
Australia’s strategic interests throughout much of the 2000s and reaffirmed that 
Australia’s ‘most basic strategic interest remains the defence of Australia against direct 
armed attack.’810 Force 2030 then reiterated the concentric circles approach taken in the 
2000 defence white paper, beginning with a verbatim restatement of Australia’s second 
priority from Our Future Defence Force, the ‘security, stability and cohesion of 
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[Australia’s] immediate neighbourhood.’811 Force 2030 combined the next two interests 
from the concentric circles approach in Our Future Defence Force to regional stability in 
the Asia-Pacific and restates the final interest as global in scope and founded on a rules-
based international security order.812 
 
5.4 Strategic concepts 
The strategic concepts employed in this period primarily related to high technology 
systems and the potential for a high technology ADF to become more capable through 
enhanced ISR and situational awareness, coordination of force elements and 
concentration of fires. The Navy and Air Force were the main recipients of major 
acquisitions, with the Army receiving material upgrades which were aimed mostly at 
enchaining its ability to function at a high operational tempo in a range of unconventional 
environments. The ADF’s force posture focused heavily on expeditionary and 
stabilisation operations and moderately on defending Australia against contingencies. The 
rationale for advantage was focused primarily on ensuring that the ADF had the best 
possible capability and on mitigating Australia’s personnel limitations. 
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Type of advantage 
By the late 1990s the type of advantage that Australia sought was predominately based on 
NCW and developing the ADF’s capabilities for information superiority.813 Coordination 
is by far the most frequently coded node and appears in almost all relevant policy 
statements.814 
 
In the late 1990s focus was shifting substantially from material capabilities toward 
coordination. Australia’s Strategic Policy placed some caveats on this, emphasising the 
quality of ADF personnel above its equipment when it cautioned that 
…as the economies of East Asia grow, Australia’s relative economic standing in the 
region will decline. Economic strength is of course an important determinant of strategic 
weight. So that will affect our strategic weight in our region, and ultimately our capacity 
to defend ourselves. As economies in the region grow, we clearly face an historic 
challenge in maintaining Australia’s relative strategic standing… New technology is one 
key to these efficiencies, and will be central to the evolution of the ADF in the years 
ahead. But there are limits to technology. Our capability will always depend on our 
people, and the ADF is already among the smallest forces in our region.
815
 
 
Australia’s Strategic Policy also explicitly noted that ‘superior command is crucial to our 
achievement of maximum results with relatively small forces.’816 
 
Despite this, more emphasis was placed on the RMA, the knowledge edge and NCW than 
on command alone. For example, McLachlan stressed the importance of the knowledge 
edge, commenting that 
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…this review puts the Defence Force at the forefront of the Revolution in Military Affairs. 
That is because our highest capability priority is the 'knowledge edge' - exploiting 
information technology so we can use our relatively small forces to maximum effect. We 
are giving priority to investments in three elements of the knowledge edge -intelligence, 
command systems, and surveillance. It is a major challenge to integrate these elements 
into a unified system giving commanders a complete picture of the battlefield, and 
enhancing their control of our forces - and doing that in real time, 24 hours a day. The 
knowledge edge is the area which, more than any other capability, can be the decisive 
factor in combat, especially when it is combined with the high capabilities of our Defence 
personnel.
817
 
 
Australia’s Strategic Policy spoke of finding a balance between capability options to 
leverage the knowledge edge against an adversary: 
As an illustration of this, complete information on an adversary’s intentions and actions 
would be useless if we lacked combat forces to respond, yet highly capable combat forces 
which are unable to locate and adversary would also be of little use. We need enough 
information to optimise the effectiveness of our combat forces. We need to establish the 
‘balance point’ at which a shift in resources from one capability to another would degrade 
our overall performance. The task for Defence planners is to match actual capabilities and 
resources to the desired balance point.
818
 
 
 Material advantage was still prominent in policy documents, as exemplified by the 2000 
defence white paper’s assertions that 
…our land forces should have sufficient firepower, protection and mobility to provide 
clear advantage in any likely operations in defence of Australia or in our immediate 
region.
819
 
 
The Government’s aim is to maintain the air- combat capability at a level at least 
comparable qualitatively to any in the region, and with a sufficient margin of superiority 
to provide an acceptable likelihood of success in combat.
820
 
 
However, coordination was also strongly emphasised: 
Effective use of information is at the heart of Australia’s defence capability. All forms of 
capability are being transformed by the innovative use of information technology. But this 
trend is more significant to Australia than to many other countries. Our strategic 
circumstances mean that innovative applications of different aspects of information 
technology offer Australia unique advantages.
821
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In addition, Our Future Defence Force talked about C4ISR infrastructure and new 
technologies for the acquisition and dissemination of intelligence to tactical units, noting 
that: ‘If effectively exploited, these can help provide a war-winning edge to forces in the 
field.’822 
Faster secure communications and data links between tactical units… will allow them to 
cooperate in combat with unprecedented speed and ease. This will multiply their 
effectiveness significantly, allowing us to do more with our relatively small forces. And 
better management, logistics and command systems will improve our ability to apply our 
forces better to maximum effect.
823
 
 
Hill also spoke extensively about coordination and NCW: 
Maintaining interoperability with the United States as its military undergoes 
transformation is a massive challenge for the ADF. It will require significant investment 
and energy. It will also require the courage to re-examine entrenched assumptions and 
develop new concepts. For example, the ADF’s ability to adapt to the imperatives of 
Network Centric Warfare will be vital if we are to retain the capability to integrate our 
forces effectively with the United States and its other core coalition partners. Iraq 
demonstrated this on the ground, in the air and at sea. I will release the ADF’s NCW 
roadmap before the end of the year. Effective control of space will be a key enabler of 
this 21st century approach to warfighting. Space provides the opportunity for high-
volume, instantaneous global communications and surveillance. This means 
unprecedented levels of shared situational awareness and ability to get inside the enemy’s 
decision-making cycle. For example, satellites made it possible for the operator of a 
Predator UAV sitting in the United States to find, identify and destroy targets on the 
ground in Afghanistan and Iraq. Our alliance relationship gives us access to space we 
could never afford on our own.
824
 
 
Similarly, the 2005 defence update emphasised coordination between force elements to 
create a concentrated effect which would enhance the effectiveness of the ADF while 
utilising the same material capabilities. 
…the ADF must be able to operate as a networked, joint force across information, air, 
land and maritime domains. It must be able to operate in environments that are complex 
and ambiguous, and where adversaries, including non-state adversaries, have increasingly 
lethal capabilities. Through continuing modernisation, it needs to retain a capability edge 
over potential rivals.
825
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Working together, these capabilities produce a greater joint effect than the individual 
platforms operating without coordination. Consequently, the ADF can produce strategic 
effects out of proportion to its size.
 826
 
 
Defence is exploiting communications and information technology to link sensors, 
weapon systems and commanders so that each shares an understanding of their 
environment – an approach to war known as ‘network–centric warfare.’827 
 
After the change of government in 2007, Rudd retained a focus on material platforms, 
emphasising that the ADF was to have the best of everything 
Force 2030 will mean the best fighter jets, the most versatile armoured vehicles and the 
most sophisticated submarines available to defend Australia's national security. This is 
only a brief snapshot of the capabilities that form the basis of Force 2030. It is a force that 
provides the ADF with greater depth, power and survivability for the next two decades. 
Force 2030 prepares us for the next generation of challenges that our defence force and 
Australia as a nation will face.
828
 
 
However, Force 2030 was more restrained in its ambitions. It made a comprehensive 
statement of the kind of capability edge it envisaged for the ADF: 
Giving our forces a capability advantage is both desirable and necessary if it prevents 
conﬂict, or allows us to prevail in conﬂict, and minimises our casualties and materiel 
losses. This approach involves maximising our strengths and minimising our weaknesses. 
Among our strengths are the capacity to exploit technology and the innovative skills and 
capacities of our people. But Australia also faces challenges due to the inherent limits of 
our population size, infrastructure and economic resources; and a lack of 'mass' in our 
armed forces in comparison to the armed forces of some other nations. Australia therefore 
seeks to develop and maintain a capability advantage that can provide a bulwark against 
strategic uncertainty, makes up for our weaknesses, and reduces the risk of attrition of 
Australia's limited forces. This approach has been central to Australian defence planning 
for over 40 years and is accepted in these terms by our neighbours.
829
 
 
The stated lack of ‘mass’ in the ADF became an theme of mitigation in the 2009 defence 
white paper and associated Ministerial statements. It also heralded a new round of 
emphasising NCW and coordination above material platforms at the strategic level. 
                                                 
826 Ibid., 24. 
827 Australia's National Security 2007, 39. 
828  Kevin M. Rudd, "Speech by Prime Minister Rudd," Launch of the Defence White Paper (Garden 
Island2009), 3. 
829 Department of Defence, "Force 2030," paras. 8.53-8.55. 
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However, Force 2030’s ambitious force structure plans generated significant discussion 
about the kinds of major platforms that Australia would acquire to maintain its strategic 
edge in the region. 
 
Force posture 
Force posture signalling was quite inconsistent throughout the 2000s.830 This was largely 
due to the substantial differences in policy approaches taken at the beginning, middle and 
end of the decade. The 2000 and 2009 defence white papers were based on a similar 
approach to framing and articulating Australia’s strategic interests, using the concentric 
circles concept of interest prioritisation to determine fundamental force posture needs. 
The defence updates were focused more on adapting the ADF to perform the kinds of 
expeditionary coalition operations which it was then conducting in Afghanistan and Iraq 
and the regional stabilisation operations it was conducting in Timor-Leste and the 
Solomon Islands. This introduced some debate about how the ADF ought to be optimised, 
either to perform the most likely operational tasks or to conduct unlikely but potentially 
catastrophic combat operations in defence of Australian territory, offshore assets and the 
air-sea gap. 
 
In 1997 Australia’s Strategic Policy linked force posture credibility to a minimum 
threshold of self-reliant capability  
If Australia is to maintain a credible level of self-reliant capability—that is, maintain the 
ability to defend our own territory without combat assistance from the forces of other 
countries—there are certain key functions which the ADF simply must be able to 
perform.
831
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It further asserted that ‘Australia’s strategic geography suggests we plan on operations 
which concentrate on defeating any aggressors in our maritime approaches, before they 
reach our territory.’832 The 2000 defence white paper continued the same fundamental 
approach to Australia’s force posture but also broadened the scope of action that Defence 
considered to be part of its core business. 
Over the next 10 years the ADF will continue to undertake a range of operations other 
than conventional war, both in our own region and beyond. Preparing the ADF for such 
operations will therefore take a more prominent place in our defence planning than it has 
in the past.
833
 
 
Howard supported the approach taken in the white paper, which echoed Beazley’s 
articulation of DOA in the 1980s, noting that 
We will not develop capabilities specifically to undertake operations beyond our 
immediate region. But where our interests are engaged and circumstances warrant, 
Australia will be prepared to contemplate providing forces to coalitions supporting 
regional security. The forces we develop for the defence of Australia will give us a 
significant range of options to make such contributions.
834
 
 
However, in the aftermath of 9/11 Howard revisited Australia’s declared intentions 
regarding its force posture and revised them to include a wider scope of action in support 
of domestic counterterrorism operations and the creation of a second Special Forces 
Tactical Assault Group (TAG) to be permanently based on the East Coast. 
…following the terrorist attacks in the United States last month the Government has 
decided to significantly enhance defence’s counter terrorist and incident response 
capability. We’ve decided that the terrorist attacks in the United States pointed to the need 
to better equip the Australian Defence Force with capacity to deal with terrorist attacks 
which were highly planned and coordinated. And as a result the Government decided at 
its meeting today to effectively double the counter terrorist capability of the Special 
Forces and to reinstate the specialist incident response unit whose capabilities in 
responding to chemical, biological, radiological and explosive incidents were in place 
during the Olympic Games. I should note that while the White Paper had foreshadowed 
the increasing involvement of the ADF in unconventional operations, the events of 
                                                 
832 Ibid., 44. 
833 Our Future Defence Force, para. 2.8. 
834 Howard, "Address to the House of Representatives on Presentation of the Government's White Paper on 
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September in the United States have indicated the need for a higher level of response to 
the threat of terrorism.
835
 
 
While Howard initially framed the increased Special Forces capability as part of domestic 
counterterrorism preparedness, the Australian Army soon found its Special Forces units 
deployed to coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Hill saw this as part of growing 
necessity for Australia to support its global interests and its allies through operations 
abroad. 
The trends I have mentioned – global terrorism, instability and extremism in Australia’s 
region, and weapons of mass destruction – have significant implications for Defence. 
They underline that Defence needs a mix of capabilities to respond to this rapidly 
changing environment.
836
 
 
Rudd rolled back on some of the Howard government’s aspirations to contribute to 
distant coalition missions in defence of international norms, but did not drop 
expeditionary operations from his mandate entirely. In the lead up to the 2009 defence 
white paper, he comemnted that 
Australia will seek, wherever possible, to develop self reliance across the range of 
relevant national security capabilities to ensure an effective contribution to our own 
security - and to the security of our friends and allies.
837
 
 
He further reinforced this view the statement that 
There is no more important task for the Australian Defence Force than the defence of 
Australia and it is around this task that our force is shaped. But we also need to do 
conduct other tasks when it is in our interests to do so. This means we need to have the 
capacity to act independently where we have unique interests at stake and do not wish to 
be reliant on the combat forces of others, lead military coalitions where we have shared 
strategic interests at stake with others and make tailored contributions to military 
coalitions where we share wider strategic interests with others. These objectives shape the 
priority tasks that our defence forces will be required to undertake in the strategic 
environment out to 2030. These tasks are: deterring and defeating attacks on Australia by 
controlling our air and sea approaches against credible adversaries, contributing to 
                                                 
835 "Press Conference: Anti-Terrorism Measures," (Sydney2001), 1. 
836 Hill, "Future Strategic Challenges in the Region: Keynote Address," 5. 
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Stability and Security in the South Pacific and East Timor by assisting our neighbours in 
dealing with humanitarian and disaster relief, and on occasion stabilisation interventions 
as we have done in the past.
838
 
 
Rationale for advantage 
The data frequently showed that cutting edge capabilities were linked to integration into 
coalition operations. 839  Interoperability was largely synonymous with cutting edge 
technology. Despite claims that interoperability did not require the most advanced 
technology, only compatible equipment, interoperability was often used to justify the 
acquisition of the most advanced hardware and systems. Stabilisation operations received 
more attention, mainly because of Australia’s experiences in regional stability missions in 
Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands. 
 
While a regional advantage was still presented as a fundamental tenet of Australian 
defence capability, it was not stressed in the middle years of the 2000s. During the 
defence update period, regional advantage was essentially a given. Focus was more on 
global security and coalition operations, which were less about technological superiority 
over irregular enemies, which was all but assured, but rather about integrating ADF force 
elements into the command structures of more technologically advanced allies. 
Howard noted that 
 …the Government has decided that Australia needs to maintain two key sets of 
capabilities. First, we need high-technology air and naval forces that can defend Australia 
by controlling our air and sea approaches. These forces can also contribute to regional 
coalitions in higher-level conflicts, as well as support forces deployed in our immediate 
neighbourhood. Second, we need highly deployable land forces that can operate both in 
the defence of Australia and to undertake lower-level operations in our immediate 
neighbourhood. To do this, we need to maintain the full range of military capabilities we 
have today, and significantly enhance many of them over the coming decade. We need to 
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increase the readiness, deployability and combat weight of our land forces, and 
progressively upgrade our air and naval forces to keep pace with evolving technologies 
and capabilities. The government is determined to ensure that the ADF will have the 
capability to both fight and win.
840
 
 
Australia’s strategic policy lists relative technological advantage as a principal factor 
which should inform Defence capability planning, specifically that ‘the level of access we 
have to leading overseas technology - particularly the extent to which we enjoy privileged 
access that gives us an advantage over other countries in the region.’ 841  Similarly, 
McLachlan combined relative advantage and cutting edge technology when he spoke of 
ADF capability options: 
Together, the enhanced military capabilities I have outlined - and the rigorous set of 
priorities against which they have been developed - will give us the most modern, capable 
force in our immediate region. This force relies on highly-skilled personnel using high 
technology and modern equipment to achieve mobility, hitting power and flexibility, 
exploiting information technology to attain maximum effect from relatively small forces. 
These initiatives will bring a comprehensive enhancement of the military capabilities of 
the ADF over the coming decade, enabling the force to meet the key benchmarks I 
mentioned earlier. We will upgrade all our major combat ships and aircraft, restructure 
and re-equip the land force and invest heavily in technology to promote the knowledge 
edge.
842
 
 
The 2005 defence update specifically mentioned cutting edge capability, noting the costs 
associated with state of the art technologies, but only to the extent that it interferes with 
budgets and long term panning: 
The rising cost of ‘state of the art’ military equipment, particularly capabilities essential 
for the ADF’s capacity to develop and operate as a superior networked force, is putting 
extra pressure on the Defence Capability Plan.
843
 
 
Force 2030 used the phrase information superiority to replace the previous term 
knowledge edge, although it seemingly referred to the same concept: 
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The future ADF will use modern information technology to link sensors, weapons 
systems and commanders and their personnel in a networked environment. This will help 
our people to work more effectively together, provide common battlespace awareness and, 
most crucially, information superiority over an adversary so that our people can make 
critical decisions on the battleﬁeld more quickly and with better knowledge than the 
adversary.
844
 
 
The 2005 defence update also noted that ‘…smaller, technologically advanced nations 
will continue to acquire advanced technology systems to reduce manpower liabilities and 
to maintain their capability advantage.’845 Force 2030 too revisited the idea of mitigation, 
which had largely been lost amidst the bolder assertions of Australia’s role as an 
international actor during the early 2000s, stating that 
Following the earlier discussion of maintaining a strategic capability advantage, the ADF 
will acquire the most capable platforms and systems we can afford within our policy 
settings, in order to offset the relatively small size of our forces and give them a war-
winning edge. Exploiting and applying new advanced technologies will be crucial to 
achieve this.
846
 
 
There was also a significant focus on the defence industry throughout the 2000s, with 
Australia companies being offered lucrative new opportunities to bid for contracts in joint 
ventures such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) project. Howard commented on Australia’s 
interest in maintaining the defence industry for both strategic and domestic policy reasons, 
noting that 
The Government believes that the White Paper's decisions and commitments will also 
provide certainty to those in industry who make a vital contribution to our defence. The 
ADF needs to rely on a wide range of people and businesses to develop and deliver the 
capabilities needed, and the Government places high priority on building effective 
partnerships between Defence and the private sector. We also want to use our defence 
investment to help foster skills, innovation and technologies in Australia and, of course, 
provide jobs where possible. The programs announced in this White Paper will have 
important consequences for many sectors of Australian industry. For example, our 
shipbuilding industry should benefit from plans to undertake major upgrades and new 
construction work.
847
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This echoed the 2000 defence white paper, which asserted that 
Australian industry is a vital component of Defence capability, both through its direct 
contribution to the development and acquisition of new capabilities and through its role in 
the national support base. So a strong industry base benefits Defence. We must take a 
strategic approach to our defence industry base, and not regard its capabilities as simply a 
by-product of procurement decisions.
848
 
 
5.5 Strategic signalling 
The turn of the century heralded a significant change in Australia’s strategic signalling. 
The operational demands of the War on Terror and simultaneous regional deployments 
stretched the ADF substantially more than during peacetime. The increasing securitisation 
of international politics meant that the ADF was invoked as a referent in a wider range of 
topics, particularly counterterrorism, domestic aid to the civil powers and deployments in 
response to natural disasters such as the ADF deployment to Banda Aceh after the 2004 
Boxing Day Tsunami. In addition, the cornerstone of ADF relative advantage, high 
technology capabilities, was being eroded by regional military modernisation and forcing 
Defence to invest more heavily in advanced equipment and systems or accept the gradual 
erosion of the capability edge to which Australia was now accustomed. 
 
In 1997 Australia’s Strategic Policy made some insightful comments about all aspects of 
signalling which serve as a good introduction to the period: 
Our armed forces are at the heart of our strategic policy. They contribute to our security 
from armed attack in many ways. They help us shape our environment, enhance the sense 
of security of our neighbours, support our allies and deter potential adversaries. More 
broadly, our armed forces contribute both to our national self esteem and our national 
standing overseas. Indeed, the quality and capability of our armed forces help to define 
the sort of country we are. Our forces say something about the way we see ourselves. 
They also influence the way others see us. Our armed forces enhance our confidence and 
                                                 
848 Department of Defence, Our Future Defence Force, para. 9.1. 
Chapter 5 
1997-2009: Capability edge in the twenty-first century 
 
 
 
 
297 
 
sense of national identity, and thereby help Australians make an effective contribution to 
our region.
849
 
 
Deterrence 
Deterrence was discussed more substantially in the first few years of this period that at 
any other time.850 This could be attributable to the policy focus on non-state issues from 
2001 through to 2007 and the absence of a defence white paper in the post-9/11 period 
until after the change of government in 2007. 
 
In 1997, McLachlan set the tone for the Howard government’s views on deterrence when 
he stated that 
Possessing the forces we need to defeat any realistic scale of attack on our territory is the 
basis of our wider defence posture. Maintaining this level of military capability is very 
relevant to how we are perceived by our neighbours and allies… A potential aggressor 
would have to cross our air and sea approaches, and -- having launched an attack -- 
sustain their forces across this gap. Our strategic geography dictates that we should plan 
to defeat attackers in those approaches, before they reach our territory… In recent years, 
Australian defence planning placed too much emphasis on reactive operations -- 
especially what have been called 'low-level contingencies'. Relying on reactive options 
runs the risk that any crisis would be prolonged. They place little pressure on an 
adversary to cease attacking or threatening Australia, and concede the initiative to an 
adversary over the pace and duration of the crisis. Pro-active operations in the defence of 
Australia could enable us to take the military initiative, putting pressure on an adversary 
to cease hostilities and providing confidence that Australian lives and property would be 
protected. 
851
 
 
Australia’s Strategic Policy further added that 
We will develop a mix of air, surface and subsurface capabilities, including some able to 
operate at long range, to pose the most complex possible set of threats to any hostile 
forces.
852
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It also outlined McLachlan’s vision of defence being predicated more on forward 
operations, meeting threats further form Australian shores rather than focusing the ADF’s 
defence effort on the air-sea gap, which he considered to be a flaw of DOA which 
relinquished initiative to an adversary.853 Australia’s Strategic Policy stated that 
More proactive operations offer the opportunity to seize the initiative, impose real 
pressure on an adversary to stop attacking Australia, and provide better confidence that 
Australian lives and property would be protected… we would attack - or threaten to 
attack - military assets and installations which could be used to attack Australia. And 
having that capability can in itself be of benefit, imposing important constraints on an 
adversary’s freedom of action.854 
 
It also linked its priorities to specific strike capabilities: 
Strike is the capability to attack targets in an adversary’s own territory. The capability to 
mount attacks of this sort offers two advantages. Firstly, they would be a cost-effective 
way to counter forces that could be used against Australia. And secondly, the capability to 
mount attacks of this sort imposes on any adversary the need to take defensive 
countermeasures. This is a significant deterrent to hostile action, and itself would 
substantially reduce the forces available for operations against Australia.
855
 
 
The 2000 defence white paper picked up many of these same themes, arguing that 
‘Australia’s defence forces serve as the decisive deterrent to any country contemplating 
armed action against us.’856 It further held that 
Even in benign situations, an evident capability to use force can help to keep things 
peaceful. When trouble starts, the ability to respond promptly with a clear predominance 
of force will often restore peace quickly.
857
 
 
At the same time, Our Future Defence Force repeated some time-held assessments of 
Australia’s relative advantage when it cast low level contingencies as the only likely 
threat from the regional militaries of the time: 
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Minor attacks on Australia, aimed at harassing or embarrassing Australia, or putting 
pressure on our policies, would be possible with the sorts of capabilities already in service 
or being developed by many regional countries. But such attacks would become credible 
only if there were a major dispute. Even then, it would be most unlikely that another 
government would miscalculate so badly as to think that it would gain by attempts at 
military intimidation.
858
 
 
Reassurance 
Unsurprisingly, after 9/11 the main focus of all discussions involving Australia’s 
commitments to allies turns primarily to the US. Australia made numerous statements 
about its credibility as a coalition partner on the international stage, but relatively few 
regarding its intentions to support regional security partners, even as it is substantially 
engaged in Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands.859 
 
In 1997 Australia’s Strategic Policy talked in generic terms about Australia’s credibility 
as military actor. It used examples like search and rescue operations abroad and joint 
exercises with its military partners to highlight how the ADF’s actions could demonstrate 
it credibility to other states. 
Apart from preparedness, we are also concerned with the way in which the posture of the 
ADF—including its use both in peacetime activities and on operations— influences other 
countries’ perceptions about Australia’s military capabilities, and the way in which we 
might use them… Posture is also a consideration when formulating the extent to which 
commitments for bilateral and multilateral exercises are met within our region, and 
occasionally wider afield. For example the professional standing of our force can be 
indicated by the way in which search and rescue operations can be conducted at short 
notice at long distances from Australia, or by the numbers and quality of forces that 
participate in joint exercises. In all such cases Australia’s credibility in going about 
military operations in a professional and practical sense is tested, with opportunities 
frequently presented to impress foreign experts that we are capable of carrying out any 
operation that we are directed to do. 
860
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Australia’s Strategic Policy also linked this conception of the ADF’s defence posture to 
Australia’s alliances and partnerships, asserting that 
…we have one of the most capable and respected defence forces in the region. These 
assets are of course closely related, with the capability of the ADF providing an essential 
underpinning to our defence alliances and regional relationships.
861
 
 
The 2000 defence white paper was more specific about the kinds of reassurances it 
intended to signal to Australia’s security partners, particularly those in the region. It 
stated it intentions to explain this position in no uncertain terms: 
…this White Paper explains our defence and strategic policies to Australia’s allies, 
friends and neighbours. Australia has long been an advocate of transparency between 
countries in our region about national policies on strategic issues, including the basis of 
force development. By understanding better the foundations of one another’s strategic 
policies, countries find it easier to work together and avoid misunderstandings.
862
 
 
The paper then elaborated that 
Our second priority is to have defence forces able to make a major contribution to the 
security of our immediate neighbourhood. Australia needs to be able to work with our 
neighbours to respond in the very unlikely event of armed aggression against them.
863
 
 
While discussing Australia’s contributions to regional stabilisation operations, Hill 
emphasised that Defence was still invested in local matters when he stated that ‘we can 
and will continue to pull our weight in our immediate neighbourhood by leading effective 
coalitions to address regional problems – first in East Timor and now in the Solomon 
Islands.’864 
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The remainder of the Howard government’s tenure was relatively ambiguous about 
Australia’s regional intentions. The 2005 defence update made a vague reference to ADF 
capability signalling Australia’s commitment to security: 
Defence capability makes an important contribution to Australia’s weight internationally. 
It expresses our commitment to security and our willingness and capacity to act in support 
of our interests.
865
 
 
Rudd brought a renewed regional focus to Australian defence policy and spoke of the 
ADF ‘contributing to military contingencies in the wider Asia-Pacific Region including 
by way of assisting our Southeast Asian partners to meet external challenges.’866 He 
further offered that 
As our security is linked inextricably to the security of our region, regional engagement is 
crucial. This includes strengthening our bilateral relationships and effective engagement 
in regional institutions. It also means seeking to positively influence the shape of the 
future regional architecture in a manner that develops a culture of security policy 
cooperation rather than defaults to any assumption that conflict is somehow inevitable.
867
 
 
After the 2020 summit Rudd elaborated on his position, announcing his intention to 
include greater contingency planning for ADF deployments to support regional states 
during humanitarian crises, natural disaster and stabilisation operations. 
Our military capacity is first class… Whether it's in the medical field, whether it's in the 
civil reconstruction field or whatever, what we're seeking to do is in fact integrate both. 
This idea for a new civilian corps for Australians to help with counter-disaster relief in 
our region came directly out of the 2020 Summit last year. It was an idea from the floor, 
from the Australian community, saying 'we're a bunch of medicos, we're a bunch of 
specialists who know how to repair broken bridges, how to quickly plug in a power 
system which has fallen down or how to get the water system going again, but what we 
need is prearrangements, preparedness and rapidity of deployment to be effective.' So, 
that just doesn't happen by clicking your fingers when you see on the morning news that 
something has happened. It means having all this prepared, as we prepare for 
contingencies with our military capabilities as well. This is a good news story, I think, for 
Australia's contribution in the region.
868
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Validation 
By the late 1990s much of the discourse had turned to validating the ADF in terms of its 
capability in the face of military modernisation in the region. As regional states increased 
the quantity and quality of their armed forces, successive policy actors sought to ensure 
that the ADF was still seen as a fierce and capable fighting force. However, the fighting 
force was going to require significant funding to sustain and improve. As a result, the 
most frequently coded validation node in this period was justification, with much of the 
discourse directly mentioning the level of expenditure commensurate with increasing 
costs of high technology weaponry and systems.869 
 
Morale was close behind as Howard, in particular, frequently linked the ADF to 
nationalism in the aftermath of 9/11.870 Similarly, McLachlan focused on the quality of 
defence personnel, noting that ‘we have a natural advantage in the strengths and abilities 
of the young people who join the ADF. This review ensures that these people will be 
equipped and trained in the best way possible.’871 
 
The 2000 defence white paper linked the ADF to Australia’s national identity, asserting 
that 
Our armed forces are not simply a service provided by government. They are part of our 
national identity. The ADF reflects the kind of country we are, the role we seek to play in 
the world, and the way we see ourselves.
872
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Our armed forces need to be able to defend Australia without relying on the combat 
forces of other countries. This principle of self-reliance reflects, fundamentally, our sense 
of ourselves as a nation.
873
 
 
At the same time, many policy actors were preoccupied with trying to establish a clear 
picture of the budgetary situation of defence and justifying increases in expenditure to the 
public. Australia’s Strategic Policy bluntly asserted that insufficient funding threatened to 
undermine the credibility of the ADF as a fighting force and may prevent it from 
adequately a defending the country or Australia’s strategic interests. 
…we are committed to maintaining and enhancing within the Defence Organisation a 
culture of continuous efficiency improvements. But we are approaching the point at 
which further cuts to the size of the ADF would damage its credibility as a fighting 
force.
874
 
 
…rising personnel costs, preserving and enhancing our skill base, and meeting any higher 
demands for readiness, along with rising investment costs for new capabilities, will place 
pressure on defence funding.
875
 
 
In justifying the rationale for capability development in Australia’s Strategic Policy, 
Howard said that 
All of this will cost a great deal. To achieve the capability enhancements set out in the 
Defence Capability Plan, the Government will increase defence spending… The 
capability enhancements in this White Paper will result in a $23 billion increase in 
Defence funding over the coming decade - a significant increase in defence funding by 
any standard. This is a much more specific funding commitment than in any White Paper 
over the past twenty-five years. It will provide the first significant real increases in 
defence spending in fifteen years… This firm commitment to realistic increases in 
Defence funding will be welcomed by the vast majority of Australians, who recognise the 
importance of our armed forces to Australia's long-term future.
876
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Soon after, Our Future Defence Force provided a full costing of its plans and was the 
first white paper in over a decade to seriously consider the budgetary implications of its 
capability ambitions. It noted that 
The fact that in the first budget of my Government defence expenditure was quarantined 
from expenditure cuts, I made it clear, as I will be at the luncheon today, that the same 
will obtain in the forthcoming budget. Defence in Australia will be quarantined from 
further cuts in the forthcoming budget. We see defence, the defence investment as being a 
very important element of our projection and influence in the region.
877
 
 
Howard justified the expenditure outlined in Our Future Defence Force and also justified 
increases to that plan based on new capability requirements and operational costs incurred 
through Australia’s involvement in the War on terror. 
…in December of the year 2000 we brought down a Defence White Paper. It provided for 
the largest increase in defence spending in more than a generation. Over a 10 year period 
it provided for significant increases in our financial commitment to the defence of 
Australia in all areas... And when you assess the world scene at present you see the 
wisdom of the Government’s decision to produce that White Paper almost 18 months ago. 
That White Paper has laid the foundation of the increase in our defence capability that is 
required to respond to the challenges that have come and may in the future come from the 
changed and more difficult economic circumstances in which we live. And while that 
White Paper made the appropriate provision as we saw it, it may well be that in the years 
ahead this country will need to make an even greater financial provision in the area of 
defence.
878
 
 
At the same time, Hill justified further expenditure as necessary to support the ADF in 
protecting Australia from vast and complex threats. He commented that 
…the Government has no higher priority than national security.  And we are committed to 
ensuring that Defence has the resources, guidance and support it needs to defend 
Australia and its national interests in the 21st century.  The strategic environment might 
be more complex and challenging than ever, but it is the world in which we are living and 
it contains the threats to which we must respond.
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Chapter conclusions 
The period 1997-2009 saw a range of important developments in Australian strategic 
policy which substantially altered the concept of relative advantage. Of particular note 
was the adoption of the RMA concept from Australia’s Western allies, particularly the US, 
and investment in capabilities and doctrine to support NCW. This change of focus from a 
clear advantage in military technology to an advantage in military capability was a 
significant departure from earlier periods which had emphasises technology for different 
purposes, but had equated cutting edge technology with military advantage. The 2000s 
still embraced the use of technology, but the cutting edge pursued from the 2000 white 
paper onwards was related to the coordination of force elements and creating the most 
effective and cohesive ADF possible using a variety of ICT, decision support systems, 
EW capabilities and major weapons systems. Similarly, capability advantage still sought 
to mitigate limits to Australia’s strategic potential. However, it increased Australia’s 
strategic weight through coordination of fires, early warning technologies and planned for 
further range in strike and interdiction capabilities to enhance strategic denial. 
 
Capability was largely conflated with technology, which often blended the two concepts 
together in policy statements. The main referent of Australia’s relative advantage 
remained regional states. However, during the defence update interregnum global 
interests became the primary focus of most policy statements and all of the updates. The 
scope of Australia’s defence policy was heavily influenced by McLachlan’s approach to 
framing Australia’s defence interests and his preference for a more forward looking 
defence posture. This was exacerbated by Hill’s view that Australia needed to become a 
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more influential international actor. Australia’s approach to explaining and signalling its 
force posture was inconsistent throughout the 2000s. The 2000 and 2009 defence white 
papers took a similar approach to framing and articulating Australia’s strategic interests, 
but the defence updates were more focused on adapting the ADF to perform the kinds of 
operations it was then conducting in Afghanistan, Iraq, Timor-Leste and the Solomon 
Islands. Strategic signalling was complicated by the increased international visibility of 
the ADF as Defence became a more central instrument in Australia’s foreign and security 
policies. Meanwhile, high technology capabilities became increasingly expensive to 
maintain and acquire and Australia faced a trade-off between its relative advantage and 
the cost of maintaining an edge. Policy statements firmly advocated the increased 
expenditure, with the Rudd government promising a substantially enhanced ADF with the 
best available capability to support it. 
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Conclusion 
The notion of using technology to offset demographic and economic limitations on 
Australia’s military emerged in the early 1970s alongside the concept of defence self-
reliance. It began as a means to bolster Australia’s credibility as a regional security 
partner as US and British presence in Southeast Asia waned. By the twenty-first century it 
became a recurring policy concept and featured in public statements and diplomatic 
signals at the highest levels of government. Although the need for an ‘edge’ in military 
capability was articulated consistently in policy and political statements, the meaning of 
the concept changed over time. Relative advantage began as a limited concept, tied 
heavily to Australia’s need to be seen as credible alongside the declining presence of its 
major power allies in the region. It then broadened to include Australia’s industrial 
capacity as an enabler for rapid expansion to a high-technology terminal force. 
Technology then became an integral component of Australia’s strategy of strategic denial 
and was also used to demonstrate a credible self-reliant capacity for defence. In the late 
1990s, alongside widespread adoption of ICT, capability advantage reflected Australia’s 
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capacity to conduct and coordinate joint operations to substantially increase the sum of 
the ADF’s parts. 
 
The conceptual transformation of relative advantage over time has not been previously 
documented or studied. This research sought to answer four questions about the concept 
of relative advantage in Australia’s strategic policy: 1) How was relative advantage 
defined throughout the period 1968-2009? 2) Have related political ideas influenced or 
coincided with conceptual change in relative advantage? 3) How has the concept of 
relative advantage been deployed as a tool of strategic communication? 4) Has relative 
advantage been primarily employed in discourse as a prescriptive or descriptive concept? 
Answers to these questions were derived from a narrative analysis of primary data which 
documented the political rhetoric used by key actors in the Australian strategic policy 
discourse. This research demonstrates that the concept of relative advantage espoused by 
political actors changed over time, was related to other dominant themes in strategic 
policy discourse and was often used in strategic communication as both a descriptive and 
prescriptive concept. 
 
This chapter explains these conclusions in four parts. The first section reviews the 
rhetorical evolution of relative advantage. It examines incremental rhetorical changes 
across four discrete time periods to demonstrate that relative advantage meant different 
things to different policy actors at different times. The second section examines the 
conceptual evolution of the concept, focusing specifically on the relationships between 
relative advantage and dominant institutional ideas within the strategic policy discourse, 
communicative strategies used to signal different aspects of relative advantage to various 
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audiences and instances where changes in the concept of relative advantage can be 
interpreted as both prescriptive and descriptive in nature. The third section explores 
drivers of change and focuses on the different ways in which relative advantage was 
framed in policy narratives across the period 1968-2009. It finds three key drivers of 
conceptual change in relative advantage: a link between Australia’s defence credibility 
and its technological base, the entrenchment of relative advantage as a principle of 
strategic policy, and an explicit link between technology and defence capability 
throughout the 1990s. The final section discusses key implications of the process of 
conceptual change for further study of Australian strategic policy in the twenty first 
century. 
 
Evolution of the edge 
Although the need for a qualitative ‘edge’ has been reiterated in consistent ways in policy 
and rhetoric, the meaning of the concept has changed over time. The conceptual evolution 
of relative advantage has occurred in four phases, which have emphasised credibility, 
expansion, material advantage and coordination advantage. In its first manifestation, 
during the period 1968-1979, relative advantage accentuated Australia’s credibility as a 
reliable and capable security partner to its regional allies.880 After the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, concerns that global conflict could seriously threaten Australia’s security 
affected attitudes towards defence planning and lagging progress towards greater self-
reliance promised in 1976. Subsequently, defence debates gravitated toward the use of 
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technology as a base for expansion from a small core force to a larger ‘terminal’881 
fighting force. In 1985, then Defence minister, Kim Beazley appointed Paul Dibb to 
conduct a review of Australia’s defence capabilities which became the basis for the 1987 
white paper. The new approach to technology mandated a clear technological advantage 
in military capability relative to Australia’s regional neighbours. 882  As Australia 
encountered the RMA in the 1990s, the role of technology was expanded to include force 
multiplication, critical enabling and coordination for joint forces in order to 
disproportionately increase the ADFs combat effectiveness. 
  
1968-1979: Emergence of the relative advantage concept  
In 1968, Australian policy began to specifically consider independent defence capability 
in the context of limited self-reliance. A ‘self-contained’ force was deemed to be best 
suited to both Australia’s collective security arrangements and the possibility of 
sustaining independent joint service operations. 883  This precursor to self-reliance is 
qualified by the concurrent needs for self-reliant capability for the purposes of conducting 
independent operations and fielding sufficient independent capability to avoid charges of 
excessive alliance free-riding. Despite the new emphasis on greater self-reliance, the 1968 
strategic basis of Australian defence policy also stipulated that the most likely 
deployment of Australian forces would be in the form of a coalition operation led by a 
major power ally.884 Australia continued to define its interests in terms of the security of 
neighbouring states, lines of communication through maritime Southeast Asia and 
                                                 
881 Babbage, Ross, Rethinking Australia's defence St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1980 150 
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August 1968, para 213 
884 Ibid., para 221 
Conclusion 
  
 
 
 
 
313 
 
underwriting regional confidence in collective security measures.885 The need to reassure 
regional security partners was evident in the language of the 1972 Australian Defence 
Review, which stipulated requirements for an ‘increasingly self-reliant’ defence force able 
to ‘project Australian strength’ beyond the continent.886 It further stipulated that Australia 
had allies in the region that shared its interests and could be strengthened through political 
and military support.887 
 
Meanwhile, the growing expense of major capital projects initiated during the early 1960s 
became a hot political issue and required frequent justification from the highest levels of 
government. Years before the notion of technological advantage was explicitly expressed 
in policy documents, then Prime Minister John Gorton stated that ‘on any criterion the 
second best is not good enough for any defence requirement that we have, and it is not too 
expensive for a nation which needs the best in the world.’888 This statement coincided 
with both statements and policy that signalled Australia’s military capability and 
intentions to regional states, both friendly and potentially hostile. Initially, this emphasis 
was directed toward the issue of deterrence,889 a long standing institutional idea within 
Defence. However, debates about defence expenditure quickly became mired in political 
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contests and often resulted in laundry lists of equipment purchases paraded to justify 
budget peaks and troughs.890  
 
In the early 1970s the tone of Australian policy changed and documents began to 
emphasise credibility rather than deterrence. In 1970 then Minister for Defence Malcolm 
Fraser’s public statements regarding Australia’s strike capability needs stressed the need 
to be able to materially influence stability in the region and frequently referred explicitly 
to both deterrence and reassurance of security partners.891 The earliest example of this 
shift in policy is the 1971 strategic basis of Australian defence policy, which pinned 
‘Australia’s political and military credibility’ to its ability to defend Australian territory, 
independence and identity.892 The 1972 Australian Defence Review further specified that 
Australia’s capability must be both ‘evident to other countries’893 and balanced between 
offensive and defensive capabilities to ensure that ‘considerations of credibility and or 
long term deterrence’894 are substantiated. Demonstrating the credibility of Australia’s 
defence capability and commitment to collective security was as an important policy 
imperative,895 reinforced by the view that Australia’s military capability was to some 
                                                 
890 For examples, see Fairhall, A., Speech by the Hon. Allen Fairhall, M.P., Minister for Defence House of 
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degree the ‘currency of diplomacy and of deterrence in the region.’896 Defence policy 
underscored the need to use Australia’s technical and industrial strength, political stability 
and military capabilities to reassure regional allies and assuage their misgivings regarding 
Australia’s ability and intention to influence their security in the event of a crisis.897 
 
In 1973, policy linked Australia’s ability to ‘demonstrate a military capability that lends 
credibility and authority to [its] foreign policy’898 with technological advantage. In this 
view Australia’s unique position in the region was underpinned by its ‘resources, 
technology, and ability to operate and maintain more advanced military equipment’899 
than local states. The issue of Australia’s increasingly independent foreign policy became 
a political football, with the criticism that Australian policy ‘lacked credibility if based on 
a weak or misplaced defence policy.’900 The result was that ‘assured defence strength in 
being’901 was held to be integral to legitimating self-reliance and commitments to regional 
security cooperation902 that were based on Australia’s military posture. Meanwhile, Sir 
Arthur Tange was substantially reforming the Department of Defence and recommended 
changes in the way Defence prioritised capability decisions to ensure that procurement 
served Australia’s self-reliance needs. 903  The Defence Committee had noted that 
Australia enjoyed relative wealth and technological advantage over the countries of 
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Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. In combination with Australia’s privileged access 
to advanced military technology, Australia’s wealth enabled it to field military 
capabilities beyond the reach of its regional neighbours.904 
 
The language used in 1976 in Australia’s first defence white paper introduced a new tone 
to the discussion of the technological level of military capability. The white paper noted 
that Australia ought to be ‘seen as a nation that takes defence matter seriously’ and that 
the newly formed Australian Defence Force should have ‘capabilities and competence’ 
that commanded respect.905 It further stated that, as a requirement for defence capability, 
the ADF ‘should at all times demonstrate Australia’s serious attitude to defence matters, 
military competence and capacity to absorb and operate high-technology equipments.’906 
During this period, Prime Minister Fraser often referred publicly to the ADFs 
technological level, to the need for greater capacity for independent operations and the 
benefits of greater burden sharing.907 Thus, as the focus on reinforcing Australia’s image 
as a credible ally began to diversify to include more capacity to undertake military action 
in Southeast Asia, coherence between signals sent to various authors also began to 
diverge.  
 
 
 
                                                 
904 Defence Committee, Strategic basis of Australian defence policy, para 34 
905 Department of Defence, Australian defence para 3-18  
906 Ibid. para 3-27 
907 For example, see Fraser, J. M., ‘Address to the R. S. L. Congress,’ ed. Prime Minister's Department 
(1976), vol.; Fraser, J. M., ‘Text of Address Given by the Prime Minister at the Roy Milne Lecture 
in Sydney.,’ ed. Prime Minister's Department (Sydney: 1976), vol.; Fraser, J. M., ‘Address to the 
Symposium of Academy of Technological Sciences,’ ed. Prime Minister's Department (1977), vol. 
Conclusion 
  
 
 
 
 
317 
 
1980-1986: The technical level as a basis for expansion  
The 1976 white paper had grand designs for the new role of the ADF and promises of 
healthy investment in new capabilities and infrastructure from the Fraser government. 
What it lacked was a clear idea of how it would translate its new resources into strategic 
outcomes.908 A first step toward rectifying this was a range of inquiries, both public and 
private, into Australia’s strategic circumstances. The 1981 Joint Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Defence inquiry report on threats to Australia’s security found four basic 
types of threats: global war, invasion of Australia, intermediate threats to Australian 
interests and low level contingencies. 909  The report concluded that even though the 
likelihood of any major threat was very low the ADF needed to retain high technology 
capabilities with long lead times in order to hedge against the rapid development of 
offensive capabilities by a regional power and to ‘act as a deterrent to hostile action.’910 A 
challenge to this conclusion is that being able to meet a challenge is not necessarily the 
same thing as deterring it.911 Deterrence must not only apply to attacks of many varieties, 
but also to threats of attack.912 
 
An important ideational carryover from the Forward Defence era was the concept of a 
force in being or core force that would provide an expansion base for a rapid increase in 
the size of the ADF in response to an emerging threat.913 Ostensibly this would provide a 
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wide ranging deterrent at an acceptable cost. One difficulty in maintaining a core force 
was ensuring that it could provide an acceptable base for expansion. A senate inquiry into 
the Australian Army tabled in 1974 identified three points which it found underpinned the 
concept of an expansion base. The first was that there is a critical minimum-sized Army, 
below which ‘the nation ceases to have a useful asset.’ The second was that Australian 
forces should be organised, trained and equipped primarily as a base for expansion in the 
event of a contingency. Thirdly, that parliament and government must be prepared to 
respond to any deterioration in Australia’s ‘advantageous strategic and technological 
position.’914 Concurrently, Prime Ministerial statements assured the public that military 
modernisation programs would ensure that Australia continued to field most 
technologically advanced equipment available to it.915 
 
In 1982 the higher defence machinery review found that the concepts of versatility and 
adaptability used in force structure planning were appropriate as a basis for defence 
planning.916 The review noted organisational concerns regarding the ambiguities between 
the roles of the Force Structure Committee and the Force Development and Analysis 
Division917 and the lack of input from the Force Development Branch in shaping strategic 
guidance.918 This was problematic because the Australian Strategic Analysis and Defence 
Policy Objectives (ASADPO) document did not ‘provide sufficient guidance, particularly 
for the purpose of determining relative priorities for the development of Defence Force 
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capabilities.’919  The 1984 Parliament inquiry report the Australian Defence Force: its 
structure and capabilities found that strategic guidance from government was inadequate 
and that Australia lacked appropriate organisational machinery for translating national 
security objectives into strategic concepts and force structure.920 Thus, long held ideas 
and debates needed to be set aside to ensure that progress could be made toward 
delivering on the high-technology self-reliant ADF promised in earlier policy guidance. 
 
In response to criticism of the government’s investment in the ANZUS alliance, then 
Minister for Defence Ian Sinclair shifted emphasis in his strategic calculus away from 
global level threats and towards regional contingencies in which Australia would expect 
to operate more independently and in which a technological basis for expansion was 
integral.921 Amidst the changing focus of ongoing force structure and defence policy 
debates, Sinclair made frequent reference to material capabilities being acquired by 
government,922 although these not regularly linked to specific strategic policy outcomes 
or requirements. After the 1983 change of government, incoming Prime Minister Bob 
Hawke quickly signalled his government’s intentions to maintain Australia’s 
commitments to its great power and regional security alliances and to reform defence 
policy to provide for a force structure which effectively utilised military technology and 
afforded the ADF a qualitative advantage in Southeast Asia.923 Soon after, then Minster 
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for Defence Gordon Scholes articulated a comprehensive approach to defence policy 
which would become a significant aspect of strategic guidance for policy formation. 
Scholes used the term ‘graduated readiness’924 to describe his thinking on how best to 
manage modernisation and budget constraints. Political needs such managing public 
expectations regarding defence expenditure and reassuring allies that a new government 
would maintain committed to long-standing relationships had a strong correlation with 
new expressions of technological advantage in the mid-1980s. 
 
1987-1996: Technological edge 
By late 1984 Defence had become dysfunctional and mired in intra-organisational 
disagreements over definitional and conceptual issues that presented an obstacle to 
meaningful policy development.925 Then Defence minister, Kim Beazley appointed Paul 
Dibb to conduct a review of Australia’s defence capabilities in 1985 and the seminal 
report was delivered in 1986.926 The next Defence white paper was released in 1987 and 
was substantially founded on the approach to defence planning outlined in the Dibb report. 
During the transition from the old policy approach to the new, Beazley reiterated the 
phrase defence in depth to stress the importance afforded to demonstrating Australia’s 
material capacity to defend itself with a high-technology defence force.927 References to 
military technology where subsequently linked to assertions that Australia’s capacity for 
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self-reliance was credible and desirable.928 Beazley framed DOA as a catalyst for change 
in the politics of defence. Changing ideational norms in the debate were, in Beazley’s 
view, necessary to accommodate the new concepts used in planning and structuring the 
ADF and major platform acquisitions. 929  Without contradicting the constellation of 
concepts that underpinned DOA, Beazley also made direct reference to the need to 
reassure allies of Australia’s commitment to its security relationships and indicated that a 
high-tech ADF provided material benefits to those relationships.930 
 
In 1989 the government released a new defence policy document, Australia’s strategic 
planning in the 1990s, which set strategic level guidance for force acquisition priories to 
Defence and explained and validated capital expenditure to the public.931 The strategic 
planning document noted the changing security dynamics in Southeast Asia, and the 
world, and linked force structure decisions to military capabilities which it stated were  
essential in securing Australia’s national interests. As the 1980s drew to a close, Hawke 
also questioned the implications of strategic changes in the region in the aftermath of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and asserted that Australia’s high-technology military would 
become an integral component of regional stability and security in the 1990s. For 
example, Hawke noted that: 
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The size of our economy, and our technical expertise, means that Australia will continue 
to maintain significant military capabilities, especially maritime capabilities, which will 
allow us to make a valuable contribution to the military dimension of regional security.
932
 
 
At this point, the requirement for Australia to sustain a clear technological lead over its 
region went largely unchallenged. Ministerial statements signalled a willingness to 
continue to spend on high-technology systems and platforms in order to ensure that 
Australia continued to be seen as a credible ally, that the ADF was recognised as a well-
equipped and formidable force, and that the public was reassured that defence 
expenditure was purposeful. However, the role that technology played in delivering 
Australia’s edge had already begun to change. 
 
As early as the 1991 force structure review,933  Australia began referring to military 
technology in terms of coordination. The review made note of the new roles played by 
information technologies in enabling the military to operate more effectively.934 Minster 
for Defence, Robert Ray noted that Australians has come to believe that Australia could 
defend itself in accordance with the central principles of DOA.935 This perception allowed 
political actors to reduce their focus on credibility and place more emphasis on material 
capability, which had come to the forefront of many defence debates since DOA was 
released. Technology emerged as a discussion point in its own right. The 1993 strategic 
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review was the first document to expressly link military technology with 
interoperability,936 noting that 
The overall development of the ADF will need to have a particular emphasis on the key 
principles of joint operations, the selective application of advanced technology, the 
promotion of competence and professionalism, and the application of a rigorous approach 
to preparedness.
937
 
 
Ray noted interoperability requirements as a driver for high-technology military platforms 
when referring to relative advantage, but sometimes situated it within a broader 
commitment to alliances, including but not limited to ANZUS.938 This coincided with 
Keating’s push for greater engagement with Asia and may reflect political needs within 
government to ensure that public statements were signalling positive intentions vis-à-vis 
other policy priority areas. 
 
Throughout the early 1990s it became clear that DOA did not account for the extensive 
transition of the strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific region from the relatively banal 
Asian security environment of the previous 20 years of the Cold War to the much more 
dynamic post-Cold War period. Two significant indicators that the doctrinal approach to 
defence embedded in DOA needed revision were tensions over North Korea’s nuclear 
program in 1994 and the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996. A third challenge was the 
increasing likelihood that Australia might deploy forces to maintain stability in the 
regional neighbourhood. 939  Political actors realised that the thinking which had 
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underpinned thee 1987 and 1994 white papers 940  required adjustment and set about 
commissioning a new policy document which could incorporate systemic changes to the 
security situation in Asia and new concepts about harnessing information technologies 
with strategic guidance which altered but did not abandon central facets of existing 
defence policy which drew on key themes from DOA. 
 
1997-2009: Capability advantage 
After the change of government in 1996, policymakers resolved to generate a new policy 
guidance document for Australia’s defence planning. The Howard government identified 
three ways in which DOA needed revision. First, by widening the scope of Australia’s 
regional interests from Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific to the broader Asia-
Pacific region in order to include substantial developments in North Asia which affected 
the security environment elsewhere. Second, by overtly acknowledging the potential for 
great power tension in the region due to China’s rise. Third, by raising the profile of 
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in Australia’s strategic priorities. 941  This 
widening of Australia’s security outlook coincided with a change in focus for the way 
technology was conceptualised in defence policy and statements. The rhetoric of the early 
1990s, which remained locked on material capability, largely faded away when faced 
with the new technological paradigm of the RMA. 
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In the late 1990s, technology became central to Australia’s ‘knowledge edge’942  and 
enabled the ADF to coordinate its force elements to a much greater degree than had 
previously be possible. Information and communications technologies were viewed as the 
ultimate kind of relative advantage in the contemporary strategic environment. The 1997 
Australia’s strategic policy document placed the knowledge edge at the top of the 
government’s list of defence capability priorities, stating that 
Our highest capability development priority therefore is ‘the knowledge edge,’ that is, the 
effective exploitation of information technologies to allow us to use our relatively small 
force to maximum effectiveness.
943
 
 
Material capabilities now took a back seat to the capacity for coordination that might 
allow a small nation to increase its strategic weight. This reflected a powerful notion of 
technocracy which had swept through Western defence establishments. 944  The 
government signalled to both external and internal audiences that Network Enabled 
Capability would deliver significant gains in the ADFs capacity to win conflicts and that 
it was, for the Australian public, also a worthwhile investment 
 
Then Minister for Defence, Ian McLachlan noted his intention that the document would 
boost public confidence in the government’s approach to defence in the foreword of the 
report. 
I hope this document gives all Australians a sound understanding of those challenges. But 
more importantly, I am confident it also provides reassurance that the Government is 
putting in place a strategic approach to ensure those challenges are met.
945
 
 
                                                 
942  Department of Defence, In search of the knowledge edge: the management component ; Dibb, The 
relevance of the knowledge edge ; Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, ‘Knowledge 
systems equipment acquisition projects in Defence,’ para.5.4 
943 Department of Defence, Australia's strategic policy Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1997 56 
944 Bousquet, Antoine, The scientific way of warfare: order and chaos on the battlefields of modernity 
London: Hurst and Company, 2009 
945 Department of Defence, Australia's strategic policy iv 
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McLachlan also noted that the government no longer prioritised the universal purchase of 
high-technology equipment, stating that 
In the past Australia benefited from being the most developed economy in our region, 
holding the most advanced military equipment and weapons. In some defence areas, that 
is no longer the case. To stay confident in our ability to defend Australia, we must be 
more efficient and smarter in using resources.
946
 
 
The rationale for this significant shift in approach to conceptualising relative advantage 
was linked to changing Australian perceptions of power relativities, particularly those in 
Asia. 947  This theme would soon re-emerge in policy statements and influenced the 
creation of a new defence white paper in 2000. 
 
Our future defence force948 was the Howard government’s second major defence policy 
document and solidified many of the ideas which had taken hold within defence since 
Australia’s strategic policy. It introduced the term ‘capability edge’ into the popular 
defence vernacular and announced that ‘Australia’s defence planning should aim to 
provide our forces with a clear margin of superiority against any credible adversary.’949 
The 2000 white paper was also separated technology from other capabilities and treated it 
as a discrete capability area. After 9/11 defence policy took a rapid turn away from self-
reliance and toward expeditionary operations. The defence updates in 2003, 2005 and 
2007, 950  took Australia further from fundamental DOA concepts and emphasised 
                                                 
946 Ian McLachlan,  Australia's Strategic Policy 2 December 1997. 
947 Ibid. 
948 Department of Defence, Defence 2000: our future defence force 
949 Ibid. 5.39 
950 Department of Defence, Australia's national security, Defence update Canberra: Defence Publishing 
Service, 2003, Department of Defence, Australia's national security: Defence update 2005 
Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2005, Department of Defence, Australia's national security, 
Defence update Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2007 
Conclusion 
  
 
 
 
 
327 
 
interoperability and coalition operations as a driver of capability development.951 It was 
not until the next change of government that defence policy would be directed back 
toward the conceptualisation of technological edge within the context of the defence of 
Australia. 
 
In the lead up to the 2009 Defence white paper, Force 2030: Defending Australia in the 
Asia-Pacific century, Defence undertook wide community consultation. This consultation 
process found that a majority of respondents supported the maintenance of a capability 
edge for the ADF in three areas: technology, information and training. The community 
consultation program also reported broad support for further investment in high-
technology force enablers, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets 
and electronic warfare systems.952 The subsequent white paper used the phrase strategic 
capability advantage to illustrate the new government’s conception of relative 
advantage.953  The 2009 white paper overtly prioritised investment in the exploitation and 
application of ‘new advanced technologies’954 in order to mitigate some of Australia’s 
strategic limitations.955 It also, quite controversially, linked Australia’s strategic concerns 
to Chinas rise, sending strong signals to the international community about Australia’s 
ongoing commitment to international security. By this point, Australia’s declared 
intentions related more to acquiring communication technologies to enhance coordination 
between force elements rather than strictly the material advantage of specific platforms. 
                                                 
951 Howard, John Winston, Keynote address:  Australia's security agenda 26 September 2006.; Robert Hill. 
Australia to Join Strike Fighter Program 27 June 2002. 
952 Department of Defence, Looking over the horizon: Australians  Defence: pp.13-17 
953 Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific century: Force 2030, para 8.53; see also 
Department of Defence, Defence 2000: our future defence force 
954 Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific century: Force 2030, para 8.57 
955 Ibid., para 8.54 
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Conceptual change 
The concept of relative advantage has changed significantly throughout its short history. 
It began as a limited concept, tied heavily to Australia’s need to be seen as credible 
alongside the declining presence of its major power allies in the region. It then broadened 
to include the technological level, which saw Australia as empowered by its industrial 
capacity and focused on the capacity for rapid expansion to a high-technology terminal 
force. In the DOA period, technology was no longer primarily viewed as a base for 
expansion and became an integral component of how Australia would conduct strategic 
denial in order to demonstrate a credible self-reliant capacity for defence. After the RMA, 
capability advantage related to the capacity to conduct and coordinate joint operations to 
substantially increase the sum of the ADF’s parts. 
 
The evolution of relative advantage parallels several other factors in Australia’s defence 
policy and strategic environment. The technological level concept emphasised Australia’s 
industrial base as a means for rapid expansion and sustainment of forces when Australia 
found itself more isolated from its great power allies than it ever had been. Self-reliance 
and technological level were closely intertwined during the 1970s, with Australia’s 
credibility pinned to it technology and industrial capacity. As Australia developed and 
restructured the ADF its confidence grew. The self-reinforcing mantra that Australia was 
a credible independent military power helped to assuage fears that the regional security 
environment was more foreboding than in previous decades. By the late 1970s credible 
self-reliance and relative advantage became discrete, although mutually reinforcing, 
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policy concepts. Australia became more concerned with using technology to maintain a 
force-in-being with greater strategic weight than a low technology ADF would have. 
 
Until this point technology had been viewed as a means to mitigate constraints on 
Australia’s strategic potential and to qualitatively improve the ADF than about industrial 
capacity for expansion, although expansion was still an integral aspect of the core force 
concept. In the late 1970s and early 1980s technology was viewed more as a basis for the 
rapid expansion of the ADF from its core of competencies and capabilities to a much 
larger terminal force which could assume any number of configurations depending on the 
type of threats which emerged. The core force concept faced significant challenges in 
implementation, though. Critics contended that the prospect of multi-path expansion 
made the force-in-being an unreliable basis for expansion to an unknown terminal force 
structure. In response to this problem, the government made significant changes to the 
conceptual basis 956  for its force structure planning and came to view technological 
advantage relative to the Southeast Asian region as an imperative precondition for 
Australia’s defence. After the Dibb Review and the 1987 defence white paper, relative 
advantage became focused on maintaining superior military technologies in the region. 
 
In addition, the concept of defence self-reliance became the key ordering principle for 
force structure planning and Australia’s force posture changed to reflect an increasing 
willingness to use force to shape the immediate neighbourhood and to deny Australia’s 
northern approaches, including the air and maritime gap, to potential adversaries. After 
the end of the Cold War it quickly became apparent that the Asia-Pacific region was 
                                                 
956 Dibb, "The Conceptual Basis of Australia's Defence Planning and Force Structure Development." 
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experiencing a boom in productivity which was being translated into military 
modernisation programs which Australia would not be able to match. Australia still had a 
large technological lead, but the platforms being ordered by regional militaries suggested 
that the gap was closing. As the latest generation of technology is often much more 
expensive to develop and acquire than previous generations, Australia faced a significant 
challenge in maintaining a technological lead in the region across a balanced force. It 
faced another problem in that modernisation would lead to militaries with similar, 
although not directly comparable, quality but also with a larger quantity of systems, 
eroding Australia’s capability advantage. 
 
Australia’s first step to remedy this situation was to prioritise specific capabilities in 
which it would retain a technological lead. The second step was to invest in RMA 
technologies which would not only improve individual weapons and platforms, but which 
would increase the effectiveness of the joint force. In some ways, the change to NCW 
planning was predicated on a lack of capacity to retain a purely material edge and by the 
entrenchment of the political idea that Australia required an advantage in the region to 
maintain a credible capacity to defend itself. It was also an incremental progression of 
institutional forces ranging from inter-service sensitivities about budget apportionment, a 
tendency to supplant retiring equipment with the most advanced affordable replacements 
and a policy paradigm which hosted several narratives which validated the acquisition of 
superior high technology capabilities. Interestingly, this aspect of relative advantage has 
not changed – what began as an attempt to demonstrate credibility became a staple of 
defence policy and is now a fundamental principle of Australian defence policy. 
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Drivers of change 
Strategic policy is, like all other matters of state control, primarily public policy. Despite 
being afforded a certain degree of additional latitude for security reasons, strategic policy 
is subject to the same fundamental pressures and forms of scrutiny as other facets of 
public policy.957 As such, domestic policy impetus played a significant role in shaping 
strategic policy narratives, including changes to the use of the concept of relative 
advantage in policy discourse. The foundation of domestic policy drivers was the 
overarching narrative of national progress from the 1970s onwards. Until the late 1960s 
Australia’s past had been widely written as a story of progress and achievement. It 
recounted a narrative of overcoming challenges which were often considered to be 
uniquely Australian in nature and linked heavily to Australia’s geography and political 
circumstances. This history created a common sense of progress in both past and future 
terms, creating what Sullivan has described as ‘a vision of endless improvement.’958 
 
From the early 1970s, Australian political actors had to contend with a loss of consensus 
regarding their society’s view of its own national past as well as the directions it ought to 
take in the future. The coincidence of the Vietnam War and the Whitlam Government’s 
election and dismissal created a turbulent domestic political environment in which 
changes to strategic policy occurred. The Australian electorate had developed deep-seated 
concerns about the government’s ability to maintain the momentum of past generations 
and over time political actors became much more attuned to issues of communication and 
                                                 
957  Ronald J. Stupak and Thomas C. Hone, "National Security and Domestic Policy-Making: The 
Similarities and the Critical Differences," International Journal of Public Administration 15, no. 7 
(1992). 
958 Sullivan, "Policy Debates in Federal Election Campaigns, 1972-96," 15. 
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credibility alongside issues of policy substance.959 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the 
political landscape was often dominated by a slow contest between visions of Australia’s 
future as a globalised society as opposed to a view of the future largely resembling the 
past. The political struggle between camps which Kelly has termed globalists and anti-
globalists came to define much of the substance of major domestic debates between 
individual political actors and the parties they represented.960 The first decade of the 
twenty-first century cemented the previously contested notion of a more global Australia. 
Political perceptions of Australia becoming a more internationally active society were 
further reinforced by the combination of an economic boom underpinned by international 
trade and a renewed focus on international politics and security after 9/11. 
 
The ideas which became embedded in Australian politics in the late-twentieth century 
were often settled through argument, deliberation and reinterpretation.961Those political 
concepts which have been taken for granted, used to communicate with electorates and 
exogenous entities, debated and conceptually altered through their use have not been 
changed by political philosophers but by practitioners. Lovejoy argues that it has been 
political utility which has driven adoption and change of political concepts. Rather than 
altruism or internal consistency, political actors have pursued ideas which are 
advantageous or effective.962 The implication being that political ideas can change rapidly 
to suit particular circumstances and, as Lovejoy notes: 
 
                                                 
959 Ibid. 
960 Kelly, "The Politics of Economic Change in Australia in the 1980s and 1990s." 
961 Peter Loveday, "Australian Political Thought. " The Pieces of Politics, ed. Richard Lucy. Melbourne: 
Macmillan, 1979, 23 
962 Ibid. 
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What is advantageous in one situation may not be in another; what a party leader tells his 
members in the party press or conference is often different from what he tells the public 
in general. It depends on the beliefs and power of the audience and what is wanted from 
[the political idea].
963
 
 
This is an important consideration for the study of the evolution of relative advantage 
because it links specific observable changes in the Australian strategic policy discourse 
with a more general trend in domestic politics. Moreover, it shows that many political 
ideas in Australian policy discourses, used either expressively and instrumentally, have 
been both enduring and malleable. 964 
 
These characteristics are similarly present in the evolution of relative advantage. 
Throughout the period 1968-2009 significant changes in the relationship between the 
concepts of advantage and credibility arose from dominant perceptions of Australia’s 
strategic circumstances, security interests and force structure planning priorities. The 
drivers of conceptual evolution largely relate to the ways in which events and issues were 
interpreted and narrativised by policy actors. It is important to note that this study has 
examined the evolution of relative advantage as it occurred. This does not suggest that the 
evolution followed a logical or linear process. Rather, the process of evolution reflects the 
interaction of ideas and actors in an ongoing political debate. The contestation of ideas, 
the changeover of power from particular individuals to others and a wide range of 
exogenous events all influenced the evolution of the edge to some extent. 
 
The evolution of relative advantage during the period 1968-2009 reflected changing 
political imperatives to employ the policy idea in different ways in order to dominate 
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strategic policy discourse in a variety of contexts and for different purposes. Primary 
drivers of change for relative advantage were related to political needs rather than strict 
and internally-consistent policy impetus. In particular, politicians have utilised relative 
advantage as a dominant discourse in defence debates to reflect and often legitimate 
political goals relating to: changing policy contexts, and in particular changes to the scope 
of Australia's strategic ambitions and the referent actor(s) of relative advantage; strategic 
concepts, especially exogenous institutional ideas which changed and where relative 
advantage changed to reflect them, such as ideas about force posturing, military options 
and the way technology should be used to enhance military capability; and different 
communication needs, particularly the need to send different signals to various audiences 
to facilitate other policy objectives. 
 
Therefore, relative advantage has been both descriptive and prescriptive, but has largely 
described decisions made for a range of reasons not necessarily limited to technological 
necessity. It was clearly used for purposes beyond force structure panning and especially 
as a tool to reassure internal and external audiences of Australia’s capacity to contribute 
to allies and to defend itself unaided against a credible threat. Relative advantage also has 
signs of being a discourse trap insofar as it has created an expectation, as demonstrated by 
the 2008 defence community consultation program, 965  that Australia will retain a 
technological lead over regional militaries even as they modernise and that the ADF 
needs to field the most advanced capabilities practically available to it in order to defend 
Australia and its interests. Although governments have mentioned the human, doctrinal 
and training aspects of the ADF’s lead over regional militaries, which are significant, 
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these statements have largely been lost to the dominant narrative of maintain a cutting 
edge defence force. Our Future Defence Force made the particularly insightful judgment 
that 
Wherever technology developments lead us, in the final analysis, people carry out 
military tasks so it is important that we continue to attach top priority to the human 
aspects of technology in warfare.
966
 
 
However, this statement was not sufficient to challenge the technological framing of 
Australia’s ability to defend itself which had by then been building momentum within the 
defence discourse for more than three decades. 
 
This conceptual framing occurred in three distinct phases. The first was the link between 
credibility and technological advantage which was established in the early 1970s. This 
cemented the notion that technology mitigated strategic deficiencies in Australia’s 
defence policy paradigm. While the ways in which technology has been construed as the 
silver bullet for Australia’s circumstances have change dramatically over the decades, the 
general principle has remained inviolate. The second phase was the gradual entrenchment 
of the principle that Australia must have a relative qualitative advantage. This created a 
narrative of confidence based on a condition of superiority. The quality of the ADF was 
consistently measured against other militaries and was rarely considered against objective 
standards of what was necessary for defence. This logic is built into the approach to 
capabilities-based defence planning that Australia adopted in the 1980s and is not 
necessarily problematic in itself, but it does help to explain the evolution of relative 
advantage. The third phase was the explicit link between technology and quality which 
occurred in the late 1980s and 1990s. The RMA brought with it a host of positive rhetoric 
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about how it would offer unparalleled advantages to technologically advanced militaries. 
The conflation of technology and quality also conceptually mapped the technological 
edge, which had changed significantly from its origins, back onto credibility. 
 
These processes have created a conceptual trap in which expectations of Australia’s 
defence policy risk becoming untenable but have been a fundamental tenet of the 
dominant defence narrative for so long that it will be a serious challenge to change the 
discourse to accommodate new realities. This is not to argue that relative advantage is 
inherently undesirable. It is most certainly an attractive option in its own right. However, 
this is a cautionary tale insofar as there remains exceptional risk of incurring enormous 
expenses in pursuit of an objective that developed it gravitas in a different policy era. As 
Australia’s strategic circumstances continue to change policy-makers would be ill-
advised to succumb to a discourse trap founded on an institutional idea which may no 
longer be relevant. In light of the uncertainty posed by the twenty first century strategic 
environment, relative advantage may be a useful idea until it is not.  
 
Implications 
This study has examined the evolution of the concept of strategic capability advantage 
from the first instances of Australia’s now decades-long experience of defence self-
reliance. It has found that the concept of relative advantage espoused in various forms 
throughout that period has been used inconsistently and has been conceptually altered by 
exogenous policy impetus and external strategic factors. At the same time, the central, 
and essentially normative, idea that Australia ought to have a clear capability edge 
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relative to the Southeast Asian region has become entrenched in defence thinking. This is 
demonstrated in strategic policy, bureaucratic terminology, Ministerial statements and in 
the wider community, including think tank policy analysis, media reporting, and the 
Australian public’s expectations from the Commonwealth government. The ideational 
role of relative advantage was quite powerful within the Defence Organisation and across 
the wider defence policy community. It legitimated force structure planning and 
capability acquisition decisions which were rationalised very differently by the Defence 
bureaucracy. It also created a narrative for explaining Australia’s conception of defending 
itself militarily, providing support to its claims to credibility and to encouraging positive 
perceptions of national security and defence self-reliance in the public. 
 
Relative advantage has been a powerful policy idea and a dominant narrative of 
Australian defence policy for much of its history. However, the logical extension of 
relative advantage in the twenty first century is an expectation that Australia should 
maintain a strategic capability advantage. This is concerning because Australia’s ability to 
maintain a qualitative and technological lead in Southeast Asia faces increasing 
uncertainty at the economic development and military modernisation of regional countries 
increases.967 Contrary to popular expectations, Australia is losing the edge it has enjoyed 
in the region for the last four decades. Australia has not had to seriously reconsider the 
basis of its engagement with the region during the period 1968-2009 because the answer 
has seemed obvious. Although Australia has not dominated Southeast Asia, it has been 
the most powerful individual economy and military in the region. As a consequence, 
Australia has been in a favourable position to provide for its own security and to 
                                                 
967  Defence Intelligence Organisation, "Defence Economic Trends in the Asia-Pacific 2010." Defence 
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contribute to the security of others. As regional militaries modernise, become more 
capable and develop doctrine and sustainment protocols, they will in combination, if not 
individually in some cases, eclipse Australia’s capacity to retain a capability edge. 
 
This process is already under way and it will increasingly challenge a political idea which 
has become a principal element of defence force structure planning, a core measure of the 
standard of the ADF and a key expectation of the Australian public. Such challenge will 
undermine a dominant defence policy narrative which reflects, explains and justifies 
Australia’s approach to maintaining and equipping the military, planning for the defence 
of the country and for setting shared expectations of security and military power. This 
will require conceptual change to counter; change which interrupts the line of reasoning 
that leads Australia towards potential self-entrapment by linking the both the ADFs 
credibility as a fighting force and Australia’s credibility as a strategic actor to a waning 
capacity to maintain relative advantage in the region. The first step in further 
transforming the political and institutional idea of relative advantage is questioning some 
of the fundamental assumptions about the narratives which frame Australia’s credibility 
and which idealise an ADF which is cutting edge. Understanding the history of the idea of 
relative advantage will help overcome the shock of losing the edge and may assist in 
realigning Australia’s approach to defence policy in the twenty-first century. 
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Appendix A: Codebook 
The coding scheme used in the thesis is based on the above three core variables, dealing 
with policy context, strategic concepts and strategic signalling. Each of the variables 
represents one major node in the coding scheme, with each of these major nodes being the 
top of a three level node hierarchy. Each major node is broken down into three 
subordinate nodes and each subordinate node has a number of nodes below it, ranging 
from two to six, which represent attributes of each subordinate node. provides an 
explanation of the node hierarchy and a brief explanation of the concept or information 
that each node represents. 
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Table 8: QDA Coding Scheme 
Node Levels Description 
Concept 
The kinds of strategic concepts/ideas used in 
defence and strategic policy documents or 
statements (used to demonstrate relationships 
between policy ideas and relative advantage). 
 
Edge 
The kind of 'edge' postulated and the role that 
technology is thought to play in facilitating an 
edge 
  Coordination 
Network Centric Warfare and 
information/knowledge edge 
  Core force 
Technology as a basis for a core force or a 
force-in-being 
  Expansion 
The technological level as a base for (multi-
path) expansion into a terminal force 
  Material 
A material technological edge (including force 
multiplication). 
 
Posture  
Force posture and force structure signalling, 
including signalling of intentions/interests and 
dominant force structure considerations 
  Contingencies 
Force structure planning for ‘credible 
contingencies’ of armed aggression against 
Australia 
  Core Force 
Force structure priorities that emphasise a core 
force as an expansion base for a terminal force 
  Denial 
Force structure planning that emphasises a clear 
deterrent (controlling the threat environment) 
  Expeditionary 
Force structure planning that emphasises 
expeditionary capabilities and/or 
complementarity with allies for forward 
deployment 
  Self-Reliance 
Force structure principles which emphasise self-
reliance in the defence of Australia 
  SSTR 
Force structure for low-intensity regional 
stability and/or humanitarian operations 
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 Rationale  
The technological (or political) rationale for 
tech edge 
  Cutting edge 
Reference to having high technology military 
weapons/systems in absolute terms 
  Industry 
Reference to the role of or the need to support 
the Australian defence industry to supply high-
technology equipment/systems. 
  Mitigating 
Tech-advantage discussed with reference to 
mitigating cost or quantity disadvantages 
  Relative 
Capability and/or military technology discussed 
with reference to relative advantage 
Policy 
Context 
  
The policy context in which relative advantage 
was expressed across time 
 
CA  
Key terms/concepts employed (for content 
analysis and KWIC purposes) 
  Advantage 
Use of the term or concept of relative advantage 
or an 'edge' 
  Capability 
Reference to military capability (capacity) or 
capabilities 
  Technology Reference to technology or technological level 
 Referent  
referent actor with regard to relative capability 
and/or material resources (inferring that 
relativity is a concern) 
  Great Powers 
Reference to maintaining a technological level 
relative to great power alliance partners and/or 
major powers 
  Indonesia 
Anywhere that Indonesia is referred to explicitly 
or inferred as a separate actor to the rest of the 
neighbourhood and/or wider region. 
 Neighbourhood 
Actors within the ‘inner arc’ often termed 
Australia's ‘immediate regional neighbourhood’ 
in policy documents 
  Regional 
Regional actors (wider Asia-Pacific region) 
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Policy 
Scope 
 
The scope of Australia's strategic interests and 
signalled intentions for the acquisition and use 
of military capability 
  DoA 
Any strategic objective related to the 
security/defence of Australia 
  Global 
Expeditionary operations and/or 
complementarity with allies for the purpose of 
conducting coalition warfare 
  Regional 
Regional scope of strategic objectives - stability, 
security, credibility 
Signals   
Reference to defence interests, force posture and 
capability edge in public statements/documents 
intended to signal/communicate a message to an 
audience. 
 Deterrence  
Signals sent to potential adversaries to 
emphasise Australia's military capability in 
order to dissuade or deter military action against 
Australia or its interests 
  
Force 
Employment 
Deterrence based on the employment of force 
elements - i.e. force multipliers, doctrine and 
training advantages as well as enhanced co-
ordination offered by advanced C4ISR(EW) 
  Platform 
Deterrence based purely on the qualitative 
capability advantage associated with specific 
platforms 
Reassurance  
signals intended to reassure allies and (regional) 
security partners 
  Credible Ally 
A credible security partner (an ADF able to 
deter aggressors and offer support in time of 
war) 
  Response 
Crisis response (SSTR, humanitarian and 
internal stability support) 
  
Support 
 
 
Loan/use of niche equipment/skills and training 
(i.e. intel/logistical support) 
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 Validation  
Signals intended to validate relative advantage 
to domestic audiences 
  Justification 
Justification for significant public expenditure 
 
  Morale 
Morale and nationalism (qualitatively superior 
force) 
  Security 
The perception of security provided by a high-
tech ADF 
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Appendix B: Data sheets 
This section provides the data sheets used to validate the coding scheme. For each of the 
three main variables there is a simple frequency data sheet with a graph and table. This 
shows the aggregate coding for the secondary nodes below a main variable separated into 
periods. There is also a detailed frequency chart with a data table for each variable which 
shows the coding frequency of tertiary nodes. For each node there are four bars which 
show the change in frequency across periods. 
 
One possible criticism of this approach is that the data are presented in whole numbers 
and not as a proportion of speeches or coding from a particular era, which may not be an 
appropriate comparison as the total body of data in each period is not the same. However, 
the data are presented in direct comparison precisely because the body of information 
they are drawn from is not finite or limited. Although some periods produced more 
documents and statements than others, this was due to a deliberate choice of actors 
involved and that choice forms part of the data set because it influences the amount of 
communicative behaviour in the discourse. In simple terms, each period had roughly the 
same opportunity to engage in the defence discourse through documents and statements, 
so the amount of available data is based primarily on policy actors’ decisions. Choosing 
to say nothing is still a choice. As such, each period can be fairly compared in absolute, 
not relative, figures. 
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Figure 1: Variable 1 simple coding frequency 
 
 
 Period 1 
(1968-1978) 
Period 2 
(1979-1986) 
Period 3 
(1987-1996) 
Period 4 
(1997-2009) 
CA 277 339 654 873 
Referent 298 214 280 375 
Scope 200 158 270 321 
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Figure 2: Variable 1 detailed coding frequency 
 
 
 Period 1 
(1968-1978) 
Period 2 
(1979-1986) 
Period 3 
(1987-1996) 
Period 4 
(1997-2009) 
Advantage 10 29 48 60 
Capability 201 262 481 663 
Technology 109 110 205 308 
Great Powers 164 138 98 176 
Indonesia 59 29 60 110 
Neighbourhood 53 36 47 47 
Regional 131 106 182 198 
DoA 49 54 71 46 
Global 53 61 92 137 
Regional 143 93 174 228 
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Figure 3: Variable 2 simple coding frequency 
 
 
 Period 1 
(1968-1978) 
Period 2 
(1979-1986) 
Period 3 
(1987-1996) 
Period 4 
(1997-2009) 
Edge 59 55 87 160 
Posture 189 235 330 317 
Rationale 157 118 242 197 
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Figure 4: Variable 2 detailed coding frequency 
 
 
 Period 1 
(1968-1978) 
Period 2 
(1979-1986) 
Period 3 
(1987-1996) 
Period 4 
(1997-2009) 
Coordination 25 37 47 124 
Core force 14 9 14 12 
Expansion 11 8 23 14 
Material 13 9 14 23 
Contingencies 51 49 82 99 
Core Force 22 12 18 8 
Denial 19 45 47 42 
Expeditionary 69 35 45 117 
Self-Reliance 55 108 111 26 
SSTR 41 34 80 113 
Cutting edge 42 34 75 46 
Industry 89 70 93 97 
Mitigating 24 18 24 22 
Relative 25 25 80 65 
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Variable 2: Concepts
Period 1 (1968-1978) Period 2 (1979-1986) Period 3 (1987-1996) Period 4 (1997-2009)
Appendices 
  
 
 
 
 
350 
 
Figure 5: Variable 3 simple coding frequency 
 
 
 Period 1 
(1968-1978) 
Period 2 
(1979-1986) 
Period 3 
(1987-1996) 
Period 4 
(1997-2009) 
Deterrence 46 41 60 59 
Reassurance 219 210 228 297 
Validation 98 75 108 87 
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Figure 6: Variable 3 detailed coding frequency 
 
 
 Period 1 
(1968-1978) 
Period 2 
(1979-1986) 
Period 3 
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Period 4 
(1997-2009) 
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Appendix C: Data tables 
Table 9: 1968-1978 Referent coding 
Great Powers Regional Indonesia Neighbourhood 
127 80 40 34 
 
Table 10: 1968-1978 Policy scope coding 
Regional DOA Global 
102 38 14 
 
Table 11: 1968-1978 Edge coding 
Coordination Core Force Expansion Material 
6 11 11 9 
 
Table 12: 1968-1978 Force posture coding 
Contingencies Core Force Denial Expeditionary Self-Reliance SSTR 
32 21 12 50 51 15 
 
Table 13: 1968-1978 Rationale coding 
Cutting edge Industry Mitigating Relative 
38 72 19 7 
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Table 14: 1968-1978 Deterrence coding 
Force Employment Platform 
22 9 
Table 15:1968-1978 Reassurance coding 
Credible ally Response Support 
180 12 40 
 
Table 16: 1968-1978 Validation coding 
Justification Morale Security 
56 33 26 
 
Table 17: 1979-1986 Referent coding 
Great Powers Regional Neighbourhood Indonesia 
96 55 18 9 
 
Table 18: 1979-1986 Policy scope coding 
Regional DOA Global 
55 41 19 
 
Table 19: 1979-1986 Edge coding 
Coordination Core force Expansion Material 
20 6 8 7 
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Table 20: 1979-1986 Force posture coding 
Contingencies Core Force Denial Expeditionary Self-Reliance SSTR 
28 11 40 13 103 11 
 
Table 21: 1979-1986 Rationale coding 
Cutting edge Industry Mitigating Relative 
29 53 13 6 
 
Table 22: 1979-1986 Deterrence coding 
Force Employment Platform 
26 14 
 
Table 23: 1979-1986 Reassurance coding 
Credible ally Response Support 
194 8 45 
 
Table 24: 1979-1986 Validation coding 
Justification Morale Security 
50 22 21 
 
Table 25: 1987-1996 Referent coding 
Regional Great Powers Indonesia Neighbourhood 
  109 47 34 26 
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Table 26: 1987-1996 Policy scope coding 
Regional DOA Global 
117 52 37 
 
 Table 27: 1987-1996 Edge coding 
Coordination Core force Expansion Material 
23 11 21 9 
 
Table 28: 1987-1996 Force posture coding 
Contingencies Core Force Denial Expeditionary Self-Reliance SSTR 
50 17 38 17 106 50 
 
Table 29: 1987-1996 Rationale coding 
Cutting edge Industry Mitigating Relative 
66 75 16 50 
 
Table 30: 1987-1996 Deterrence coding 
Force Employment Platform 
36 23 
 
Table 31: 1987-1996 Reassurance coding 
Credible ally Response Support 
201 22 37 
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Table 32: 1987-1996 Validation coding 
Justification Morale Security 
50 38 37 
 
Table 33: 1997-2009 Referents 
Great Powers Regional Neighbourhood Indonesia 
176 110 47 198 
 
Table 34: 1997-2009 Policy scope coding 
Regional DOA Global 
228 46 137 
 
Table 35: 1997-2009 Edge coding 
Coordination Core force Expansion Material 
124 12 14 23 
 
Table 36: 1997-2009 Force posture coding 
Contingencies Core Force Denial Expeditionary Self-Reliance SSTR 
99 8 42 117 26 113 
 
Table 37: 1997-2009 Rationale coding 
Cutting edge Industry Mitigating Relative 
46 97 22 65 
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Table 38: 1997-2009 Deterrence coding 
Force Employment Platform 
34 23 
 
Table 39: 1997-2009 Reassurance coding 
Credible ally Response Support 
267 21 35 
 
Table 40: 1997-2009 Validation coding 
Justification Morale Security 
38 31 23 
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